HSDRGPID-11/UNUP-63

GLOBAL MILITARIZATION AND

ITS REMEDY

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Militarization" is generally understood as the militarization of a particular nation-state. Thus, in studying such a phenomenon, a historical analysis of the process of militarization is accepted as an important research tool. Comparative study of various nation-states, too, helps illuminate the internal characteristics of militarization in each state, some being more prone to develop militaristic tendencies than others. What characteristics of the state have a high correlation with militarism? Such questions are frequently raised within the framework of comparative studies of different states. In the pre-World War II period, Japan and Germany provided the best examples of nation-states which developed into militaristic states. Compared with Japan and Germany, Britain and the United States were not considered militaristic because their national characteristics were democratic. Schumpeter's theory of imperialism is oriented to such comparisons in the difference of culture. In contrast to Shumpeter's theory, Marxist theory illuminates the common characteristics of militarization in terms of the development of capitalism. Lenin added to Marxist theory by developing a universalistic theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. If, as Lenin argues, imperialism ineluctably leads to a forceful division of the world, war is inevitable. Hence, insofar as war is conducted by nation-states, then any state involved in war would be branded as militaristic, or at least as incorporating some elements of militarization. Of course, Lenin himself emphasized par-ticularly such countries as tsarist Russia as examples of militaristic and feudalistic imperialism. A number of Japanese Marxists, applying Lenin's theory, have branded the pre-war Japanese state as a combination — a militaristic and feudalistic imperialist state. In

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the light of such an analysis, it would seem only a revolutionary movement within the nation could have stopped the militarization of pre-war Japan. Yet historical developments have not demonstrated the effectiveness of such revolutionary movements in stopping the militarization of a state. The Soviet Union, for example, was not at first militaristic. But it now appears as a superpower incorporating at least some elements of militarization. In sum, comparative studies are weak for analysing the cause of militarization; moreover, no remedy for militarization has been discovered through such comparative studies.

Historically, it should be emphasized, militarization has its own structural dynamic logic within the developmental process of society. It has been the product of an international political situation in which a country's achievement of independence and security requires reliance upon the military method. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "militarization" as "conversion to a military status or to military methods."[1] However, once the military method becomes rooted in the domestic social structure as a normal thought pattern, militarization reaches a stage where it develops automatically within the domestic political, economic, and social structure. On the other hand, contemporary militarization has distinct characteristics that are formed by the pressure of international politics interdependently intertwined on a global scale. This is one reason why the dynamics of militarization have been the subject of inquiry. There has been an attempt to discover to what extent militarization is a product of external relations and to what extent it is rooted in its own domestic inertia. Of course, the complexity of the issue makes it impossible to answer this question for every nation and for every time period. However, in an age of global politics it is an undeniable axiom that the militarization of each nation-state is a form of interdependence in a negative sense. Quincy Wright pointed out that it is peace which produces democracy and not democracy which produces peace.[2] I think his dictum still applies today. In fact, I would go one step further and argue that it is demilitarization which produces global democracy and not global democracy which produces demilitarization.

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To make this clear, I would like in this paper to illuminate the
various causes of militarization and its accompanying dangers by means
of empirical findings, and then discuss a remedy for global
militarization.

II. THE HISTORICAL STRUCTURE OF PATHOLOGICAL LEARNING IN THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM

The development of post-Meiji Japan as a modern nation-state is one example we can consider. Development occurred under the banner of achieving "national wealth and military strength." Japan was forced to adopt this policy because its independence was threatened by western powers. Under this slogan, there was a possibility that Japanese militarization would change its goal from protecting independence by relying upon military strength to acquiring military strength through national wealth. Of course, national wealth does not automatically result in military strength. In Britain, these two factors were viewed as different phenomena, and historically industrialization was interpreted as a factor that replaced militarization.[3] However, in order for the means, national wealth, to serve the goal of the state, military strength, a number of different cases resulted along with the gradual enlargement of the western state system. One such case was Japan, which unfortunately had by necessity to become militaristic. After the requisite period of establishing a social organization which could fill the gap between national wealth and military strength, so that national wealth could be considered the same as military strength, and also after an ideology for the social structure had taken root, militarism as an ideology flourished in Japan.

Masao Maruyama, a leading political scientist in post-war Japan, in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics defines "militarism" from its historical and empirical usage as:

> A type of thought or behaviour which gives the highest priority to the system of and preparation for war semi-permanently, and which subordinates all other areas of the

people's life — such as politics, economics, education,
culture, and so forth — to the military value in a society
or country.[4]

Once national wealth and military strength are strongly intertwined
with militarism and the necessary international conditions that
reproduce the tendencies toward militarization occur, then the
pathological functions of militarization grow limitlessly in a vicious
circle because of the interdependent relationships within society.
What appeared in Japanese and German militarism symbolizes that
militarism eventually turns into an "insane situation with order,"[5]
and as a companion of its own degeneration, militarism drives not only
the people in the countries directly involved but also the people of
many other countries to a destructive situation.

The pathological vicious-circle process is also operative with regard
to the international conditions for militarization. That is to say,
militarization by one country first leads to militarization of its
hypothetical enemy, and then to the militarization of many periphery
countries as a type of positive feedback. Furthermore, this process
also reinforces the conditions for increasing militarization in the
first country. In cases where there is a strong asymmetrical ruler-
subordinate relationship, the demands for liberation from militarized
domination will increase, and the nationalism of so-called "national
liberation" will develop into explosive opposition against domination
by the great powers. The escalation of asymmetrical confrontation
will result in a war of national liberation or a war among the great
powers that support them.

The militarization of Japan after the Meiji period developed as a
consequence of the necessity to join the ranks of world powers as a
means of preserving the independence of the Japanese people against the
great western powers that had forced Japan to abandon its seclusion
policy and open its ports. In Asia at the time only Japan and Siam
(Thailand) were able to maintain their independence from the western
powers. Siam took a position, like a mathematical singular point,
within the balance-of-power equilibrium between England and France and

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thus skilfully maintained its independence. Japan fought the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War to promote national wealth and military strength, and through the victories in both wars it enhanced its independence. Without these victories, there was a danger that Japan would also be reduced to a colony or semi-colony of the western powers as other Asian countries had been. Consequently, Japanese militarization became synonymous with protecting Japan's independence. The invasion of Asia by the western powers, within the globalization process of politics, received its first counter-attack from Japan. Japan's victory had the effect of spreading national revolution to the colonized Asian countries, but within the globalization process of politics this was nothing more than a natural interdependent development. What became clear in these influence processes was the pathological syndrome which strengthened Japanese militarization and, as in the case of Turkey, the establishment of a military character in national revolutions.

When Japan demanded that Korea open its ports, Japan used the very method that the United States had used at the time of Perry's arrival. A metastasis of method in international politics — the threat of force — was used very early by Japan against a weaker country. Soon this method, which Japan had learned from the great powers, encountered fierce resistance from Chinese nationalism.

After World War II the militarization of the nation-state is symbolized by the confrontation between the superpowers through competition in expanding nuclear armaments. The development of America's nuclear policy by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the starting point for the bipolar cold war structure of the early post-war era. At the same time, moreover, the dropping of the atomic bomb on these two cities was also revenge for Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. The effect of the method employed at times when relations between nation-states reach the extreme condition of enmity is a tendency to rationalize the method afterwards employed in relations between states.

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America's cold war strategy towards the Soviet Union in the post-war era was strengthened by reference to the Munich appeasement policy — the genesis of World War II. As an example of surprise attack, Pearl Harbor continues to haunt the United States in its post-war strategy towards the Soviet Union. Thus, even if the view that the United States was responsible for creating the cold war situation is correct, it is obvious that the prototype which determined the evolution of US nuclear strategy immediately after the war was derived from the historical experience that the United States could not cope effectively with the significance of Chamberlain's Munich compromise and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.[6]

On the other hand, Pearl Harbor was the inevitable outcome of post-Meiji restoration policy. In a sense, the origins of Japan's behaviour can be traced to its pathological learning from Perry's diplomacy by threat of force. In this context, geopolitical logic serves to explain the security policy of a nation-state. The attack on Pearl Harbor by a maritime power, Japan, is certainly also an example of a Japanese geopolitical self-fulfilling prophecy.

The nature of this "evil logic" can be found in the criminality derived from the self-fulfilling characteristic of this logic. It is nothing more than acquired learning that takes place in the relationships between states.[7] At the International Military Tribunal Far East, Lieutenant Kanji Ishihara shouted at the prosecutor that Japan had simply copied Perry. But copying is simply the first stage of learning, and there is certainly a second stage. This second stage begins from innovations in military technology which occur as a result of developments in scientific technology and is influenced by changing geopolitical arrangements of various states. For instance, the nuclear missile systems of the United States and the Soviet Union are centred on the North Pole.

Although at the outset of nuclear strategic thinking a discontinuity and new meaning in power politics was introduced by the enormous destructive power of these weapons, strategy was not completely freed

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but, similar to magnetic hysteresis, conditioned by historical parameters. Thus, nuclear strategy pathogically increased the use of power politics that had existed before the outbreak of World War II.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that current militarization is not supported by the kind of abuse of power characteristic of Japan and Germany in the pre-war period, nor by the militarized Emperor system or fascist movement. Indeed, most Japanese opposition parties criticize pre-war militarism and there is a strong tendency for questions of war and peace to be taken up. In such a framework, this type of analytical schema cannot be used successfully to analyse the fundamental characteristics of present-day militarization. It is necessary to be aware of the emergence in Japan nowadays of a strategic-theory-type logic — a specialist's logic — which, in combination with a new, modernly clad geopolitical logic, is being used to support the slowly developing militarization of the Japanese state. Needless to say, the base of this type of logic is the confrontation between modern nation-states as systematized since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Relations between sovereign states have naturally changed a great deal in structure during the past three hundred years. It is clear that such structural changes have been supported by the tremendous increase in destructive power that has made rapid strides based on the scientific revolution and also by the development of mechanized warfare between states. On the other hand, relations between states in the post-war era are, in a sense, a summary of the historical developments in such relations. In order to analyse present-day militarization, therefore, it is necessary to consider a tri-partite structure — technological, geographical, and historical.

The worsening of the military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union should also be viewed from the perspective that there was a transformation in American nuclear strategy beyond mere ideological or economic national interests. The East Asian international environment, which was created by US nuclear strategy,

became a symbolic environment for China and the Soviet Union.[8] For
example, Dulles' nuclear threat to China on the Quemoy issue was a
part of nuclear strategic software. With this event as a turning
point, a gap concerning nuclear strategy against the United States
developed between Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. That gap, through the
key issues of the Soviet Union's nuclear technology aid to China and
joint military command over the use of such weapons, precipitated a
domestic debate in China over its military policy. On the other hand,
the Sino-Soviet conflict, which proceeded to the high level of nuclear
strategy, had unprecedented political repercussions on Soviet domestic
politics because China succeeded in developing nuclear weapons
independently. Khrushchev's resignation and the almost simultaneous
announcement of China's first nuclear test were very symbolic events.
In addition, the US strategy of escalating the bombing of North
Viet-Nam intensified the Sino-Soviet conflict. During 1966, from a
strategic nuclear perspective, China was in a rather insecure position.
The escalation in the bombing of North Viet-Nam, which developed from
the confrontation between the United States' global nuclear strategy
and the Soviet Union's counter-strategy, threatened China's
dismemberment by the two superpowers; that was also related to the
Great Cultural Revolution which began in 1966. The formation of a
symbolic environment by the strategic nuclear software that encircled
China can be regarded as an important factor which determined the type
of militarization in that country. The fact that radicalization, which
accompanied the shift to militarism, progressed in China during the
Great Cultural Revolution can be viewed as a response to the changes in
the superpowers' global political policies concerning nuclear strategy.

Neither NATO nor the Japan-United States Security Treaty can be
anything more than a small compensation when considered in terms of
the nuclear confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.
The structure supporting this confrontation is the nuclear-deterrence
theory. In a sense, the contemporary result of militarization in the
nation-state system has been a product of pathological learning. With-
out a radical change in the direction of learning, the nation-state
system will be completely annihilated by the doomsday nuclear deterrence.

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III. BEYOND THE NUCLEAR-DETERRENCE THEORY

In the development of relations between soveriegn nation-states in the
post-war era, the nuclear-deterrence theory has generally come to be
accepted. Communication of such a theory created both horizontal and
vertical nuclear proliferation. A detailed theory can be developed in
this regard.[9] For example, pathological learning of the nuclear-
deterrence theory which acts as the medium in the process of
horizontal nuclear proliferation has principally been carried out based
on relationships between sovereign states. In other words, the
nuclear-deterrence theory has been passed on from the policy-makers of
one country to those of the opponent.

Present-day nuclear proliferation is possible if the necessary economic
and technological conditions are fulfilled. In a democratic state,
however, the support of public opinion is also essential in order to
realize a process of nuclear development. In reality the manipulation
of public opinion is occurring in the form of entrusting strategic
military thinking to specialists. Not only the existence of the
military-industrial complex but also the change in the structure of
public opinion is a factor contributing to a loss of resistance to
militarization. Thus, intellectual and scientific criticism of
militarization is becoming more and more important in the contemporary
world.

It is certainly true that there are limitations to simply critical
resistance to militarization. In reality, without the clarification
of the conditions for disarmament, criticism leads nowhere.
Intellectual criticism alone cannot create the conditions necessary to
politively prevent militarization. Nevertheless, we still need a

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reliable theory that can be used to develop a much broader critical
resistance to militarization. Active types of security theories which
become expressed in the form of concrete policies are also a pressing
problem to be tackled.

For example, the recent controversy regarding Japan's overall security
has grown to encompass a broad interpretation of security — economical
security and cultural security, including resources, food,and so
forth. In fact, there is a tendency for proposals to be continually
made in an attempt to rapidly increase military spending beyond the
limit of 1 per cent of the GNP. Moreover, unimpressed by such
arguments, some specialists have begun to argue in favour of breaking
the 1 per cent limit in the narrow sense of direct military spending.
It should be particularly emphasized that this tendency is becoming
stronger. In this, the tendency has clearly surfaced for the argument
for overall security in the broad sense to be used as a cover for the
increase in Japan's defensive strength in the narrow sense. In this
pattern the militarization of the economic giant Japan is taking place.
We can here clearly observe a type of militarization completely
different from that in pre-war Japan. The important thing to be
taken up here is not, however, a comparative study of security policies,
but rather the dynamic logic of the ideology of militarization. Of
course, this does not deny that a well defined theory of comparative
security policies is useful for development of militarization theory.

Takashi Inoguchi's unpublished paper "Political Security: Towards Its
Broad Conceptualization" tries to establish three-dimension variables
and classify eight cells for analysing eight different types of
security policy.[10] His classification scheme is shown in table 1.

In his analysis, Inoguchi provides an explanation for illustrative
cases of each security policy; however, the historical dynamics of
structural changes of each security policy still needs to be explored.
In the case of Japan, it seems that the dynamic development of the
pre-war state started from seclusion in the Tokugawa Era and developed
to conquest during the period of the Pacific War through manoeuvring,

TABLE 1

Level of Activity	Level of Strength	Focus of Attention	
		Outward-looking	Inward-looking
Active	Strong	Conquest	Revolution
	Weak	Hegemony	Finlandization
Passive	Strong	Manipulation	Seclusion
	Weak	Manoeuvring	Submission

manipulation, and hegemony. The post-war Japanese state, in contrast, started from submission to the United States Occupation Forces and developed to economic hegemony, mainly through manoeuvring. The difference between pre-war and post-war Japan is clearly indicated by the fact that post-war Japan has concentrated on economic development, whereas military development was the main goal before the war. In both cases, the goal aimed at has been the result of the international environment and the stage of national development.

Even under nuclear deterrence, such characteristics continue to be operative. The problem here is to clarify the pathological impetus for each nation-state to pass the threshold of economic power and move to militarization. Of course, the nuclear-deterrence theory is a strong logical impetus for nuclear development and militarization. However, this is simply an international impetus for militarization; hence, it is also necessary to analyse the domestic impetus for militarization.

IV. THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE OF MILITARIZATION

Masao Maruyama, in his notable work cited previously, classified
modern militarism into three stages. The first stage was the
establishment of a "standing army" by autocrats; the second was the
establishment of a "citizen's army" or "mass army," as occurred in
the American and French revolutions; the third was the bureaucratiz-
ation of the "citizen's army" after Napoleon. According to Maruyama,
the bureaucratization process developed in connection with counter-
revolutions which occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century
in several European countries, especially in Prussia, where it
assumed a typical form under the feudalistic leadership of the
Junkers. In Japan, "the long political domination by the samurai
class and the tradition of the martial spirit" also became a very
favourable soil for militarism. In general,

> since the technology of modern war requires a high degree of
> organization and mechanization, the requirement for a mass
> army is based on the premise that the citizens' intellectual
> level is developed to a certain degree.[11]

In addition, militarism represses the development of a critical spirit
and needs to inculcate a spirit of blind, absolute obedience. As
Maruyama says,

> In nations where the curves of the development of technologi-
> cal knowledge and the development of political consciousness
> are not parallel but divergent, in general such [countries]
> are more favourable to the growth of militarism.

Therefore, he concludes that "modern militarism is a deformed child
born from the gap between the mass nation and democracy." However,
there are some problems in making such definite assertions. In Japan
there was a superiority not simply in military values, but rather a
superiority in the military value because it was the Emperor's army.

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In other words, during the Shōwa period in Japan,

> the major characteristic is not that the military was more
> powerful than other political groups and manipulated the
> people in order to spread its military value, but rather that
> it was the Emperor system, which was originally an integral
> authority system as well as a value system, which on the
> whole became militaristic.[12]

Therefore, in Japan the right-wing movements only accelerated the
reorganization process towards the militarization of the Emperor
system, but they did not become independent carriers of militarism.
An interesting comparison on this point is American militarization
after World War II. The United States has proceeded with its
militarization under a nuclear strategy that is based upon coherent
co-ordination in the name of democracy. The militarization of Japan,
under the coherent co-ordination of the Emperor system, clearly
differed from the basis of American militarization. However, both are
similar in their political dynamics towards militarization. Further-
more, the United States organized dictatorial governments, which
embodied neither democratic values nor systems, in order to build an
anti-communist front in line with the requirements of its world
policies, and the positive feed-back energy, which was caused by the
interactions with these dictatorial governments, further strengthened
the United States' syndrome towards militarization with the nuclear-
strategy system as its axis. The CIA move to build a cold war
structure played an important role in accelerating militarization on a
global scale. Thus, during the 1970s, in parallel with the new stage
of horizontal nuclear proliferation there has been an astronomical
increase in arms exports to the Third World by the great powers. In
spite of the development of the world economy in the 1960s, the after-
effects of the cold war structure still continue to promote
militarization and pressure democracy, especially in periphery
countries (e.g., the persistence and re-emergence of dictatorships).

Without a significant change in the United States' world policy, it
will be impossible to stop militarization on a global scale and revive
democracy. The types of militarization vary according to the

historical phase and geographical conditions. Nevertheless, there is
a global characteristic in that militarization occurs under structural
interactions on a global scale. In the inner dynamics of militariz-
ation, a common characteristic is its pathological social function.
For example, in military organizations the elegant military uniforms,
rank badges and decorations, splendid military bands, strict hierarchy,
prompt unconditional obedience to authoritative orders, and so forth
are held up as ideals for other social relations.

Even in the United States it can be said that militarism has made
quiet, secret progress on a large scale since the purge of suspected
communists under McCarthyism. Under the strategy of nuclear deterrence,
therefore, the so-called "garrison state," as the final product of
militarization, evolves regardless of the type of government. A
measurement of the development in militarization can be achieved, to
some extent, by conceptualizating and indexing its structural components.
Nuclear war has lost its function as a means of attaining national
objectives. Consequently, the "self-goal orientation" of war (i.e.,
war leads to war) reveals itself as being parallel with the "self-
principal orientation" of technological innovation in both the hardware
and software of military strategy. The change in the form of war which
has occurred since the two world wars — that is, from wars applying
chemistry to wars applying physics to wars applying mathematics — has
produced a revolution in the techniques of warfare. War has become
extremely depersonalized, and in this can be found a fundamental cause
of the militarization of global politics under nuclear weapons. More-
over, militarization continues to grow and has, indeed, transformed
itself within the structure of intra-national and inter-national inter-
dependence. It is inevitable that under contemporary militarization the
difference between professionals and laymen has become extreme; thus,
nuclear strategists do not have to be professional uniformed soldiers.
In order to break through this wall and establish a new order of inter-
dependence which will lead to demilitarization, a new learning process
must be sought throughout the world. This is intimately related to
developing the potentiality for demilitarization at every level in the
structure of global politics.

V.   DESIGN FOR CREATING AN OVERALL PEACE

Now is the time when we must design an overall peace order which is of a completely different nature from designs for creating overall security. In such a new design, it is first necessary to ensure that any country's security designs become a functional part of the idea of global disarmament. The evaluation of last year's UN Special Session on Disarmament by the global hawk coalition tended to be completely separated from the security designs of respective countries and regions. There was no exception in Japan.

Prior to the opening of the UN Special Session there had been a rapid shift to the right in discussions on defence in Japanese military circles. The session was moreover simply treated like a festival and was not tied to the question of disarmament in a Japan where security discussions now aim at speeding up militarization. If information control of this tendency had been attempted, it may have ended in complete success before the start of a new resistance to this tendency by the Japanese opposition, particularly the Japan Socialist Party.

Among the groups which supported and participated in the Special Session is the deep-rooted idea of simply calling for nuclear disarmament in areas unconnected with security issues. In this way, both the military specialists and ban-the-bomb specialists contributed to the isolation of Japan's defence discussions from the discussions at the UN. This resulted in their unexpected co-operation for militarization within the narrow framework of specialization in which both remained entrapped.

In any design for creating an overall peace order we must search for

the causes of militarization as well as suggest positive counter-
proposals to each of these causes.   This can become a tool to remedy
militarization.

In the first place, if it is argued that present-day militarization
originates from international tension, then reduction of international
tension is, above all, the first essential step to stop militarization.
It cannot be denied that international tension is the cause of
important local militarization as is occurring in such regions as the
Korean peninsula.   For this reason, various local conflicts that exist
in the world at the present moment — such as the Moro liberation area
in the Philippines, the Thai-Malaysian border in southern Thailand,
Palestine, Cyprus, and Somalia — should be resolved by new efforts at
constructive community-building.   As contemporary peace research is
increasingly becoming oriented towards centre-periphery-type structural
theories, and as an area of potential conflict is one of the most
important fields of peace research, the combination of peace research,
peace education, and peace action in such an area has become a fruitful
focus for future intellectual efforts.

However, in the 1970s the militarization of the United States and the
Soviet Union should rather be called militarization under détente.   In
this case, present-day militarization is advancing on the level of the
military-industrial-bureaucratic-labour-university complex with hardly
any relation to the increase or decrease in international tension or
local conflicts in the periphery of the world.   The more serious
factor here, then, is especially the competition for advanced military
technology.   Secondly, therefore, a review of science and technology
policies on a global scale has become an urgent task.   It is a
disturbing fact that 25 per cent of today's scientists are devoting
themselves to military technology, and in the superpowers this figure
has reached 60 per cent.

It is perfectly clear that a review of science and technology policies
should form part of a grand educational reform, including reform of
the present-day university system.   In Japan, of course, we have a

peace constitution, and officially no military research is being carried out in the universities. Even so, it can be inferred that there are examples of such research being carried out in secret.

The view is held in some quarters of Japan that there is no particular need for concern about the militarization of the universities since Japan's defence expenditure is less than 1 per cent of the GNP and this is very low when considered globally. Such a view, however, is quite short-sighted. In comparison to other countries in the Asian region, Japan has the highest rate of military expenditure. This, of course, is related to the high growth rate of Japan, but there is strong pressure to continue this tendency. The appearance of arguments in favour of breaking through the 1 per cent limit on defence spending, in a period of low economic growth, is definitely a result of such pressure.

Designs for creating overall security in particular provide easy cover for such pressure. In the design for creating an overall peace order there is the need for a logical structure which does not provide such cover. The logic must, above all, create an objective that can prevent the further militarization of countries throughout the world and clarify the process to reach this objective. Accordingly, as a base for the review of science and technology policies on a global scale, there is thirdly the need for the realization of a new conception of university reform which goes so far as to include the position of the faculties of engineering and science. Clearly, the shape of peace research within the institutionalization of university reform is of tremendous significance. Despite the fact that we are entering such a period, however, there can hardly be seen any of this kind of awareness in designs for university reform.

Tokyo Imperial University was established in order to train individuals of importance to the state. But now, after the passage of one hundred years, we have entered a period when university reform should be investigated from the perspective of creating an overall peace order to stop further militarization throughout the world.

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In order to combat militarization, there is more than anything else a need to institutionalize within university reform a prototype science and technology policy for positively building peace. Peace research institutes should here have the courage to take the lead in this task.

The important distinction between peace research and medical research is, as Anatol Rapopport continues to emphasize, that peace research has been without a system comparable to hospitals or health centres.[13] This indicates that the birth of peace societies or peace research institutes, both inside and outside universities, can in itself become the first stage in building a peaceful order. A change in the quality of civilization is now a global demand. Since this demand should be investigated in combination with the problem of stopping global militarization, the university reforms presently proposed in Japan need to be basically reconsidered within the framework of a re-examined human civilization.

Fourthly, in order to build peace on a global scale, there needs to be not only a review of science and technology policies from the institutional perspective but also a thorough re-examination from the perspective of the actual qualitative content of the system itself. This is symbolically expressed by the fact pointed out at the UN Special Session that economic aid and technological aid to the Third World is still at a very low level at a time when world armament spending is close to reaching US$400 billion a year. The opinion was expressed that it would be best to reorganize science and technology, which have supported qualitative arms proliferation competition on a global scale and promoted global militarization, in order to build a peaceful, just order that includes the Third World.

There cannot help but be doubt concerning the goals of development up until this time. Is it in fact desirable that the goals of development be tied to the strengthening of the state's military power? This means that, at the same time that there is a re-examination of this problem on a global scale, there also needs to be an inquiry into the nature of the goals of development. The central issues that must thus be

tackled are the conquering of poverty, social justice, human rights, and the environment on the level of a new global community and on the level of global disarmament. Problems such as resources, energy, food, population, and urbanization, which have up until now been discussed in isolation from the environment, should be reinvestigated with consideration being given to global relationships to an over-militarized environment and global community demands. If this occurs, then there would also arise the question of whether the kind of economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and law that have been taught up to the present are suitable. The problem is thus not restricted to the problem of engineering, science, or agriculture.

Fifthly, however, the problem of militarization virtually cannot be solved amid the conflicting sectionalism of the separate departments within the universities. Academic societies, too, cannot be said to be raising questions that are guided by new values or the creative development of scholarship. The bureaucracy, moreover, is strongly restricted by the classic objectives of the sovereign state. Unfortunately, there is also a tendency for pressure to be exercised on the intellectual ability of the bureaucrats, who are of high capability, for pathological learning. What about the possibilities of MNC's, UN non-governmental organizations, or local authorities tied together through sister-city relationships? If in this way we can examine each actor one by one, we will be able to evaluate any advantages or disadvantages from the perspective of building a future peaceful order capable of stopping militarization. The problem is not to end with such a simple evaluation, however; there is a need to go on to search for a method by which the advantageous points can be strengthened and the disadvantageous points weakened and destroyed.

The problem of evaluating various actors is, at the same time, a problem of clearly distinguishing normal learning in the direction of demilitarization and pathological learning in a negative direction, such as militarization, and development, until it becomes an issue of searching for the various conditions associated with these two learning processes. Thus, the methodology for building an overall peace order

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will permeate the education system through learning.

Since the end of World War II, Japanese scholarly circles have been
convinced that as long as there is no government control, scholarship
will develop freely and contribute to peace. This is clearly expressed
in the content of a statement issued by a group of progressive
scholars, known as the Peace Issues Discussion Group,[14] concerning the
peace treaty issue in Japan. The statement was made in response to the
Unesco social scientists' statement of 1949. However, we have to say
that, within the dynamics of present-day international politics, when
technology is left divided and allowed to develop on its own, the time
when we can simply conclude that the development of science and
technology in and of itself will contribute to the creation of a
peace order has already ended. It can now be argued, therefore, that
we have entered a time when there must be a serious re-examination of
this point. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the excessive
growth of the university engineering departments was the result of
strong demands from business.

> In fact, the idea that arms are business is accepted as common
> sense throughout the world. That Japanese are the only ones
> to act in opposition to such common sense is a cause for the
> image of the Japanese as difficult to understand in
> foreigner's eyes. Despite the fact that Japan's Ban on Arms
> for Export policy is domestically tied to the image of Japan
> as a peaceful state, globally it simply reflects an extreme
> policy of gross stupidity and lack of common sense.

This quotation is from a statement in the May 1978 issue of Bungei
Shunju by a Japanese specialist in international economics. It was an
attempt to demonstrate the necessity and desirability of frank arms
exports taking advantage of the extremely avant-garde demand that
Japan should become more internationalized. He continues:

> If you are in a bind, there is no room to talk of "not
> exporting arms" or other nice sounding phrases. Even among
> labour unions, which in principle protect the peace
> constitution, the executives of the Shipbuilding Labour
> Federation have ended up making the pitiful cry that "arms
> exports or anything is better than losing our jobs." Given
> this stance by the labour unions, it cannot be expected that
> the opposition parties will emphasize "opposition to arms

exports"; the labour unions are the base of these parties.

The author goes on to say that, although there is opposition in public, "it is <u>ninjo</u> [human feeling] that deep down there is a growing feeling that arms exports cannot be avoided." When the discussion has progressed to this extent, then the dynamics of a social structure which supports the self-expansion of the military-industrial-bureaucratic complex will, in reality, clearly surface.

The logic developed in such a proposal is not that of the demand for militarization for one's own country, but that of looking to the demand for arms from other countries. However, if there is a change around, the logic can be transformed into a demand for the strengthening of domestic defence capabilities. The logic that an economic giant must inevitably become a military giant is, as can easily be imagined, simply one step beyond. This is perfectly clear in the following quotation from the same author:

> It appears that Japan's manufacturing capability has already become too large. If we just take the example of tanks, then an annual production of 2,000-3,000 is really only a drop in the bucket when compared with an annual production of auto-mobiles of 8.5 million. In regard to a shipbuilding capacity of 19 million tons, too, with an international market for warships of just 0.1 million tons per year, even if there is a large increase in price this will still be a far cry from completely digesting the Japanese shipbuilding industry's excess capacity. In the event of the recession becoming even more serious, if the means of escape is sought through arms production, this must mean banking on a demand for domestic defense.

In the end, this is the same as proposing that we should go beyond the bothersome opposition party's criticism of defence arguments to willingly dash into arms proliferation through independent arms production. The problem is that such proposals are on the surface carried out coolly, scientifically, and objectively. Of course, this does not mean that there has already been established in present-day Japan a military-industrial-bureaucratic-academic-complex. However, by using arms export approval as the occasion, or by seeking reparation for arms exports and expanding production, there is an attempt to open

a road to establish such a complex through increased defence
capabilities and arms proliferation.

In order to stop this kind of militarization, there is the need for a
transformation of the domestic political process and social structure.
Moreover, in order to solve the actual regional conflicts where UN
peace-keeping forces are already stationed or the potential regional
conflicts that continue to be the most important accepted cause of
militarization, the type of aid provided by Japan, the economic super-
power, is a vitally important issue. At the present time, however,
the domestic political, economic,and social structures are significant
obstacles to the provision of appropriate aid from Japan for de-
militarization. The universities themselves, which should stand in
the forefront of any intellectual revolution, are not taking the
leadership in this question. So long as this remains the case, it can
be said that the necessity for university reform to match the most
progressive project of the UN University, the Project on Goals,
Processes and Indicators of Development, has become one of educational
reformists' most important tasks in human history. In this sense, in
the design for creating an overall peace order there needs to be the
unification of research, education, and action centring on new learning.
The whole world is a school. The presently strong resistance to
stopping militarization is based on the fact that new learning on a
global scale, which includes university reform, has not been created.

This argument is also supported by recent creative academic efforts
towards building a new non-violent political science by Professor
Glenn D. Paige at the University of Hawaii. He argues:

> . . . a profound nonviolent paradigm shift in political
> science would create both intensified awareness of violence
> and unprecedentedly vigorous attempts to create alternative
> nonviolent theories and policy applications. It would call
> for a thorough renovation of existing sub-fields. In
> essence it would mean a shift from a science that studies,
> philosophizes about, and accepts the eternal existence of
> a disease (e.g., cancer, violent politics) to a science
> unambiguously committed to the eradication of that disease
> from the life of mankind (e.g., basic and applied cancer
> research, nonviolent political science).

According to Paige, a new learning process can be developed by the impact of the growth of a new, non-violent political science. He concludes in the last part of his article on the implications of the social role of political science:

> . . . the social role of political science will shift from the relatively passive, peripheral role of a "proviolent service station" to the more active role of a central institution for creation and application of nonviolent political knowledge. It will seek to change its environment rather than to "trouble shoot" its defects. One of the principal objectives of nonviolent political science will be the education of nonviolent political leaders and thoroughly skilled and committed nonviolent supporters of such leaders. It will maintain lifelong contact with these "students" so that no gap should open up between knowledge and action, action and knowledge.

> To accomplish this shift in its social role, political science will have to detach itself from its present dependent relation to violence-accepting institutions and to create new nonviolent institutions to which its academic support can be wholeheartedly given.[15]

We can fundamentally argue that militarization has been the product of the nation-state system. However, as I have already pointed out, there is still the possibility that the nation-state system can produce peaceful interdependence, if various interdependent actions are horizontal and do not result in structural violence. The development of normal learning is of crucial importance. In order to achieve such peace-oriented learning and peaceful interactions, various obstacles need to be removed and disarmament that leads to true demilitarization realized.

Whether such a remedy can be realized in the framework of a preserved nation-state system or in the creation of a new global system is still indefinite. However, if a remedy for militarization in each nation-state can be universally achieved, the question of whether the nation-state system is still to be preserved might not be clearly obsolete, because it cannot be denied that important changes in the character of the nation-state system may produce demilitarization in the world and simultaneously the goals of development may also be successfully redefined.

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VI.   POSTSCRIPT

The recent war between China and Viet-Nam raises several important
questions regarding the concept of global militarization. Linkage
structures between military establishments in different countries have
already developed to a considerable degree, and global co-operation
among them is becoming an important obstacle to global disarmament.
After Helsinki in 1975, "Finlandization" has become an important target
of criticism for countries wishing to reduce their military build-up.
In the case of the war between China and Viet-Nam, the world military
establishment, including the forces of the United States, NATO, and
Japan, informally inspired the Chinese policy-makers to initiate a
limited attack on Viet-Nam. This was not manifested formally; formal
statements by these governments indicated a reluctance to inspire
China and seemed to aim at persuading a change in Chinese intentions.
Although this was formally true, Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) was
impressed by the informal attitude adopted by the military establish-
ments of the United States, NATO, and Japan. They were rather
enthusiastic about China's plan in order to gain a stronghold over the
USSR, should it decide to adopt a tough attitude (e.g., a military
build-up) against a possible attack on Viet-Nam by China. Thus, it
might be true to say that the world military establishments are now
trying to concentrate their efforts transnationally to form a so-
called global "Kuantung Army" to resist the so-called global "Shidehara
Diplomacy," to borrow analogous terms from the pre-war days. Here
President Carter's diplomacy might be compared to "Shidehara Diplomacy,"
which was seriously attacked by the "Kuantung Army" and other hawk
groups in Japanese political circles at the time. The contemporary
scene may be different from the 1930s because the global linkage of the
military establishment seems to be on a more abstract level of global

structure and could create a more complex linkage among hawk groups.
A clear illustration of the complicated nature of contemporary politics
is manifested in the combination of hawks and doves in the Carter
administration. Of course, analysis of this problem requires another
historical as well as analytical paper on the global militarization
process. It is in this area that further research needs to be carried
out.

NOTES

1. OED, vol. VI, p. 438.

2. Q. Wright, A Study of War (1942), vol. 2, p. 841.

3. OED, vol. VI, p. 438.

4. M. Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1961.
    Note that this passage is not included in the English translation
    of this study.

5. Karl Liebknecht.

6. In other words, the United States rejected appeasement policy and
    became wary of sudden attack.

7. H. Seki, "Towards a Peaceful Solution of the Conflict of Divided
    Korea — Role of Japan in the Global Context," prepared for the
    Symposium on Transdisciplinary Approaches to World Order Problems,
    17-19 July 1978, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University.

8. Anatol Rapoport, Conflict in Man-Made Environment, Pelican, 1973.

9. H. Seki, "Metastatis of Nuclear Deterrence," Peace Research in
    Japan, 1976. H. Seki, "The Rebuilding of Peace," Japan Echo,
    vol. 2, no. 1 (1975).

10. Takashi Inoguchi, "Political Security: Towards Its Broad
    Conceptualization," unpublished article, 1978. This paper embodies
    the best research along these lines.

11. Maruyama, op. cit., p. 287.

12. Takeshi Ishida, Sengo Nihon no Seiji Taisei, Tokyo: Tokyo
    University Press, p. 87.

13. Anatol Rapoport, "Directions in Peace Research," in B. Haglund and
    I.W. Ulrich, eds., Conflict Control and Conflict Resolution,
    Scandinavian University Books, 1968.

14. H. Seki, "Politics of Peace," Japan Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3
    (1977).

15. G. Paige, "On the Possibility of Nonviolent Political Science,"
    Japanese edition, Shinshiten [New perspective], vol. 1, no. 1.