The Emerging Peace and Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa: Prospects and Challenges
AFRICA, 17 Jan 2011
Alemayehu Fentaw – TRANSCEND Media Service
Abstract
This paper looks at the Horn of Africa as a regional security complex. It attempts to consider the new Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace and Security Strategy as laying the foundation for the emerging peace and security architecture for the sub-region and subjects it to critical scrutiny. In so doing, it appraises the prospects and challenges facing the nascent peace and security architecture in the Horn of Africa.
Introduction
Many a seasoned observer of the Horn of Africa has all along been skeptical about the emergence of a viable supra-national organization that will realize the building of a regional peace and security architecture in the not too distant future. Most, if not all, of them, however, insist that the Horn has to be approached as a ‘regional security complex’ (Healy 2008:42). A regional security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns are so closely intertwined that their national securities cannot meaningfully be understood in isolation from one another or a scenario in which security threats to any one state of the region has serious security repercussions on the rest (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Waever, 2003). The concept is predicated upon what Buzan calls patterns of amity and enmity among states. Patterns of amity and enmity are shaped by a multiplicity of factors. These include territorial disputes, cross-border ethnic distribution, ideological orientations, suspicion and fear and long standing historical links of genuine friendship and expectations of protection or support. A defining feature of a regional security complex, therefore, is interdependence, be it conflictual or cooperative. In short, a security complex may exist where there is a high level of mutually felt insecurity among two or more regional states. Similarly, a high degree of mutual trust and friendship can also demarcate the boundaries of a security complex. Security complexes emphasize the interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared interests. On this account, external relations between the states of the region support and sustain the conflicts within the states of the region in a systemic way. The different conflicts interlock with and feed into each other, determining regional external relations that exacerbate conflicts.
A “black hole” is a term coined by Richard Falk to account for the disintegration of nation states or ‘nation-state projects’ in the context of global change. Black holes or their threat lead to regional security crises as has already become a reality in countries such as the former Yugoslavia in East Europe, Sri Lanka in South Asia, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Africa and is a threat to many more (Hettne and Andras 1994). This paper looks at the eruption of black holes in Somalia and the Sudan within the Horn of Africa security complex and the conflict resolution mechanisms used by IGAD to deal with the problems resulting from the black hole. It is submitted that the intervention mechanisms used in these cases were ad hoc while the emerging peace and security architecture promises an institutionalized mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.
Sally Healy, Chatham House’s Horn of Africa specialist, drew particular attention to the need for a regional approach to security in the Horn by way of logical inference, albeit she dismissed it as practically unlikely. Alex de Waal, another prominent Horn specialist, chimes in tune with Healy. ‘The political conditions for . . . the building of a robust sub-regional architecture for peace and security,’ writes de Waal, “have not existed and do not appear imminent.’ He points out ‘credible democratization in the largest states of the region, a resolution to internal conflicts, a stable sub-regional inter-state order, autonomous and capable multilateral institutions, and benign engagement by the dominant superpower, namely the US’ (de Waal, 2007: 1) as necessary political conditions absent from the region. The prospects, however, of achieving a regional approach does not appear to be as bleak as Healy or de Waal thought, given that the determined efforts that IGAD has undertaken to launch a 5-year Peace and Security Strategy (2010-2014) can reasonably be expected to bear fruits by the end of the term. At this juncture, it has to be borne in mind that a full-fledged, robust, and comprehensive regional peace and security structure can never emerge in the short-run.
Structure of the Nascent Peace and Security Architecture
Peace and security have become priority issues not only for the African continent, but also for the regional economic communities (RECs). In 1996, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda established the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to take over from what used to be the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was founded in 1986 to coordinate the efforts of the Member States in combating desertification and drought, with expanded mandate in economic cooperation as well as peace and security. What accounts, in part for, IGAD’s revitalization is ‘[t]he realization of the member states on the limitations of self-help approach and their recognition to the need of a regional approach’ (IGAD 2010: 5).[1] Eritrea has withdrawn from IGAD since 2007, because of its objections to IGAD’s support for Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in 2006.
The revitalized and re-invigorated IGAD launched its project to build a Peace and Security Strategy for the Horn of Africa in 2003 when the IGAD Heads of State and Government Summit entrusted the Secretariat with the task of drawing up a comprehensive regional peace and security strategy. Particularly, the IGAD Division of Peace and Security was mandated to coordinate the development of the regional peace and security strategy. To this end, the IGAD Secretariat organized a kick-off conference in Khartoum on 1st of October 2005. At a workshop in Mombasa in July 2007 thematic issues were identified for research and recommendations emerged for a Mediation Support and Facilitation Unit as part of the IGAD Peace and Security Division. Having identified the thematic issues to be researched, IGAD has commissioned several studies and called two stakeholders’ workshop and one experts’ roundtable to validate the studies and elicit critical inputs to the peace and security strategy. Of the thematic issues on which the experts deliberated in the two-day roundtable in Djibouti in February 2008, the following figured in prominently: border demarcation of IGAD member states and its implications, cross border economic cooperation in the IGAD region, landlocked states’ access to the sea, cross boundary water resource management, and cross border cooperation on countering terrorism. IGAD also conducted a workshop on the Peace and Security Strategy on 13th and 14th of March, 2009.
The general aim of the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy is ‘to achieve sustainable peace and security for the attainment of economic integration and development in the IGAD Region.’ To this end, it has identified four strategic priorities:
a. Strengthen and streamline conflict prevention, management and resolution in the IGAD Region;
b. Strengthen preventive (track 2) diplomacy in the IGAD Region;
c. Promote cooperation to address emerging common peace and security threats relating to terrorism, maritime security, organized crime and security sector reform within the IGAD Region;
d. Enhance cooperation in other areas incidental to peace and security including environmental protection, disaster prevention, management and response, transit corridor management and management of trans-boundary water resources, energy resources and prevention management and resolution of challenges relating to refugees and internally displaced persons. (IGAD 2010:6)
The new IGAD Peace and Security Strategy focuses on the peace and security of the Horn’s communities, the states and the region itself and is premised on the principles of respect for international law, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, rejection of the use of force to resolve problems, equitable utilization of trans-boundary resources, respect for territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, and respect for colonial borders. Besides, the strategy presupposes such operational principles as subsidiarity, interest convergence, constructivism and incrementalism in the course of its implementation.[2] The strategy is guided by an underpinning consideration to turn vulnerabilities into opportunities of mutual cooperation for regional peace and security. (8)
The emerging IGAD peace and security architecture fits within the broader frameworks of the United Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which imposed on member states the obligation to participate in advancing international collective security, as well as the IGAD Agreement. According to Article 7(g) of the IGAD Agreement, IGAD’s objective is to ‘[p]romote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-State conflicts through dialogue’ (IGAD 1996). Article 18(a) stipulates that ‘Member states shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress.’
Accordingly Member States shall:
a) take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation peace and stability;
b) establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for pacific settlement of differences and disputes;
c) accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations. (Id)
The emerging IGAD peace and security architecture comprises of the following components to achieve its goals:
- IGAD Program of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR)
- Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)
- Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs)
- IGAD Civil Society Forum(IGAD-CSO Forum)
- IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IGAD-IPU)
- IGAD Women’s Desk
- IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT),
- Policy Framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)
- Panel of the Wise
- Mediation Support Unit (MSU)
That said, I shall attempt to portray, albeit in broad strokes, elements of the new IGAD Peace and Security Strategy[3]. The Strategy, under its Strategic Action Priority I, envisages drafting, endorsement, and execution of three major protocols, namely, Protocol on Demobilization and Disarmament, Protocol on Non-Aggression, and Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. It also envisages a thorough overhaul and revision of CEWARN’s competence as well as legal and institutional framework in such a manner as to boost its capability to monitor not only pastoral but also other forms of conflicts; and the full operationalization of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) in all IGAD member states.
As part of its Strategic Action Priority II, the Strategy envisions the setting up and running of a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and framework, including a roster of mediators and a Panel of the Wise; and an institutional and normative framework for Track II/Preventive diplomacy, including enhancing the roles of the IGAD-CSOs Forum and the IGAD-IPU in preventive diplomacy.
The Strategy, under its Strategic Action Priority III, contemplates the revision, development, cooperation, and enhancement of a comprehensive institutional, programmatic and normative framework at regional level for combating terrorism, money laundering, trafficking in humans, drugs, and small arms, piracy, cyber crime, and intellectual property related crimes; as well as the promotion of security sector reform (SSR).
Under its Strategic Action Priority IV, the Strategy requires inter-sectoral collaboration among the various agencies/divisions of IGAD as well as close cooperation among member states on the development and promotion of normative framework, institutions, infrastructure, and capacity for regional disaster prevention, management and response; drawing up and executing a protocol on the management of shared water resources; promoting the conclusion of agreements between states for the use and management of transit corridors; promoting the ratification and implementation of AU Conventions relating to refugees and internally displaced persons; and enhancing sustainable environmental and natural resources management as well as equitable access to natural resources.
The existing IGAD organs, namely the Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors have been charged with the responsibility for implementing the Peace and Security Strategy.
Prospects of the Nascent Peace and Security Architecture
The emerging IGAD peace and security architecture promises a lot more mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in non-violent ways. IGAD, being one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that have been heralded as the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture, is expected to play a laudable role in leading the region towards economic and political integration as well as in improving the human security crisis the region has for long been facing. Although the Strategy lays down a framework for the emerging regional peace and security architecture and details will be developed in the course of its construction in the coming five years, however, it can safely be said that the architecture will provide a well-proportioned for human security, as the Strategy has at least recognized the problem of human insecurity.
A properly structured and well endowed regional peace and security architecture should include a mechanism by which member states can collectively anticipate and respond to external challenges to their maximum advantage. In this regard, even if the Strategy puts great emphasis on CEWARN, unfortunately, it, apart from making a passing mention, fails to provide for measures designed to expand EASBRIG’s mandate and boost its defense and/or peacekeeping capability. The proposed IGAD Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR Protocol) should allow EASBRIG to intervene in the internal affair of a member state on behalf of IGAD in the event of a serious and massive human rights violations; an unconstitutional change of government; or any other situation as may be decided by the concerned body. Since the Horn served as a theatre for proxy wars both during the Cold War and more recently in the US War on Terror, the region’s statesmen should not lose sight of the fact that external powers have good reason enough to engage in acts aiming at frustrating the attainment of the peace and security architecture as well as regional integration. The looming international competition over natural resources—such as fish in the waters off the coast of Somalia, the strategic waterway of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, oil in the Sudan, and the Nile River—promises a continued strategic interest and challenge from powers external to the IGAD states.
Within the emerging IGAD peace and security architecture, room must be made for anticipating and meeting the security challenges of the future. Recently, serious, gross, and systematic human rights violations, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, electoral violence, transitional justice, on- and off-shore terrorism, and the unlawful use of marine resources have emerged as key threats to human security in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the emerging peace and security architecture can provide powerful and effective tools for addressing these problems. Besides, the International Criminal Court and other special tribunals pose a challenge to peace-building efforts by IGAD. International criminal indictments are already playing a role in Uganda and Sudan.
After all, IGAD is the most important regional organization in the Horn of Africa. Despite the challenges, IGAD, in its efforts to contribute to regional peace and security, managed to broker peace processes for Somalia, leading to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government, in October 2004 and for Southern Sudan, leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in January 2005. All peace processes undertaken by IGAD, however, stalled when regional tensions came to play.
Whatever else will happen in the long run, IGAD’s proposed peace and security strategy would seem to have realized the fact that it cannot afford to overlook the modern approach to security that emphasizes the security of people and the nonmilitary dimensions of security; the creation of forums for mediation and arbitration; the reduction in force levels and military expenditure; and the ratification of key principles of international law governing inter-state relations. In other words, they have been endeavouring to understand security in ways that incorporate political, social, economic and environmental issues. The common security regime is, thus, supposed to provide an early warning of potential crisis, the building of military confidence and stability through disarmament and transparency, the negotiation of multilateral agreements and the peaceful management of conflict.
Challenges of the Nascent Peace and Security Architecture
First and foremost, it has to be borne in mind that the conflict-prone nature of the Horn of Africa is sufficient to frustrate endeavors to implement and complete the nascent regional peace and security architecture.
Second, as Alex de Waal rightly identified, there are six major political obstacles in the way of building a robust peace and security architecture for the Horn of Africa. To wit: (1) the lack of internal peace in most countries, (2) the fact that internal conflicts are rarely contained within the borders of one country, (3) the absence of a stable and consensual regional power order, (4) the disputed legitimacy of states and governments and the inability of democratic processes to provide that legitimacy, (5) dependency on foreign financiers and especially the US [and EU], and (6) the lack of autonomy of the key multilateral institutions.[4] In a recent talk, de Waal pointed out the absence of a sub-regional hegemon as a further obstacle to peace and security in the Horn of Africa, as opposed to other African sub-regional communities that can dish out role models such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which have found their regional hegemons in South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. These states can single-handedly support and drive the creation of new sub-regional institutions and even military interventions to create conditions conducive to peace and security. The fact that no single state in the Horn can command undivided hegemony, in terms of both hard and soft powers, over the rest of the region gave IGAD member states a disincentive for greater cooperation among themselves.
In other words, IGAD member states represent a split hegemon, with each possessing different forms of power, whether hard or soft. For example, Ethiopia has an edge in military power while Kenya has a comparative advantage in its economy. Sudan, being the largest country in the continent, recently tapped its oil reserves. Even tiny Djibouti has an advantage in its strategic location for the transshipment of seafaring cargo. No single IGAD state can overwhelm its neighbours through the use or threat of use of its hard power. Over time this balance of relative strengths may be an advantage if interdependency and cooperation can be mustered for a robust peace and security architecture that is not subject to the whims of a single hegemon.
In addition, the absence of prior experience in uniform securitization exercises among states of the Horn that would help determine involvement in collective security frameworks and balancing or bandwagoning behaviors further complicates the effort to appraise the probable prospects and challenges facing the emerging regional peace and security architecture.
Moreover, the emphasis on early warning in a stronger IGAD peace and security architecture in a way points to a serious problem that pervades early warning systems. While there are always many situations that send up warnings that could lead to a crisis, it is impossible to know in advance which warnings will actually result in a crisis. Good intelligence must be married to competent analytic capacity situations or being stymied in responding can compound failure rather than build support for IGAD.
The emerging peace and security architecture can only be as good as the on-the-spot decision-makers from the member states and their willingness to agree on political objectives to guide activities, including humanitarian and military operations in the Horn. In the words of Sally Healy: “The prospect of a shift to a new regional security order in the Horn of Africa is slim. Conflict is normal and deeply etched in the minds of the various leaderships. At the ‘centres’ of the stronger states – Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea –perceptions of security threats are largely the preserve of military and intelligence circles and remain set in traditional political and military moulds.“[5]
Furthermore, a robust and comprehensive regional peace and security architecture calls for the formulation of a Common Security and Foreign Policy for the Horn which delineates the member states’ collective responses to both internal and external security threats. Member states are expected first to harmonize their respective national security and foreign policy before they can reach a Common Security and Foreign Policy for the Horn. In order to ease the stresses and strains involved in exercises at working out the planks of such a regional policy and to make the transition smooth, the common policy can be worked out and agreed as between the ‘Core States of the Horn’, namely Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Sudan.
Financial constraints on the IGAD Secretariat and its member states have resulted in worthy initiatives that are articulated but not funded, as IGAD is mainly dependent on external donors to fund its activities. For instance, IGAD’s first AU authorized peacekeeping mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in 2006 failed to materialize mainly because of the inability of the member states and lack of external sources to meet the estimated cost of US dollars 335 million for the operation.[6] While outside donors have often come to the rescue, to maximize ownership and participation, IGAD must find ways to be self-supporting as well as self-initiating.
IGAD is not the only REC involving IGAD member states that is working on commitments and mechanisms for peace and security. There are overlapping mandates of RECs such as the East African Community (EAC), which embraces the eventual establishment of a political federation of its member states, but does not include all IGAD states, and Common Market of East and Southern African States (COMESA). In the words of Dr. Girmachew Alemu: “The overlapping membership of states in the various sub-regional communities weakens the ability of states in sub-regions to pull together their resources in building up relevant security institutions. [It] also causes potentially conflicting political commitment of states to opposing objectives of the various sub-regional organizations. Moreover, [It] can also be used by states to evade the responsibility to address specific security problems by claiming that responsibility lies with one or another sub-regional organization.”[7]
The Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, are members of the Arab League whilst such major states of the region as Uganda and Kenya, being members of the East African Community (EAC), seek to circumvent the regional integration scheme that would be dominated by Ethiopia. In this connection, Buzan and Wæver have described Kenya as an insulator that separates the Horn of Africa region and its security concerns from the Southern regional frameworks, although they admit that the conflicts from the Horn of Africa blur the lines distinguishing the Horn of Africa from the Central African region.[8]
Moreover, regional integration in the Horn of Africa remains weak because inter-state security dynamics are influenced by intra-state security problems: displacement, cross border incursions by rebel groups all have a profound impact on inter-state relations. They have, however, been rather unpredictable and prevented the states in the region from establishing substantial and institutionalized interaction, the necessary prerequisite to build a regional security organization.
Scholars recognized that a well articulated IGAD peace and security strategy, based on human security, would not, in and of itself, provide a panacea for the complex and entrenched conflicts in the Horn of Africa. But, if properly structured, this strategy could catalyze and generate incentives for non-violent conflict resolution and disincentives for violent solutions, not only for states but for non-state actors as well.
Conclusion
IGAD is credited with playing an instrumental role in both the Sudan and Somalia peace processes. The prospects for a successful IGAD peace and security architecture rest with the ability of member states to increase incentives to abandon their hitherto strategy of conducting national security and foreign policy through war and to more adequately meet the basic needs of their citizens. In this regard, the role that a harmonized national security and foreign policy that offers a well-proportioned human and state security framework cannot be overemphasized.
IGAD’s unfinished project of constructing a peace and security architecture, representing what Alex de Waal calls a “third concept of security community” which is “brought about by the democratization of the sub-region”, is, no doubt, formidable. For de Waal, this is the only viable security community for the Horn, albeit “currently a dream.” What it takes to make it real and effective is “the incremental establishment of a network of institutions and initiatives that between them represent a significant force for peacemaking. The components of this include building common understanding on norms and procedures between the different levels of CSOs, governments, African inter-governmental organizations, and the international community; building the capacities of peace-related institutions at all levels; and building up powerful constituencies for peace throughout the region.”
A peace and security architecture in a sub-region such as the Horn of Africa must necessarily be inclusive, indigenous, modest and evolutionary, and embedded with incentives for positive behaviour; it must encompass bilateral relations within a multilateral context, cooperate with international actors of good will, and hold the promise of resolving conflicts without violence. Besides, it should recognize the rights and roles of women in peacemaking and peacebuilding.
Moreover, the Strategy should also explicitly embrace the AU policy vis-à-vis unconstitutional change of regime, albeit it recognizes the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance and calls upon members states for its implementation. Although it shall remain to be a matter that will be seen when the IGAD Protocol on CPMR is drawn up, EASBIRG’s mandate has to be redefined so as to include rights of intervention on certain well-defined grounds like serious, gross, systematic human rights violations such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as unconstitutional change of regimes.
Overall, IGAD’s initiative to build a regional peace and security architecture for the Horn of Africa is commendable, not least because the potential benefits are so great and security is, after all, a precondition for economic development. Besides, it lays down the foundation for further regional economic and political integration. Despite the prevailing pessimism, the peace and security strategy has come too long to fail.
Endnotes
[1] The discussion is based on IGAD Peace and Security Strategy: 2010-2014 (Final Draft), 19 January 2010.
[2] Id, p. 4
[3] The discussion is based on IGAD Peace and Security Strategy: 2010-2014 (Final Draft), 19 January 2010.
[4] Alex de Waal, In Search of a Peace and Security Framework for the Horn of Africa, in Report of the Conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa, Organized Jointly by CPRD and IAG, March 12-13, 2007, Sheraton Addis Hotel, Addis Ababa, p. 12
[5] Sally Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel, A Horn of Africa Group Report, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008, p.42
[6] Girmachew Alemu Aneme, A Study of the African Union’s Right of Intervention against Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, Unpublished PhD Diss., Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, 2008, p.255
[7] Ibid, p. 151
[8] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 230, 243.
Notes
Sally Healy, “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel,” A Horn of Africa Group Report, Chatham House, 2008, p.42; See also Alex de Waal, “In Search of a Peace and Security Framework for the Horn of Africa,” in Report of the Conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa, Organized by CPRD and IAG; Medhane Tadesse, Turning Conflicts to Cooperation: Towards an Energy-led Integration in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004.
The discussion is based on IGAD Peace and Security Strategy: 2010-2014 (Final Draft), 19 January 2010.
References
Alex de Waal, In Search of a Peace and Security Framework for the Horn of Africa, in Report of the Conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa, Organized Jointly by CPRD and IAG, March 12-13, 2007, Sheraton Addis Hotel, Addis Ababa
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IGAD Peace and Security Strategy: 2010-2014 (Final Draft), 19 January 2010.
Buzan B, Ole Wæver (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Girmachew Alemu Aneme, A Study of the African Union’s Right of Intervention against Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, Unpublished PhD Diss., Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, 2008
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Alemayehu Fentaw (LLB, MA, summa cum laude, Salzburg Global Fellow), formerly a lecturer at the School of Law at Jimma University, is an academic lawyer-cum-policy analyst based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He focuses on Horn of Africa and the AU Peace and Security Architecture.
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