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THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT IN NEW ZEALAND

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

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Geneva, September 1979

Johan Galtung

This paper is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on this subject at this stage of the research.

In this paper an attempt is made to critically evaluate the nature of development in New Zealand. A main object is to suggest that there are, internally and externally, many misconceptions about the level and bases of New Zealand development. The perpetuation of these myths is one reason why planning has been so ineffective. A number of points are stressed particularly. First, that in many, if not most, social structures, development patterns are much more complex (in terms of goals and process) than most overseas simplistic models suggest. There is diversity and volatility. Additionally, however, many aspects of the social structure are unknown either because of the myopia of the observers or because they see simply what they are looking for. As a consequence of the lack of simplicity and comprehension, much change is unexpected[1] and unaccepted. Development is often chaotic and conflict is implicit.

We do not want to spend too much time in definition (the basic parameters of the GPID project are broadly accepted) nor in defining what New Zealand society is. We simply accept the official geonomenclature,[2] even though this excludes many New Zealanders (those overseas) and those internationally part of the New Zealand network (economic, political, social, kinship, friendship, enemy, etc.) and includes those who do not call themselves New Zealanders — notably those Polynesians who regard themselves as inhabitants of pre-European Aotea Roa (Land of the Long White Cloud) or more latter-day republics[3] and those from outlying physical islands or internal social islands, whether Polynesian or European.[4] However, we do insist that New Zealand should be regarded not as a monolithic concept but as a pluralist assortment of different social groups whose boundaries are

constantly changing in space and time.[5] We are most interested in the idea of "collective mentalities" as proposed by Marc Bloch and the Annales School of French social historians. We are not really looking for ideal types in the sense of Max Weber — rather more for down-to-earth, grass-roots, everyday (in the sense of Schutzian lebenswelt) images and models.

If we begin by looking at goals of development, we can see some of the problems that structure-space-time pluralism raises. In terms of structure,the dividing lines may be ethnicity, religion, age, sex, class (strata of power, wealth, or status), party, or other forms of subcultural affiliation. Each group or individual may belong in varying degrees of intensity to none, one, or many pluralist segments, and the number and intensity varies over time. There is much evidence pointing to a nomadic structure in New Zealand society, obvious from such indicators as a 30-40 per cent annual house occupancy turnover in some areas, a history of ten or more jobs by the time a man reaches 30, five schools per annum for some young children, more than ten foster families for other abandoned children, the highest ex-nuptial birth rate in the world, very high air mileage and other travel per capita, and a net outflow migration at present higher than the birth rate. Considerable social movement and boundary crossing may also be indicated in the large number of cars, calories consumed, even high blood pressure levels, etc.

In terms of goals, development may be defined by many New Zealanders not in terms of goods but as being place- and even time-oriented and -associated, particularly with status factors. The key aspiration may be a return to a euphoric homeland (the Pacific Islands for the Islanders, the marae for the Maori, England or Europe for the Europeans, the bright lights of Sydney for the young, the El Dorado of Auckland for the upwardly mobile workers, the retirement havens of Tauranga, Nelson, Whangarei, etc., for the elderly). The time dimension features a return to the good old days, or to a future millennium. This explains in the former case why overseas observers have said New Zealand is 30 years behind the times, why the radio

stations, even the jazziest, continually play "golden oldies." The search for a millennium explains the enormous popularity of lotteries, punting in general, and of charismatic political figures like the late Norman Kirk or the present Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon. One novelist, C.K. Stead, has suggested that a possible future New Zealand state would in fact be fascist. Others have talked of a "kindly fascism,"[6] a bureaucratic fascism dispensing welfare-state handouts but as dictatorial and as repressive as any other fascist state.

New Zealand has, despite its democratic ideology, a power elite who translate goals into what are conceived of as needs, not necessarily nationally or monolithically but still for all the plural segments. Even in the drawing of boundaries (and hence their legitimacy) and certainly their maintenance and crossing,[7] control lies in the hands of the bureaucracy. New Zealand then is a case not of over-development, in a sense of over-consumption or over-production, so much as of development from above, over-development in the sense of over-legislation and over-demarcation of lines and controls. This form of over-development shows itself in the myriad of maps, mosaics (many conflicting) that cover any New Zealand community, each drawn (and frequently redrawn) by the thousand or more statutory bodies as well as by government and local bodies. These "official" mosaics combined with the mental maps of the various pluralist groups become so entangled that there are no longer any paths through the thicket and much social time is spent tying and untying the knots.

This kind of exercise has produced many kinds of development effects. First, it has been a major reason for the key institution of the committee. Because every issue involves large plural segments and multiple mosaics, there need to be representatives, not usually as delegates so much as token symbols from important social groups in New Zealand. Committees in New Zealand always have token women, token Polynesians, token Aucklanders (Wellington is the committee capital). However, many, perhaps most, plural segments are not represented. Committees in New Zealand sit interminably. Moreover, they are constructed from and construct other committees. The

hierarchy up and down which information passes is circular in the sense that each committee passes on or passes back decisions so that very few decisions are made, and those that are made are usually too late, or inappropriate. This same structure is not only true of the power elite but pervades most social groups in New Zealand society, with perhaps the exception of rural subcultures.

The tangled weave of committees and boundaries is also most resistant to contact with the everyday world of the "every man or woman." There is a "closed" quality about New Zealand society. Government is secret even in mundane details, and communication is habitually blocked. Other groups are not much different. Again, there are many illustrative stories, sayings, and revealing vignettes. There is the overseas traveller who comes to find New Zealand closed, and indeed there are many long holidays and short working periods, between smokos, lunch breaks, rest stops, strikes, lockouts, go-slows, rain-offs, etc. There is the story, too, of a man who rang the Post Office to ask which beach was featured on a new stamp — only to be told that the Post Office did not divulge without higher authorities' permission the source of information on its stamps — and the matter supposedly almost went to the Cabinet (in New Zealand even the fate of a lavatory in a small rural school might be [forgive the pun] a Cabinet matter).

To a considerable degree the economic aspects of over-development are dictated by this over-imposition. The committees fix the numbers of cars, televisions, etc., not really through pricing so much as through supply. There are demographic controls through migration and cultural controls through censorship. In New Zealand even the richest are frustrated in purchasing goods because of unavailability, both locally and particularly from abroad, controlled through the licensing system.

Over-development however is resisted or ignored by some groups in which development processes are quite different. To some extent Polynesian communities involve different paradigms[8] — traditional extended and large families, flexibility, social as opposed to economic values —

though in all this there are many who are Polynesians, as defined by Pakehas (Europeans) at least, who have crossed the boundary and reclassified themselves. There is, too, in the European world of committees, much of the Polynesian distaste for publicly exposed conflict. Polynesian meetings are simply ritual and symbolic expressions of decisions already taken or more precisely of certain inevitabilities, of which the European habit of procrastination might even be one example.

A strongly independent group who have always preferred development from below to development from above are the farmers.[9] Their goals are much more orthodox, an increase in free trade in which their efficiency (and the inherent fertility of the soil and climate) will be rewarded. But the farming industry is in many senses more urban than rural. It is highly capitalized, and increasingly controlled, if not by stock and station agents and urban investment, then by processing interests (e.g., freezing works virtually controlled by militant labour), by transport (again there are strong unions — it costs more to ship a bale of wool from one end of New Zealand to the other than from New Zealand to Europe), or by the government's compulsory acquisition of the wool clip or dairy or meat products.

Development-from-below groups are then in a minority, and development from above has resulted, we might argue, not so much in over-development in the terms of world society as in a form of under-development. It is easy enough to show how New Zealand has slipped from 3rd or 4th in GNP per capita in the sixties to a place below 20th,[10] and this is echoed in other quantitative indicators (such as the UNRISD series).[11] The lowest place currently would seem to be 43rd in the world for population per physician.[12]

On these indicators alone one might classify New Zealand as a third-world rather than a first-world country, or perhaps, with the omni-presence of the state bureaucracy, as a second-world country. There are certainly, at least historically, other indicators of presumed inferiority, socio-moral if not socio-economic. In the nineteenth

century New Zealand had a bad reputation as a most undesirable place to which to migrate, inhabited by cannibalistic Maoris and brawling, criminal Europeans in a drunken stupor. Research carried out recently at the University of Auckland has shown that images of Polynesian violence (one radical even talked of reintroducing cannibalism) and the high rates of drinking and alcohol-related deviance were a major reason for the large number of migrants wishing to leave the country. There is currently an outflow (i.e., excess of permanent departures over permanent arrivals) of 1.3 per cent per annum of the population.[13] Politically, too, New Zealand has become somewhat isolated in world assemblies, lumped together with Rhodesia and South Africa, and some have predicted African-type instabilities at least in the surrounding Pacific region.

But the main problem has been economic. New Zealand has had during its recent history a dependent economy, with a brittle base, consisting of a small number of agricultural export products. Certainly these products have been produced efficiently enough. The New Zealand environment has been described as nearly perfect for pastoral production, although because the labour force has been concentrated in urban areas (over 80 per cent of the population), the rural sector has been very capital intensive, which has increased vulnerability and dependence. The problems of this dependence have not, as many assume, been solely associated with the increased protectionism that has resulted from the traditional market, Great Britain, joining the EEC. Much of New Zealand's economic history is characterized by a succession of "booms and busts" related to prices on world markets for protein and wool and, in the case of the booms, to the shortages caused by the world wars. This seems to be related to the nomadism and high rates of mobility that we have talked about. Some have argued[14] that a new protein price boom is likely just as there has been since 1973 a wheat as well as an oil-price boom.[15] But the recession may not be turned into a boom because a run-down farming sector, a depopulated country, and a slow-moving inflexible bureaucracy is not ready to take advantage of it.

The historical boom-bust pattern has created particular patterns of poverty associated with debt. In the bust periods the country borrows heavily overseas, and these running debts are never really extinguished. At the moment the external debt is something like NZ$400 per head, with interest and service charges on top, or about one-fourth of total wages and salaries. External trade related to external debt has led to high levels of imports and with it an almost Latin American style inflation still running at 12-14 per cent per annum. To a large extent internally, debt and credit have created lines of poverty which we have argued elsewhere[16] are a major feature of contemporary New Zealand. Many New Zealanders are deeply in debt, with mortgages on houses, repayments on hire purchase, back tax, etc. It is often a Micawber-type situation where outgoings run over incomes, and there is a major problem therefore when there is unemployment (running, officially, at about 2-1/2 per cent of the work force and increasing[17]), sickness (accidents only are fully covered by the welfare state), marital breakup (also increasing — present New Zealand matrimonial legislation splits the estate equally between spouses), business losses (liquidations, etc., are also increasing amongst the large petit-bourgeois small-business community, which has historically been the most important group in New Zealand). The cash pressure has had other major consequences on the social structure, forcing women out to work, forcing all into overtime, shiftwork, moonlighting (second or third jobs); and some have argued this lies behind problems in the home, particularly juvenile crime (mainly youngsters bored with empty homes), the increase in anxiety- and stress-related diseases, or indeed what are defined as social problems.[18]

In this situation official action has not relieved the situation at all, and some have argued that many problems may be created or at least maintained by a series of self-fulfilling prophecies. If we leave aside the external debt question, it might be argued that the whole ethos of the welfare state is based on a supposition that the "people" need and want assistance with life's problems from the cradle to the grave. The population then is compulsorily locked into the system

and, as in other countries, the welfare agencies seek out clients, customers, patients, pupils, etc.[19] Rates of disease begin to look suspiciously like numbers of hospital beds; criminals and police numbers are in tandem; schools are of the kind that Ivan Illich, Bourdieu, and others condemn, concerned with classifying, examinations, or, paradoxically and equally numbing, ritualized imposed permissiveness; and so on. Since the search and the classification rather than the delivery of the goods is paramount, the welfare system becomes very inefficient. Since the system is bending over backwards to incorporate clients it is prey to the "rip-off," the skilled, almost professional, unemployed-benefit seekers who are becoming a feature of the social structure.

At the outset one might argue that there is not necessarily a widespread desire for compulsory welfarism, that in New Zealand as elsewhere pluralist subcultures, and even individuals, want to do their own thing in their own way. Many of the "poorest," the "problem cases," will not define themselves in this way; it is rather a label attached to them. This may lead to apathy, especially affecting production or productivity since New Zealanders are very heavily taxed, and many certainly now do not vote or vote willy-nilly. But it has also stimulated a variety of attempts by groups to get a greater share of the cake. The trade unions have been most significant here, and now the civil servants, professional groups, even farmers, are becoming unionized. Professionalization is part of this process and has built walls round many groups. These unions and pressure groups cannot really be described as development-from-below movements. They are not cooperative and are run by a narrow power elite and try to insist on compulsion. They operate in parliamentary lobbies, not in the constituencies. In many sectors the sum result has been to lessen income by paralyzing key industries, lowering productivity and increasing conflict and confrontation situations.

One might in fact argue that the major reason for New Zealand's under-development is related to the difficulties that exist in crossing boundaries — between pluralist subcultures and classes,

across the bureaucracy-client divide, as well as internationally, etc. Because boundaries cannot easily be crossed, there cannot easily be rational planning or a free trade in goods, services, ideas, etc. Because boundaries are drawn in a deterministic Euclidian fashion, without topological flexibilities and transition zones, there is inevitably conflict. The existentialist flow of the lebenswelt, the common sense, and perhaps the creativity inherent in it is contained and stifled. Under-development becomes cultural as well as social, economic, and political. Government and official action to solve problems has been singularly unsuccessful. Borrowing was seen as the answer to the trade deficit, as we have pointed out, but there were also very significant shortcomings in internal policies as well. The attempt to redistribute wealth through taxation did not work; some of the wealthy were able to avoid tax because there were no capital gains or value added taxes. For those on lesser incomes the relatively steep rates of tax, which continual general wage orders and wage rises soon reached, acted as a real disincentive to extra work. The large number of benefits lagged behind general wage levels, and this served to create categories of persons who were socially stigmatized if not economically disadvantaged. Largely because of bureaucratic inefficiencies, the provision of social services was inadequate. Efforts to provide equality of opportunity for minority groups, particularly through education, were not highly successful either. Amongst some Polynesian groups there was the familiar low-income/ inadequate-education/low-income vicious circle, fuelled by the need in an inflationary recession for young people to get into the work force. As jobs dwindled, those who had better education found themselves unemployed anyway or on government unemployment relief schemes, which simply stuffed more under-used hands into an already over-staffed bureaucracy.

More recently conflict has entered the New Zealand pattern of development. It seems to have emerged more clearly as socio-economic conditions have deteriorated and is finding a number of areas of expression which are tending to paralyse the economy. Take, for instance, industrial conflict. New Zealand is high on the

international strike league. Some elements of industrial conflict may be beneficial. Status competition is significant in increasing productivity. What is of course damaging are the confrontations and inflexibilities that we know only too well, and worse still violence, with its legacy of vendetta. The solutions to these problems are complex — again, status elevation may be one element. New Zealand's strike-prone industries (waterfront, freezing industries, etc.) are those which are rated generally as least desirable, "lowest class," even if well paid. It is interesting to note how some countries have "upgraded" such occupations — e.g., by building in honours and rank systems, offering workers limited time periods in an industry, many fringe benefits, professionalizing the occupation, emphasizing community service functions, etc.

Lying behind social conflicts are the broader problems of class. Although there has been much debate over whether New Zealand is developing a class system (however defined) or not, there is increasing evidence of differences in wealth, power, and status.[20] One of the problems of a decentralized nation where there is additionally not a great deal of taxation income for redistribution is that inequalities may be accentuated. However, if there are adequate opportunities for mobility this danger is lessened. Education has a key role here. Dore[21] has recently argued that elite groups tend to try to protect themselves by restricting entry to their circle, particularly through educational qualifications, producing what he calls the "diploma disease." Such a situation militates against the most able people from all groups of society (ability is not usually confined to one group) having wealth, power, and status. In a decentralized system some local choice might be exercised over those who might have access to higher education (and through it, wealth, power, or status) so that these people would be in a sense representatives, rather than the products of an artificial examination system. There must remain, too, adequate provision for deprived groups, for genuine cases of need, and for ensuring that even when these functions are delegated, these people are taken care of in a human rather than an efficient way.

Any conflict situation is exacerbated by economic problems. Despite some slowing down, New Zealand has a chronic, almost Latin American-style inflation.[22] Apart from imported inflation, much is due to the inappropriate wage context in which social competition is placed. Rising prices also reflect considerable inefficiencies — unnecessarily long chains of distributors that perhaps a decentralized socio-economy would minimize, unnecessary duplication of consumer items (the "57 varieties" syndrome), premature obsolescence, etc. It is widely assumed here that such consumer demand reflects some basic consumer motives. The evidence, however, as J.K. Galbraith has recently argued, points rather to a demand dictated by companies, particularly the big companies and the multi-nationals.[23] Encouragement is possibly needed then for the small local businesses carrying perhaps a more limited range of goods. Even here there may be possibilities for more participation, e.g., co-operatives.

Another factor contributiong to inflation may well be what has been called "over-production." It is assumed in western market economies that consumer demand is expansive and there is a continuous push for increased production to provide more and more goods. The kinds of things Galbraith talked about in the sixties — built in obsolescence, ubiquitous wastage — were and are still part of this pattern. In many cases it is not proved whether the consumer either wants or needs these products and the whole process certainly raises prices.

Underlying many of New Zealand's particular problems is undoubtedly the system of communication, or rather the lack of it. Part of this is related to the transmission of values through the education system and the mass media. Despite some improvements (e.g., ethnic time in broadcasting) the minorities are not heard or, more precisely, are neither listened to nor understood, and sometimes speak only rhetorically. As we have said, a danger of a plural society is a breakdown in communication. Throughout, ways need to be sought of finding institutions which promote dialogue and mixing, especially in the vital youth (and courtship) period during which attitudes and, more importantly, kinship links are formed. This means

that schools have a vital role and may mean that children, at least teenagers, need to go to school outside their localities — either through busing, encouragement of private or special-function schools, or simply the widespread use of exchange schemes, visits, etc. Other youth leisure institutions, e.g., sports, need maximum encouragement, but to be successful they need to be run by the youths themselves.

There is also the problem which causes much conflict and communication difficulties, of the increasing gap between the Polynesian peoples and the majority European population. By 1973 in New Zealand those officially defined as Maori[24] and Pacific Islanders accounted for something like 10 per cent of the total population or nearly 300,000 people. The proportion of Polynesians to Europeans was much higher in certain areas (or parts of the social structure), both in traditional Maori residences (e.g., Rotorua) and particularly in the major cities of Auckland and Wellington. Originally living in self-sufficient rural farming communities, the Maoris have become an urban proletariat. The drift to the cities gathered pace in the fifties, and although by the seventies it had begun to slow off, it was still much faster than the European rate of urban migration. At the 1971 Census 50.7 per cent of the Maori population lived in the cities as did the vast majority of the Pacific Island population. Some suburbs had become markedly Polynesian. In 1971 in Manukau city 22 per cent of the population were either Maori or Pacific Islanders,[25] and in some suburbs a majority were Polynesian. Similar comments could be made about other urban areas. In addition, the Polynesian population was growing at a much faster rate than the European population. In the late fifties and the early sixties the average annual increase of the Maori population was near 4 per cent per year, one of the highest in the world.[26] Although by the 1971 Census it had dropped to 2.5 per cent, this was still nearly double the European rate.

The Pacific Islanders' rate of increase was also very high and swollen further by immigration. In both cases the age structure of the population was very young. At the 1966 Census the median Maori age

was 14.9 years compared to the overall median age of 26 years. As a consequence, projections for the Polynesian population assumed a greater and greater proportion of New Zealand's people.

The reasons for this population growth were cultural in essence. In traditional Polynesian society, fertility was a prime value;[27] the larger the family, the more productive the labour force and the more prestige the family or village achieved. The extended family, based on a large number of children, provided a warm and secure environment. It is hardly surprising that, given the added tensions of city life, the family remained a keystone of the social structure.[28] In addition, as we will see later, the efforts of outside agencies, especially in the family sphere, were weakly developed.

On almost all socio-demographic indicators (cf. table 1) the Polynesians showed what is regarded as an inferior development profile, high fertility, and a shorter life expectancy. Secondly, a much higher proportion of Polynesians were unemployed than were the general population. In an unofficial survey conducted in 1968, nearly one-third of all those unemployed were Maoris.[29]

In addition, the Polynesians found themselves in the less prestigious, less skilled, less secure, lower paid jobs. Many were involved in labouring in the roads, the construction gangs, and the buses or working long hours in the factories. Despite some improvements, the rate of Polynesian involvement in technical or professional positions was under 50 per cent of the European rate for males and about 15 per cent of the female rate. In one recent survey[30] of the destination of Maori school leavers, over 40 per cent went into unskilled or factory work. Again, despite improvement in Polynesian incomes, these were still well below the European mean wages, something of the order of 15 per cent according to the New Zealand Populations Census, 1966 (Incomes, A6), and in general the Polynesian had a much larger household to support with this smaller wage packet. Vicious circles were created by low wages, particularly a heavy involvement in hire purchase and debt, and low levels of savings.

TABLE 1. Selected Indicators Amongst the New Zealand Maori

Indicator		Value
Population increase		2.9%[a]
Population structure by age:[b]		
under 21		61.8%
21-64		36.4%
over 64		1.8%
Fertility rate		2.0%[c]
Life expectancy at birth:[a]		
male	1966 onwards —	61.44
female		64.78
Infant death rate		2.72%
Death rate		0.6%[d]
Urban proportion		70.2%[e]
High-income group		8.0%[f]
Education proportions		13.5%[g]
Educational qualification ratio[h]		86.9%
Unemployment ratio[i]		48.2%
Apprenticeship ratio		5.6%[j]
Crime ratio[k]		5.7%

a. Source — NZ Department of Health Trends/1972/46ff.

b. Source — NZDS/OY/1972/1038 (Estimate December 1970).

c. Ibid. — Number of births per 100 married women in age group 16-44 (1970).

d. Ibid./65 — Deaths in proportion to total population.

e. 1971 — NZDS/OY/1972/63.

f. Proportion with incomes over $2,599 (cf. 21.3% total population) — see NZDS/1966 Census/V.5/6.

g. Proportion of under-21 Maori population in secondary schools (cf. 14.7% total population) — NZDS/OY/1972/203/1038.

h. Proportion of Maoris with less than school certificate 1969 (cf. 52.7% non-Maori) — PPTA, Interim Report on Maori Education 1970.

i. Proportion of total employed in an unofficial sample survey 1968 in Auckland, Whangarei, Hamilton, Rotorua, Gisborne — see A.C. Walsh, 1972, op. cit., p. 14.

j. 1970-71 — Number of Maori apprentices to total apprentices — Department of Maori and Island Affairs 14/8/72.

k. In proportion to the population (1969; cf. 1.0 for non-Maori population) — Report on Crime in New Zealand 1969/H20G, Wellington Government Printer, p. 21.

Incomes and jobs were also intimately related to education, and once again the Polynesian population was in many senses deprived.[31] It is true that in the late sixties and early seventies the numbers attending secondary schools had climbed steadily, so that by 1972 almost all Polynesian children had some secondary schooling. But relatively few[32] Polynesian children gained the school certificate, the major measure in New Zealand of school attainment, and there were only a handful in the universities.[33] Polynesian children dropped out of school at the minimum leaving age. Only slightly better rates of academic success were achieved by the Maori private schools.

The reasons for the relatively poor performance of Polynesian students were complex. Basically (and this would explain the greater success of the Maori private schools) the New Zealand school was a European environment. Language and curriculum were based on models closely linked to European New Zealand society and values. Very few schools taught Polynesian languages, which very few teachers understood. Little attention was paid to the aspirations and identity of the Polynesian people.[34] Although many tests had indicated that the innate ability of the Polynesian student[35] was no less than the European, there was a basic lack of outside assistance, particularly pre-school facilities. At higher levels too, education for the Polynesian population was both quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate. In particular the technical bias in both rural and urban schools created many of the problems it was intended to solve, at least pushing the Polynesian population away from the higher echelons of the occupational structure.

Another important contributing factor to the relatively low socio-economic position was poor Polynesian housing. Whilst the Polynesians lived in rural villages around traditional _maraes_, there was usually adequate access to land, despite the fact that most land had been alienated by the Europeans, particularly in the nineteenth century. Rural housing, though not always of a good standard was at least available. The situation in the cities[36] was radically different. Land and housing were scarce and expensive, and as we

shall see later, the government's housing schemes were not very effective. As a consequence, the Polynesians congregated in crowded, unsanitary tenements in what were becoming slum areas in Auckland and Wellington particularly. As more people came to the cities and the pressure on housing increased, so too did the problems.

Bad housing contributed also to relatively poor levels of health amongst the Polynesian population. Admittedly the crude Maori death rate was lower than the European death rate by 1971, was steadily declining, and had been lower since 1960. But this reflected the younger Maori age structure, and the adjusted rate shows the Maori death rate to be nearly 50 per cent higher than the European rate. Maori deaths under one year totalled 13 per cent of all Maori deaths in 1970 and 20 per cent of all infant mortality deaths. The Maori expectancy of life was approximately eight years less than the European. Rates for certain diseases (tuberculosis, heart disease, pneumonia, schizophrenia) were higher for Polynesians than for Europeans in 1971.

Another correlate of the lower socio-economic position was the increasing number of social problems, especially crime in the growing urban ghettos.[37] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Maori crime rate, for example, was growing at about five times the European rate. In interpreting this rate overall, we have to remember that the Maori population in the cities is basically youthful and that generally youth crime is increasing. Older-age Polynesian crime was less than comparable European rates. Polynesian crimes were also only higher in certain categories of crimes, notably those relating to law and order and property. In many cases the gangs and their activities were related to high spirits, boredom, and frustration at a lower socio-economic position.[38] There were other reasons for the apparently high rate. Offenders were classified as Maori, even if this was not a legal description (i.e., in terms of the 50 per cent criteria). Many Maoris were undefended in the courts and often unaware of their rights in what was considered to be an alien European environment.

The reasons for the lower levels of attainment in jobs, wages, education, housing, and health were all inter-related and it is difficult to pick out the critical area. In many ways, however, the causes were not simply within the Polynesian communities themselves. We will comment later on the reasons why government policies were not more effective; it is important to note here the influence of cultural barriers on the greater socio-economic success of the Polynesian people. New Zealanders both privately and officially have always denied that prejudice and discrimination exists in New Zealand. But much recent evidence and surveys indicate that prejudice is considerable and probably increasing. Studies have shown for example that many Europeans prefer not to live next door to Polynesians, nor marry them, and often hold derogatory stereotypes of them and wish to restrict immigration.[39] Despite legislation on discrimination, there is much evidence that Polynesians find it difficult to rent or buy housing in many areas, and when they are able to rent, the price is loaded to include the damages and failure to keep up payments which European landlords assume to be characteristic of Polynesian tennants. There is evidence too of discrimination, conscious or unconscious, in jobs, in promotion, in school, and in mortgage and loan facilities, in life insurance premiums, in legal proceedings, etc.

Prejudice and discrimination, however, went both ways across the ethnic barrier. There were growing signs of anti-European feelings by Polynesians (including some violence) and a renewed interest in Polynesian identity and ethnocentrism. Anti-European feelings dominated, but the different Polynesian groups were also prejudiced against one another. There was relatively little intra-Polynesian marriage, usually residential segregation,and sometimes violence.

These differences resulted in a conflict situation. This is not new. Since the wars of the nineteenth century there have always been Maori-Pakeha conflicts. For many years, after military defeat, Maori depopulation, and the deprivation of Maori land, there was little strife. To some degree this was a loss of spirit. But also Maori people lived and worked in rural areas, in some cases retreating into

(and recreating) traditional Maoritanga (tradition) or messianic religions, native or Christian. Maoridom was latent rather than lost.

The new industrial New Zealand which emerged after World War II changed all this. The political leaders, presumably lulled into a false security by the tranquil image that the bucolic Maori generated, encouraged urban migration to provide labour for industries which were intended to diversify away from a purely rural farming economy. Although taking some years to crystallize, a Maori identity emerged in the cities, which saw the revival of culture (notably through the establishment of urban maraes) and more significantly, political activism. Encouraged further by the example of militant blacks in the United States and swollen by Polynesian immigration both from the countryside and the Pacific Islands, the Polynesian factor has now become vital to future harmony and development.

The solutions to New Zealand's development problems may be seen in two ways. First there are the possibilities of development from above. There are grave problems here in first recommending such a programme because of the easy slip into dictatorial or command planning. Perhaps fortunately, because of basic deficiencies in the political process, effective planning is unlikely. It is to be hoped that, as more information becomes available and as there is more experience with the planning process, there may be greater co-ordination, concertization, if not orchestration. International developments may aid this process, including the possibilities of close Australasian links or even a Pacific common market.

But the great hope for New Zealand, as for many other countries is for a variety of social, economic, and political forms reflecting the essential pluralistic social structure. This multiple development from below is already emerging in a number of different forms. There are strong regional, even irredentist tendencies. A good example is the demand by South Islanders for independence, a demand which has little to do with ethnicity or class, but reflects rather resentment

of one region to centralized control. The Polynesian revival is well documented, turning in the Maori case, at least, on a new identity with the land and culminating in the symbolic proclamation of a republic at Bastion Point.[40]

Less well known, but perhaps of more fundamental importance at least in the economy, is what we have called the rural renaissance. This is something quite new in New Zealand and gathering momentum, drawing on the dynamics of both ethnicity and regionalism.

Since the war there has been a marked urban, particularly a northward urban drift. Most of the rural Polynesian Maori people and most of the migrants from the Pacific Islands have gone to the big cities and especially to Auckland. In rural areas community facilities have declined; schools, shops, and hospitals have closed; and the farming community has imported expensive machinery and technology to make up for the vanished labour. But this situation is changing. The farmers can no longer afford to capitalize with machinery. The costs of these overseas imports and operating costs are rising rapidly, reflecting overseas inflation, escalation of energy prices, and worsening exchange rates. There is a growing concern in the big cities with social problems – indeed some migrants from Europe came to New Zealand to escape big city pollution and are not happy to find they have jumped from the Northern frying pan into a South Pacific fire. There is increasing unemployment which is affecting particularly Maori and other Polynesian workers.[41] Certainly there is migration abroad and increasing numbers are using this exit. Traditionally Australia has been a haven in hard times, and Sydney is the fourth largest New Zealand city. But the Australians have even higher unemployment than the New Zealanders, and there is also a growing prejudice against New Zealand migrants, who are blamed rightly or wrongly for escalating crime rates in Australia.

The rural alternative has begun to appear as a truly feasible one. In the Maori case the return to the marae (traditional village green) has become a major <u>rite de passage</u> in the re-emergence of Maori

identity. Linked with this has been a renaissance of Maori culture and Maoritanga (traditional ways of life) generally. There is now a strong movement to demand the return of Maori land acquired, in some cases confiscated by successive European governments, since the Maori Wars of the last century.[42] Some politicians are not necessarily sorry to see a rural return for the Maori population and one conservative politician has even hinted that Polynesian offenders should be sent away from the cities to be rehabilitated by the virtues of country life or, in the case of migrants from the Pacific Islands, returned permanently to their tropical villages. The Pacific Islanders, many of whom come originally from villages, are firmly urban based, but some Samoan extended families for instance have purchased 10-acre blocks of land (which surround the cities) to establish a traditional nu'u (village). Some people (particularly young people) have also established communes in the country, and in some areas joined long-established, mainly religious groups who have lived and farmed in the countryside. New blood is also being provided by wealthy urban families (the so-called Queen Street farmers — from the name of the main street of Auckland) moving out onto small holdings or organizing companies to run farms. This has meant more capital in the countryside, new productive agricultural farms (e.g., viticulture, breeding, pines, etc.), new ideas, and keen young farmers as sons often stay on and farm.

The politicians have also been influencing the rural movement in other ways. One way of keeping down the apparent rate of unemployment has been the panacea, dating back to the Keynesian principles of the Depression, of providing work, particularly in planting or working in the forests. This however has not really led to the formation of real communities, as most of the workers are single men who live in colonies of huts in and around the forests.[43] There have also been incentives to urban youth to encourage them into farming by providing training schemes, etc. The third Labour Government (1972-75) established ohu (kibbutz-style communes) by giving Crown land to applicant groups.

In future planning, rural relocation is playing an important role. The Commission for the Future is suggesting a policy of decentralization and devolution and the encouragement of small villages and the resurrection of the country town.[44] The agricultural experts are looking for new crops and products. There is much talk of cottage industries, and Switzerland is being held up as a model of a modern country which is peaceful and prosperous on the basis of small-scale, village-style units.

Already some consequences of these changes are making themselves obvious. The traditional political system is being challenged and not only by Maori nationalists, some of whom sooner or later want to see an independent Maori state (Aotearoa) or even tribal independence. There is also a resurgence of the rural-based Social Credit party, which in February 1978 had its first member of Parliament elected for the seat of Rangitikei.

The rural renaissance in New Zealand is not a particuarly new phenomenon and it differs in different parts of the country. The rural environment contains many different kinds of social groups not basically divided by ethnicity at all but more fundamentally by social and economic factors. Function[45] is significant, e.g., dairy versus sheep or beef farming, or cropping, or, more usually, a predominance of one or another of forest farming,[46] orchards, viticulture, pigs, deer. Within each type there are other important divisions: within the sheep group, according to whether farmers are wool-, lamb-, fattening-, or breeding-oriented, and whether the farms are in the hard or easy hill country of the North Island or the high country or foothills of the South Island or the plains. Reflecting these functional divisions are more important social divisions, for example, in the dairy industry whether or not the farm uses family labour only or hires hands or operates on a metayage (sharemilker) system, or the degree to which a farm (notably dairy) is geared to providing produce for a rural factory. Size of farms is important, as farms can vary from an acre or two around the cities to the huge runs of the Southern Alps. Historical factors are

important too. Families are differentiated by the stratigraphics of dates and modes of taking up land. There is a social hierarchy, at the top of which there may be original squatters or graziers from the nineteenth century who have long had literary and cultural activities. There are farmers settled on rehabilitation land after the war, or young farmers under post-war land development schemes, or doctors or lawyers or businessmen who run the farms as a profitable business or as a hedge against inflation or taxation as urban areas expand and land prices rise in a country where there is no capital gains tax. This latter group is also much interested in promoting cultural activities. There is a good deal of literature now which claims that the farming industry as a whole is not resurgent but recessive[47] with declining income and living standards and increasing anxiety, to use Professor Franklin's phrase. Certainly there has been an overall fall in farm income relative to other incomes[48] and purchasing power in real terms, mostly caused by inflation beyond the farm gate.[49] Facilities, schools, hospitals, shops, etc., have been closing in many country areas. Certainly there is anxiety, though this is not proved by one recent study which purports to show a greater use of tranquilizers in rural as opposed to urban areas.[50]

In many areas however there is real progress. The High Country sheep farmers for example, for many years on insecure Crown leases, have now at least a firmer tenure, and there are now more realistic grazing lands which will protect a mountain environment ravaged by erosion.[51] Farmers generally, and particularly in the dairy industry, have now a guaranteed income under government equalization schemes. Most export produce is being sold; there are no gluts or dumping. There are some growth types of farming — viticulture, kiwi and sub-tropical fruits, forestry, and cervid culture, for example. There are growth areas — e.g., the businessmen farms around Auckland, which have the best stocking and productivity rates in New Zealand.

More significantly, and probably anxiety has been a positive factor here, there is a new sense of unity that farmers did not have

previously and a new determination to take action as industrial workers have done. The older official bodies such as the national Federated Farmers are still conservative pressure groups but other groups of farmers are more aggressive, withholding stock, driving flocks into town, etc. There are new groups like TREC (Towards Rural Equality of Citizenship) which combine both populist and professional philosophies along with elements belonging to the women's liberation movement.[52]

Clearly there is much more to successful development than simply recognizing or encouraging development from below. There has to be, at least in New Zealand, and probably more widely, a recognition that the change that is least destructive and most wanted by people is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In this change, existing traditions persist and the job of planning agencies may be to control any exploitative tendencies and to humanize institutions, whether public or private. The welfare institutions particularly have suffered most at the hands of the bureaucracy and need many reforms which would involve again the replacement of large central hospitals, schools, prisons, etc., with smaller units more intimately connected with families and communities. Encouragement needs to be given to modes of contact, dialogue, etc. Some "native" institutions already exist, notably in sport, and there are some traditional mechanisms in New Zealand which might help in the process of humanization and communication. Picking out the valuable traditional New Zealand institutions which might be encouraged is perhaps a debatable exercise, but certainly the short list would include:

(a) The Polynesian institutions of the extended family and the value of mutual self-help and respect for worthwhile traditions.
(b) The tradition of sport as a means of uniting in friendly combat opposed social groups.
(c) The ubiquity of voluntary associations on every conceivable facet of social life, many of whose activities lead to future welfare and development.
(d) The value of flexibility, ingenuity, etc. in solving problems (the Taranaki Gate syndrome?) and the emphasis on do-it-yourself.

However, these mechanisms may well need specific action by the researchers, the planners, and the legislators to provide an appropriate environment for change.

Because New Zealand is a fragmented society, the question of dialogue is important, for both research and praxis. Research is not, or should not be any longer, part of a process of knowledge-imperialism, or the exploiting of people's views for gain, or political or other advantages. It is, or should be, an egalitarian relationship. There should be a free flow of information and new syntheses should emerge. The outside researcher is not, or should not be, a spy, perhaps not even a helper or animateur, but a discussant.

The demerits, at least from the New Zealand situation, are considerable and present formidable obstacles. First there is a gap between the theory of dialogues and the reality. Many dialogues intend communication, synthetic development, conflict resolution, etc., but degenerate. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the concept of dialogue is rather woolly, a portmanteau concept which contains some dialogues (or elements of them) which are useful and some which are not, and which in fact may be most counter-productive or exploitative. What, we would argue, is now needed is to break down these different types of dailogues.

To classify dialogues the following factors need to be taken into account: the strength of the parties (or their voices), whether the libretto is harmonic or discordant, the degree of ritualization and of the play/serious dichotomy (cf. J. Huizinga in Homo Ludens), the relationship to the locii of power and decision making, the degree of trust, the degree of mutual comprehension of language and/or concepts, the degree of social distance and ability or willingness to cross social boundaries, the nature of background noise, the pace of dialogues, the extent of outside manipulation, the degree of publicity, the extent of propaganda and preaching, the nature of order, national and international, and the social, economic, and political ramifications, etc. There are undoubtedly other factors,

but perhaps these are the most important.

Using these kinds of criteria, we can come up with a rough typology of dialogues (not in order of priority, importance, etc.) and their usefulness, covering some (not all) situations (table 2).

In conclusion, future development in New Zealand may be said to depend on two processes. First, that there is development from below. Without recognition and encouragement, the social structure will not have the vitality that comes when the constituents are real-life communities. This means that there cannot be a single mould or consensus. To establish priorities to adjudicate fairly on the inevitable dissensions means a need for appropriate mechanisms of consultation and communication. Even before this, there needs to be an atmosphere of cooperation. At the moment in New Zealand, this primum mobile, the cooperative spirit, is sadly lacking.

TABLE 2. Typology of Dialogues

	Type of Dialogue (what)	Groups/individuals using (who versus whom)[a]	Usage (where/when)	Effectiveness as dialogue (how)
1.	Autistic dialogue: individual (or group) spokesmen speaking without answers being accepted or sought	Some governmental edicts (gazetted not through Parliament) vs. opposition. Spokesmen of extremist groups, left and right, vs. establishment	Very frequent. Encouraged by low level of parliamentary activity with many recesses and impotence of TV media	Nil
2.	Rhetorical dialogue: answers assumed; shades into performing dialogues (choruses) etc. Cf. propagandistic dialogue (9, below)	Politicians vs. each other; some senior bureaucrats vs. public and juniors; social workers vs. clients; management vs. workers	As above	Nil or very little
3.	Manipulated dialogue: class I — introduction of issues and control through agenda (or vice versa, i.e., keeping off agenda) class II — red herrings class III — staged debates	Mainly politicians vs. each other and pressure groups	As above. Especially at election times	Very little
4.	Babel dialogues: mutual incomprehen-	Polynesians vs. Pakehas (Europeans);	In newspaper columns, daily interaction,	Often counter-productive, leading to

	sion of language and/ or concepts	academics vs. others; bureaucrats vs. clients; party strife	Parliament	much frustration and mutual misunderstanding
5.	Noisy dialogues: may be a variant of 4, but also where ambient noise intrudes	As above	Public meetings; Parliament; as well as daily interaction	Raises tempers and leads to conflict
6.	Ritual dialogues: class I — Huizinga (Spel) play variety class II — Ernst and "sacred" varieties class III — diplomatic encounters class IV — constitutional sealing of important issues	Formal bodies — e.g., Pakeha (Parliament, city councils, etc.) with factions vs. each other, and Maori marae (village meeting places), Samoan foro (councils), churches, royal commissions, tribunals, etc.	In the august halls and institutions of bodies mentioned. Usually reference to a "bible," standing orders, staff manuals; sometimes in Polynesian communities, real Bibles	Tends to have the advantage of a quiet tone and general acceptance; low on popular participation and strong on authority and tradition. Very little chance of new transcending syntheses
7.	Black and white dialogues	Politicians, media people, extremists	Any institutions which are relatively public and polarized; notably Parliament, the media	Usually counterproductive; very minimal relationship to facts; deterministic
8.	Russian-doll dialogues: an analogy to those Russian (and, not to be ethnocentric, other nationalities as well) dolls where on opening an item a smaller one is found inside	Legal profession, and adversary systems; most of the many committees which rule New Zealand life inside and outside the bureaucracy	Courts, committee rooms	Usually procrastination (= no action = preservation of status quo) or reductio ad absurdum

a. Where I have not indicated who versus whom, assume an internal dialogue.

	Type of dialogue	Groups/individuals using	Usage	Effectiveness as dialogue
9.	Propagandist dialogue	Very widespread — not only the politicians but especially the many pressure groups of NZ society (New Zealand has a very high rate of associations[b]); also common in educational institutions and churches; commercial enterprises	Association meetings, schools, advertising, churches	Very effective but exploitative. Advertising companies have considerable influence, especially through TV and many subliminal cues on general attitudes. Unfortunately much NZ propaganda is very inaccurate. Religious propaganda is less effective as it is often preaching to the converted
10.	Deflected dialogue: best summed up in Joan Metge's phrase "talking past each other",[c] related to 2, 4, 5, 6	Social workers, teachers, and also clients, pupils, ethnic spokesmen	Especially at conferences	Very little
11.	Qualified dialogue	Statisticians, politicians, media	Used widely in the media, political meetings, and by scientists (social or otherwise). Opinion polls very common	Usually statistics degenerate into mumbo-jumbo or angels on a pinhead, but occasionally simple; usually inaccurate or misleading
12.	Quickies: these are the many ephemeral dialogues	Officials, academics, etc. as tourists; includes many overseas	In fast dialogue situations — airports/planes, fast food and	Naturally create very erroneous impressions on both sides

on which officials and experts particularly base their findings and recommendations	visitors or New Zealanders overseas	social occasions, missions, study trips, walkabouts

b. See David Pitt, The Joiners, in J. Webb and S. Collette, New Zealand Society (New York: Wiley, 1976).

c. In David Pitt, Social Work and Social Problems in New Zealand (University of Auckland, 1979).

NOTES

1. These kinds of conceptions are part of a new attack on the social sciences or determinism. Cf. Elias Norbert, What Is Sociology? (London: Hutchinson, 1979); J. Goudsblon, Sociology in the Balance (Oxford: Blackwells, 1977); E. Ions, Against Behaviouralism (Oxford: Blackwells, 1979).

2. Cf. Eurostat, Geonomenclature (Brussels, 1978. Code 804).

3. For example the recently established Bastion Point Republic, established on former Maori land in Auckland. For the background on Maori land disputes see D.C. Pitt, "Te Roopu o te Matakite," Journal de Société des Océanistes, no. 4 (Paris, 1976).

4. There are several categories here:
   i. Polynesian outliers include the tropical "colonies" where there is still New Zealand citizenship — notably the Tokelaus and the Cooks;
   ii. European outliers — notably the Chathams, incidentally also the last resting place of the ancient aboriginal type people, the Morioris, probably decimated by Maori colonization;
   iii. faunal/floral outliers — habitats of non-human species with attendant scientists (including Antarctica), often part of international teams (e.g., NZ-US in the Ross Sea, even sometimes NZ-USSR co-operation in oceanographic research);
   iv. the internal islands include Polynesian splinter groups, European farmers — e.g., high-country kingdoms — etc.

   The general structure of New Zealand society is discussed in D.C. Pitt, ed., Social Class in New Zealand (London: Longmans, 1977); Pitt, "Social Change in Australia and New Zealand," International Review of Community Development, nos. 37-38 (1977), pp. 67-111; Pitt, "Plural and Polar: Society and Development in Contemporary New Zealand," Journal of Economic Development and Social Change in Asia (forthcoming); S. Franklin, Trade, Growth and Anxiety (London: Methuen, 1978). See the Appendices for some additional material from Pitt, Social Alternatives in New Zealand's Future, (Wellington: New Zealand Commission for the Future, 1978); and Pitt, Social Boundaries and Education (Paris: OECD/CERI, 1978).

5. On pluralism in New Zealand see D.C. Pitt and C. Macpherson, Emerging Pluralism (London: Longmans, 1975).

6. The phrase belongs to Sir Guy Powles, former (and first) ombudsman — Listener, 29 Apr. 1978.

7. See D.C. Pitt, Social Boundaries and Education (Paris: OECD/CERI, 1978).

8. See D.C. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress (Oxford University Press, 1970); Pitt, ed., Development from Below (The Hague: Mouton, 1976); Pitt, Social Dynamics of Development (Oxford: Pergamon, 1976).

9. See D.C. Pitt, "A Rural Renaissance," paper presented to the ISA World Congress, Uppsala, Sweden, 1978.

10. See IBPD, World Bank Atlas (Washington, D.C., 1966, 1978).

11. UNRISD, Research Data Bank of Development Indicators (Geneva, 1976).

12. Statistical Yearbook, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1977), p. 836.

13. The outflow figure has increased sixfold since 1975 — New Zealand Department of Statistics Information Bulletin, 1978.

14. E.g., Gordon Stephenson, former Chairman, Dairy Section of Federated Farmers, of Putaruru.

15. Cf. L. Brown in E. Stamp, Growing Out of Poverty (Oxford, 1977).

16. See D.C. Pitt, ed., Social Class in New Zealand (London: Longmans, 1977).

17. The Auckland Committee on Unemployment has estimated figures of 130,000-150,000, three or four times the official rate (see Unemployment News, August 1978, pp. 1-2).

18. See D.C. Pitt, ed., Social Work and Social Problems in New Zealand, (London: Longmans, 1978).

19. Cf. D.C. Pitt Social Dynamics of Development (Oxford: Pergamon, 1976).

20. See D.C. Pitt, ed., Social Class in New Zealand (London: Longmans, 1977).

21. R. Dore, The Diploma Disease (London: Unwin, 1976).

22. The OECD rated it fifth worst among its members in 1977-78.

23. J.K. Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin; 1977).

24. The definition of Maori (New Zealand Polynesian) is extremely complicated. In general it is a person who claims half or more Maori descent. In new legislation planned in 1975, a Maori is a person who calls him/herself a Maori. Some statistics (e.g., education and policy) are based on usually European evaluation of Maoriness. See A.C. Walsh, More and More Maoris (Wellington: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd., 1961).

25. P. Curson, "Polynesians and Residential Concentrates in Auckland," Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 79 (1970), pp. 421-432;

D.I. Rowland, "Processes of Maori Urbanisation," New Zealand Geographer, vol. 28 (1972), pp. 1-22; K.W. Thomson and A.D. Trlin, Immigrants in New Zealand (Palmerston: Massey University Press, 1970); D.C. Pitt and C. Macpherson, Emerging Pluralism (Auckland: Longmans, 1975); A.C. Walsh and A.D. Trlin, "Niuean Migration," Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 82 (1973), pp. 470-486; B. Kernot, People of the Four Winds (Auckland: Hicks Smith, 1971).

26. See W.D. Borrie in K.W. Thompson and A.D. Trlin, Contemporary New Zealand (Wellington: Hicks Smith, 1973).

27. See D.C. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

28. See D.C. Pitt and C.M. Macpherson, op. cit., 1975.

29. A.C. Walsh, op. cit., 1971.

30. Ibid.

31. See particularly D. Bray and C. Hill, eds., Polynesians and Pakeha in New Zealand Education (Auckland: Heinemann, 1973); also National Advisory Committee on Maori Education, Maori Education (Wellington: Department of Education, 1971, mimeo); J. Ewing and J. Shallcrass, Introduction to Maori Education (Wellington: New Zealand University Press, 1970); R.K. Harker, "Maori Education and Research," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol. 7 (1971), pp. 46-57.

32. Post Primary Teachers' Association, Report on Maori Education (1970, cyclostyled), gives 13.1 per cent Maoris as compared to 47.3 per cent European.

33. R.K. Harker, "Maori Enrolment at New Zealand Universities," New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, vol. 5 (1970), pp. 142-152.

34. R.K. Harker, "Socio-economic and Cultural Factors in Maori Academic Attainment," Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 80 (1971), pp. 142-152; D. and M. Archer, "Race Identity and the Maori People," Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 79 (1970), pp. 201-218.

35. E.g., M.M. Clay, "Language Skills: A Comparison of Maori, Samoan and Pakeha Children," New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, vol. 5 (1970), pp. 153-162.

36. See Housing in New Zealand — The Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Wellington: Government Printer, 1971), chap. 9.

37. See A.D. Trlin, "Immigrants and Crime," in Webb and Collette, New Zealand Society; P.T. O'Malley, "The Influence of Cultural Factors on Maori Crime Rates," ibidem; Department of Justice, Crime in New Zealand (Wellington: Government Printer, 1969); J.R. McCreary, "Considerations on Some Statistics on Maori Offending," New Zealand Social Worker, April 1969, p. 40; D.C. Pitt, ed., Social Work and Social Problems in New Zealand (University of Auckland, 1978).

38. See D.C. Pitt and C. Macpherson, op. cit., 1975.

39. A.D. Trlin, "Attitudes towards West Samoan Immigrants in Auckland," Australian Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 3 (1972), pp. 49-57; Heylen Research Centre, The Heylen Poll (Heylen Research Centre, Auckland, 1972); A.D. Trlin, "Immigrants in the Cities," in R.J. Johnson, ed., Urbanisation in New Zealand (Wellington: Reed, 1972).

40. The background to the Maori land protest is described in D.C. Pitt "Te Roopu o te Matakite," Journal de Société des Océanistes (Paris, 1976).

41. Cf. D.C. Pitt and C. Macpherson, Emerging Pluralism (London: Longmans, 1975).

42. See for example D.C. Pitt,"Te Roopu o te Matakite," Journal de Société des Océanistes, no. 4 (Paris: 1976).

43. See D.C. Chapple, Tokoroa – Creating a Community (London: Longmans, 1975).

44. See D.C. Pitt, Social Alternatives in New Zealand's Future (Wellington: Commission for the Future, 1978).

45. See the following table, taken from Franklin, op. cit., 1978, p. 139. Statistics are very poor and confused in this area.

Farm Types in New Zealand (Numbers of Farms – 1973)

Farm type	Number
Principally dairy	15,932
Principally sheep	13,731
Principally beef	5,852
Sheep and beef	6,331
Dairy with sheep or beef	2,210
Sheep with dairy	152
Beef with dairy or sheep	1,519
Mixed livestock	5,215
Sheep and cropping	1,741
Principally cropping	1,170
General mixed farming	1,623
Market gardening	1,623
Orchards	2,054

46. I.e., two-tiered farming with sheep or cattle usually under Pinus radiata.

47. See for example S.H. Franklin, Trade Growth and Anxiety (Methuen, 1978).

48. In 1973, according to a Federated Farmer study, sheep farmers earned about half of top salaries (e.g., doctors); by 1975 it was a third.

49. About 50 per cent is value added after the farm gate.

50. S.D. Webb and J. Collette, "Rural Urban Differences in the Use of Stress-Alleviate Drugs," American Journal of Sociology, Nov.

1977. This study, however, used only a survey of prescriptions, and some drugs studied are also used for non-psychotropic conditions, e.g., for gastroenteritis. Another survey based on respondents has shown a very low rate of drug usage. See T. Gill, The Rural Women of New Zealand (University of Canterbury: 1975).

51. Cf. K.F. O'Connor, Introduction to the Waitaki (Wellington: UNESCO/MAB, 1976).

52. Franklin, op. cit., 1978, p. 177.