

© The United Nations University, 1982  
Printed in Japan

ISBN 92-808-0318-2  
ISSN 0379-5764

HSDRGPID-53/UNUP-318

**APPROACHING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL  
ECONOMIC ORDER DIALECTICALLY AND  
TRANSFORMATIONALLY\***

**Herb Addo**

Institute of International Relations  
University of the West Indies  
St. Augustine  
Trinidad

\* See Notes on p. 75.



This paper by Herb Addo was first presented at the Expansion/Exploitation and Autonomy/Liberation Processes IV Sub-Project Meeting, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, January 1981. It can be considered as a contribution to that sub-project of the GPID Project.

Geneva, September 1981

This paper is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on the subject at this stage of the research.

## CONTENTS

1. Introduction: Identity and Purpose	1
2. Why the Earlier Slogans Failed: Poverty of Vision	5
3. The Imperialist Problématique and the Quality of the Peripheral State	16
4. The Dialectical Politics of Transformation	30
5. The Transformation Potential of the NIEO	42
6. The NIEO's Valid Transition Politics of Deorientation	53
7. The NIEO's Valid Transition Politics of Re-creation	63
8. Is the State Dead?	69
Notes	75

## 1. INTRODUCTION: IDENTITY AND PURPOSE

This essay deals with the well-trodden thesis that the capitalist world-economy<sup>1</sup> has always been characterized by the concentration and the centralization of capital; and that, in its inter-state context, it assumes the form of the unequal incidence of accumulating capital between the centre and the periphery parts of the world-system. The essay is self-consciously set in the tradition of knowing that "dialectics" is not just a word to be bandied about in its normally accepted forms. Dialectics is not just a method or analytical frame for the study of social phenomena. It is more than a scheme of analysis which alerts us to the conflicts involved in the interrelations and the interactions between opposing social forces. Dialectics is more than a way of teasing out additions and explanations from social phenomena as they unfold, through the technique of questions leading to more questions, in the search for answers in the course of inquiry in order to provide information for its own sake. Dialectics is all this and more.

It is essentially the application of its forms as a method, an analytic frame, and a general scheme for the drawing out of lessons from

the experience of a phenomenon. It is a learning process and an education: the utilization of the phenomenal and the experiential effects of the movements in the flow, or the motion, of social history in order to inform and influence its future unfolding.

In addition to being self-consciously dialectical, this essay also claims to be structural-relational. It is structural because it attempts to go deeper than the superficialities of the capitalist exploitation phenomenon to unearth the supporting and the inner relationships and relations which sustain the relational superficialities of the unequal incidence of accumulated and accumulating capital which define the centre-periphery relations and interrelations in the capitalist world-economy.

The dialectical objective is to understand the phenomenon of exploitation, so that the forces and the structures which give rise to and sustain it can be influenced in directions that will make them ineffective and so aid the transformation of the world-economy, within which they operate, to make it more just and equitable.

The forces involved here are many and must therefore be resolved into analytically neat folds and vectors. This is why we employ the dialectically appropriate scheme of opposing the positive with the negative: the theme with its anti-theme, the thesis with its antithesis. In this regard, we endeavour to unearth underlying real contradictions within an apparent contradiction: the fact that capital leaks from the periphery to the centre is not itself a contradiction. It is natural order in the capitalist world-economy; and for this reason this cannot be approached directly. What constitutes contradictions are the inner processes and relations implied by this

order which make exploitation so persistent when both the world-system and its economy appear to be changing so much.

This approach should compel respect for "the opposite" at every turn. If, however, this is not evident at all points in the essay, it is because of some obvious constraints and not because of any lack of optimism and confidence in anti-systemic forces and their eventual triumph. This essay focuses on states as the organizing nodes in the capitalist world-economy; and the hope is that a subsequent essay will address directly, in transformational terms, anti-existing-states forces.

The New International Economic Order (the NIEO), viewed as the summary of the main problems in the political economy of the capitalist world-economy, is a convenient and appropriate source of entry into the politicals of the dialectics of the transformation of the capitalist world-economy into another form which would be more just and equitable. In this essay, I conceive the NIEO as the foreign policy consequence of the contradiction of the dependency of the periphery parts of the world-economy on its centre parts. The thesis is that the NIEO can succeed in transforming the world-economy to make it more just and equitable only if its contents are appreciated by the periphery states in much broader and deeper political senses than they appreciated the NIEO's predecessor "developmental" slogans.

The idea of transformation, as a process, is also approached dialectically by the distinction that we establish between two sets of opposed processes within it. The set of processes that can aid the transition of the world-economy into a more just and equitable form in the reasonable future we call valid transition potential; and the set of processes that can work against such a transition we call arrested transition potential.

The main argument is that broader and deeper political considerations for the transformation of the world-economy will reveal the nexus between the internal-periphery and the internal-centre sources of imperialism as the main obstacle to the transformation of the world-economy. This nexus we call the imperialist problématique. The NIEO can aid the dissolution of this imperialist nexus only if the periphery states practise what we call valid politics of transition, which, as the name suggests, is the kind of politics informed by the valid transition potential in the world-economy, and avoid the practice of its opposite, the arrested politics of transition, which is informed by the dialectical counterpart of arrested transition potential.

We argue also that the viability of the politics of valid transition is contingent upon a change in the quality of the peripheral state, to the effect that periphery states will abandon the imitation of the centre states' way of life, which is exploitative by nature, and instead, practise the first principle of "honest" political economy by producing and distributing non-exploitatively to meet basic needs for all in their areas. This, I suggest, can be done only if the periphery states in the world-system begin to orient themselves to practise domestically the same just and equitable economy that they appear to seek at the world level.

The attempt here is to link internal-periphery injustice with the injustice in the capitalist world-economy. The proposition is that exploitation in the periphery is linked to that in the centre, and that both brands of injustice are related characteristics of the capitalist world-economy. The argument is that the negation of injustice in the periphery could signal the negation of injustice at the world level.

This essay is, then, meant to be read as an invitation to take a few steps down the dark realms of the misconception that imperialism concerns only the inter-state relations between the centre and the periphery of the capitalist world-economy. The invitation has become necessary because of the pressing need to move from the correct, but by itself unhelpful, criticism of the imperialist dialectic at its inter-state level only. Criticisms of imperialism at this level alone lead to dubious calls for "world revolution." What we need at this stage of capitalist development is the endeavour to understand the imperialist phenomenon enough to realize that its roots are deeply sunk in internal-periphery contradictions within the global processes, which result in capital leaks from the periphery to the centre. In the context of the transformation politics of the world-economy, this realization points to the strategic primacy of internal-periphery transformation over inter-state reformations in the negation processes of the imperialist exploitation generally and the dissolution of what is referred to here as the imperialist problématique in particular.

## 2. WHY THE EARLIER SLOGANS FAILED: POVERTY OF VISION

Despite the fact that a lot has already been written on the NIEO, a lot more can and certainly will be written on it. The reason for this is simply that, from a distance, the NIEO appears to be dealing with the seemingly inexhaustible problems of the political economy of the single, interdependent, active, and rapidly evolving capitalist world-system, insofar as these problems deal with the differences in the qualities of individual lives from the perspective of the world-system. Intellectually,



therefore, the NIEO falls in the domain of the objective laws which claim to govern and explain the production and the distribution of material means of subsistence. In this light, the NIEO would appear to be concerned with how these laws explain the historical fact of exploitation, as it expresses itself in our present world, and in terms of the transformational potentialities of controlling, ameliorating, or altogether removing exploitation.

When we square the NIEO with the temper and the goal of our present capitalist world, it soon becomes clear that what are really in contention are the maintenance, the probable attainment, and the potential transcendence of what has become known as the Bourgeois Way of Life (BWL),<sup>2</sup> as it relates to the production and the distribution of Basic Human Needs. It is, therefore, not surprising that the various treatments of the NIEO have come to serve all ideologies; and that the NIEO itself is held as a "developmental" slogan by many.<sup>3</sup> The NIEO has come to refer to both the rationalizations and the irrationalities of the capitalist world-economy, as this economy is typified by the peculiar combination of the exploitation modes that underpin it and the transformation potential inherent in it.

Two things should be made very clear about the NIEO. First, it is at one and the same time an affirmation and a protest: an affirmation of the thesis of the capitalist world-economy and the protest of its antithesis, both forming the dialectical unity that the world-economy must necessarily have by virtue of being a historical process. Second, as a protest, the NIEO has had a chain of inglorious precedents in the recent history of the world-economy. The recent phases of this history can be identified by a parade of slogans,<sup>4</sup> as they have come to attach themselves to the pathetic

unfolding of an impossible dream. These slogans have included: "massive infusion of technical aid," "foreign aid," "import substitution," and "trade not aid."

The dream has been the organization of the idea of converting the socio-economic circumstances of the periphery parts of the world-economy into circumstances similar to those of its centre parts.<sup>5</sup> This organization is what is often, and in our view wrongly, referred to as "development."<sup>6</sup> The impossibility of the dream lies precisely in the futility of seeking to organize this conversion within a refurbished capitalist world-economy. It is in this context that, if we have heard a lot about interdependence and collective and individual self-reliance in connection with the NIEO, we should realize that these terms would not have commanded the attention accorded them today were it not that they are considered potent antidotes to the current exploitation strains in the long and historic<sup>7</sup> story of the development of the capitalist world-economy.

Let us proceed, then, by asking: why did the "developmental" slogans which preceded the NIEO fail?

In the early post-war period, it was believed that all that was needed to develop some parts of the periphery was the infusion of technical aid into these periphery parts of the world-economy from its centre parts.<sup>8</sup> Later, in the 1950s and early in the 1960s, import substitution, aimed at the conservation of scarce foreign exchange for the purpose of laying the foundations of industrialization in the periphery, had its firm hold.<sup>9</sup> During this same period, in fact all along, aid in its many forms was touted as the thing to pursue, if economic growth, humanitarian justice, and social stability of periphery societies were to be guaranteed within a smooth-running

world-economy.<sup>10</sup> Soon after this, the slogan of "trade not aid," still in pursuit of foreign exchange, began to echo in international settings (especially in GATT and UNCTAD), where nations of the periphery dared to confront those of the centre on the crucial matter of fairness in the world-economy.<sup>11</sup> Toward the end of the 1960s, calls for the need to adjust the structural relations between the centre and the periphery of the world-economy on a much wider basis and in more comprehensive terms began to be heard. By the early 1970s, as the developmental frustrations mounted, the demands of the periphery states had evolved into what appeared to be higher forms. This led to a situation where, by the mid-seventies, we had come to see the packaging of these old trade- and foreign-exchange-related demands, and some new additions, into a neat bundle of demands for a more just and equitable international economic order. This bundle is what is known today as the NIEO.<sup>12</sup>

It looks very much, then, as if as one slogan appeared inadequate for developmental organization, new ones were coined; and as if as each slogan proved not merely inadequate but perhaps even dangerous for developmental purposes, in the everchanging context of the world-economy, they were all put together, and held together by the new additions, in the package called the NIEO. The hope was that where the different slogans failed, the collective would succeed. But can this be true?

The following pertinent questions are in order: Can the NIEO as a collective slogan succeed where the earlier solitary slogans failed? If so, what makes this probable? Is the NIEO package really that new to guarantee success? Or is it something about the system itself? Has the system itself changed that much to allow success? If the periphery states are to do

something to ensure success, what must they do? What should be their strategy, then? In other words, how should the periphery states do what they must do to ensure the objective of the NIEO? This, indeed, is the basic question with the NIEO, and I intend to treat it in this essay from the point of departure that with some years' hindsight and from the retrospective reading of history,<sup>13</sup> we should now be in a position to appreciate the astonishing inability of these developmental slogans to embrace any more than the tangentials of the real meaning of the history of the world-economy.

The initial conviction here is that these earlier development slogans were unsuccessful mainly because the periphery states failed to read the world-economy and its history properly. First, they tended to assume wrongly that there was ample room in the centre of the world-economy for both themselves and the centre states. Second, they acted as if whatever needed to be done to move them to, and accommodate them in, the centre, needed only to concern the international aspects of the structural relations between the centre and the periphery parts of the world-economy. Third, the periphery states naively tended to believe that what needed to be done could be left to the initiatives of the centre states. Fourth, the periphery states misunderstood development to mean no more than the growth-led imitation of the centre societies' Bourgeois Way of Life.

From the world-system perspective, all this constitutes an amazing tendency to ignore the harsh central fact of the world-economy, to misread the ever present and glaring differentiations within this economy, and to misunderstand the subtle variations which must, of necessity, attach themselves to the stubborn realities of the development of the capitalist world-economy, so that it can appear to be changing while, in fact, it remains essentially the same.

The central fact of the world-economy is its historic theme of accumulating capital in the centre and away from the periphery.<sup>14</sup> The glaring differentiation within this economy is precisely what Amin has established as constituting the difference between the central formations and the peripheral formations that compose the world capitalist mode of production and distribution.<sup>15</sup> The subtle variations we refer to are the ever-changing, but persistently stubborn, forms of the structural-relational mechanisms of the world-economy, brought about by the improvements in the efficiency of the exploitation of both human and non-human resources in aid of capital accumulation in the centre, resulting in the pauperization of the periphery. These variations bring about changes within the centre and within the periphery; and yet maintain the related separateness of the central and the peripheral formations, within the single world capitalist formation, for the purpose of sustaining the historic theme of the system. This is the relation which Amin has described convincingly as still bearing, in essence, the order of primitive accumulation from the periphery to the centre.<sup>16</sup> And it is this same relation which Johan Galtung has described, in the context of the expansion-exploitation processes of the capitalist world-system, as "a process with a centre and a periphery, both of them moving, the context of them moving, the exact processes within and between changing, but the gradient of exploitation remains, enriching the centre, impoverishing the periphery in various ways."<sup>17</sup>

It is this subtle variation, characteristic of the world-economy, that I have described elsewhere<sup>18</sup> as the different phases of imperialism. I see imperialism as a related and a persistent phenomenon of capitalism from its very inception in Europe, in the late 15th century. Imperialism is the globalizing process of capitalist exploitation. It changes in form,

as capitalism develops, for the sole purpose of continuing to make it impossible for capital to accumulate in the periphery, but possible in the centre. I have called this manner of viewing imperialism "the continuity of imperialism thesis."<sup>19</sup> This is a way of pursuing Oliver Cox's insight that imperialism has been an abiding attribute of capitalism.<sup>20</sup> With the pioneering aid of James Caporaso,<sup>21</sup> I have argued that to the extent that imperialism at the international level deals with exploitation of the periphery by the centre, in aid of capital accumulation in the centre and away from the periphery, it is a function of the multiplicative relationship between augmented value-inequality<sup>22</sup> between the centre and the periphery, and induced dependency of the periphery on the centre.

I suggest, then, that the predecessor slogans of the NIEO failed because they were aimed at the impossible removal of the exploitation resulting from imperialism at the international level, while its supporting props of inequality and dependency, and the mutual relationship between them, were ignored. This is what should lead us to say that earlier slogans embraced no more than the tangentials of the history of capitalism, by which we mean that they embraced the historic effect of capitalist exploitation but not its historic structural and relational roots. The argument is that, at this phase of its development, the significance of capitalist exploitation is much larger than its international manifestations, because its roots run much deeper than their shallow international expressions.

We believe therefore that the NIEO will fail, as surely as its earlier forms did, for as long as the periphery states continue to see the conflict of interests between themselves and the centre states in terms of an "international élites deal," in which, as Frank says, the only cost involved is

that to be incurred by the centre states in the formal integration of the periphery élites in the capitalist world-economy.<sup>23</sup> We suggest, then, that if the NIEO is to succeed in transforming the world-economy into another form which is more just and equitable, then the periphery governing classes must see the problem of the unfairness and the injustice in the world-economy, and its probable transformation, in terms of the main problem of the persistence of imperialism. They should aim to undermine imperialism at both its internal-periphery and its internal-centre sources.

This will entail reasoning downwards from the high level of world imperialism, in order to isolate its fundamental causes in terms of the imperialist problématique, which we see as the vexing persistence, at the periphery end, of the nexus between the internal-periphery and the internal-centre sources of world imperialism. The argument, in the main, is that the periphery sources of imperialism have come of age and, without prompting, they are capable of independently exploiting the periphery for the benefit of capital accumulation in the centre states. This, however, is only one side of the coin. In true dialectical fashion, there are forces opposed to the periphery sources of imperialism. The problem in this regard is whether these opposing forces can be precisely identified as genuine dialectical opposition. The problem is confusing regime opposites with dialectical opposites.<sup>24</sup>

The imperialist nexus I refer to above has been developing both in complexity and in subtlety as the world-economy has been developing. Therefore I can argue with respect to the NIEO that, from the point of view of the dialectics of world-history, it must embody some properties which could be used to dissolve this nexus in the "respectable future,"<sup>25</sup> and some which could be used to dissolve it in some very distant "final analysis." Later in this

essay and in the context of transformation, I refer to the properties and processes that make for transition of systems in "respectable time" as valid; and those properties and processes that work against such transition as arrested. But, meanwhile, I argue further that it is not possible to treat the transformation potential in the world-economy without hinging this treatment upon those of the imperialist problématique and its transformation potential.

I am inclined to view the conflict between these two types of properties of the NIEO's transformation potential as the domain of the politics of foreign policy consequence and as evidence of the further maturation of the contradiction of periphery dependency on the centre. For this reason, I am inclined to argue that the foreign policy consideration of the NIEO is more political in implication than economic in substance; and, therefore, that in discussing the foreign policy strategies for achieving the NIEO, we should isolate, and then stress, what is politically viable about the NIEO's transformation potential. This potential can be approached in many different ways. But, however viewed, it will have to depend upon the extent to which it can be said that the NIEO represents a crisis<sup>26</sup> of sorts at this phase of the world-economy, and the extent to which it can be said that the crisis expresses the near maturation of the contradictions embedded in the world-economy generally and in the imperialist problématique in particular.

The arguments so far would suggest that if we mean to approach the NIEO in comprehensive transformation terms, we shall have to do so in the context of three derivative questions. The first would relate the NIEO to the specificity of the long history of capitalist development;<sup>27</sup> the second would explain the NIEO, as a probable embodiment of crisis, in terms of the



phenomenal relationship between capitalism and imperialism; and the third would stress the automaticity of the link between the properties of the NIEO, as probable crisis, and the properties of the present New International Division of Labour (NIDL) phase of imperialism.<sup>28</sup>

Once this is done, it should then become very clear that the NIEO is nothing if it is not the foreign policy consequence of the dependency of the periphery states on the centre states at this NIDL phase of imperialism.

It will not be easy to treat the subject fully, as outlined above. However, I reason that the essence of such treatment would amount to treating the NIEO in terms of its potential for the negation of the imperialist problématique.

Approaching it this way, I realize that, while the actual economic contents of the NIEO are not unimportant by any means, they matter less than the political character that distinguishes the NIEO from its predecessor slogans.

The basic argument in support of this position is rather simple. Given the reality of the world situation, economic policies alone are incapable of transforming the world-economy, for the transformation capabilities of specific economic policies derive their particular transformational potential from precise political readings and appreciation of the world capitalist reality. With respect to the NIEO, the political readings must of necessity spring from some degree of dissatisfaction of the peripheral states with their dependent roles in the world-economy. So far as the NIEO is concerned, it is the depth and breadth of this political dissatisfaction that forms the stuff of its transformation politics.

It is this that I intend to treat below in terms of the inevitable dialectical struggle between the valid and the arrested transition constituents

of transformation. This could be a complex matter, and it should be approached with some caution and determination.

One thing to note and stress, as we proceed, is that, given the complexity of world reality, economic policies are by themselves incapable of promising the transformation of the world-economy, because such policies are double-edged in their transformation abilities. Whether the same policy aids the valid transition form or its dialectical counterpart of arrested transition depends on the political appreciation mentioned above. So that, if the NIEO indicates a higher political appreciation than the earlier slogans, then the question becomes whether the appreciation is high enough to transform the world-economy in the respectable future. This is our chosen question with respect to the NIEO, and we intend to treat it in terms of how such politics would appear were the NIEO to be transitionally valid. Our position will be that the periphery states will be pursuing the correct transformation strategy, the more their politics can be said to approximate our description below of valid politics of transition.

This calls for no less than a bold attempt to draw the political context for evaluating the transformation potential of the NIEO in terms of the dialectical struggle which attends the maturing of the major contradiction of the age.

Towards this end, I ask many logically pertinent analytic questions. Most prominent among them are the following: 1. What is "transformation," and how does it differ from "transition"? 2. Given that we know what properties constitute a transition, is the NIEO a transition? 3. If the NIEO is a transition, what is valid, in terms of the respectable future, about its transition potential?

Prior to seeking answers to these questions, I need to reduce the imperialist problématique to its plain political essence, the quality of the peripheral state, so that I can link this essence to the different politics of transition.

### 3. THE IMPERIALIST PROBLÉMATIQUE AND THE QUALITY OF THE PERIPHERAL STATE

The idea that an exploitation relation is a multiplicative function of inequality and dependency can be expressed to mean that any entity that relates to another entity in unequal and dependent terms is exploited by that other entity. Presented in this manner, the concept exploitation and the category from which it is derived become too highly general to be of much analytic use. In these general terms, exploitation is applicable to all unequal and dependent relations at all times and in all places. We therefore need to provide a context from which our use of exploitation would derive its precision and specificity. We suggest that, within the world-system methodology, the context is the capitalist historicity, which is to be understood in terms of evolutionary capitalism from the late fifteenth century till now.

In this context, exploitation is inextricably connected with the expansion and the domination processes of capitalist development. Capitalist expansion and domination are what make imperialism the epiphenomenon of capitalism.

Imperialism is present in capitalist development where capitalism's expansionist impulses and dominating tendencies create the structural-relational conditions of inequality and dependency between entities to

produce the exploitation relation of unequal exchange; and it is present where the mutually reinforcing relationship between inequality and dependency leads to the reproduction of the exploitation relations. Since capitalism from its earliest has possessed these impulses and tendencies, imperialism is not only as old as capitalism, it is also synonymous with capitalist exploitation.<sup>29</sup>

This means that when we refer to imperialism, we simply refer to the exploitative relation between an exploited entity and exploiting entity brought about by the mutually reinforcing relationship between the structural conditions of inequality and dependency. Since the accumulation of capital -- primitive or not -- is all that capitalism appears to be about, then capitalist exploitation means nothing if not the process of unequal exchange which enables capital to accumulate with the exploiter at the expense of the exploited: the phenomenon of capital leak from the exploited to the exploiter.

It is from this context that we should derive the meanings of inequality and dependency, if the above formulation of exploitation is not to appear too economic. To the extent that exploitation stands for the process of unequal exchange leading to the phenomenon of capital leak, from parts of the capitalist world-economy to other parts of it, this process is brought about by the relationship between two factors: the unequal incidence of accumulated capital on the one hand, and the unequal incidence of the circumstances favourable for further accumulation on the other.

Inequality, at any one time and in terms of the exploitation process of the capitalist world-economy, stands for the disparities between entities of the system in their possession of or control over accumulated capital.

Dependence, which can and has been viewed in many different ways,<sup>30</sup> similarly stands essentially for the structural-relational constraints in the world-economy that make it impossible for certain units in the system to accumulate capital, because these constraints deprive the dependent units in the system of the internal strength they need first to initiate and then to sustain capital accumulation.

The exact view being advanced here is that the process of exploitation, the process of unequal exchange leading to the unequal incidence of accumulating capital, is set in motion when and where the two conditional inequalities -- the disparities in accumulated capital under possession or control and the disparities in the abilities to initiate and sustain accumulation -- become coincidental and interrelated. Such coincidence and interrelations produce a hierarchical system of varying status levels defined by degrees of exploitation, as described by the interrelating coincidence of differing degrees of inequality and dependency.

The capitalist world-economy in evolution has always been such a system. In its early phases of development, Wallerstein suggests, there were the core and the periphery as well as the external arena.<sup>31</sup> However, since the late 19th century, when the entire world was finally overrun by capitalist dominance, the world-economy has divided itself roughly into a three-level hierarchy comprising the centre, the semi-periphery,<sup>32</sup> and the periphery. To take the two extremes, high levels of possessed or controlled accumulated capital and low levels of dependency define the centre; low levels of possessed or controlled accumulated capital and high levels of dependency define the periphery.

This is what makes the centre-periphery relation a simple power relation,<sup>33</sup> which leaves the periphery open to the automatic, if not the natural, exploitation by the centre.

Three observations are worth making with respect to this formulation of capitalist exploitation. The first is that capital appears both as the effect as well as one of the two structural causes of exploitation: the exploitation resultant of capital leak is capital in its various forms; the structural condition of inequality in possessed or controlled accumulated capital is also capital in its various forms. This, we must admit, should not be surprising in a capitalist world-economy.<sup>34</sup>

The second observation is that where disparities in inequality and/or dependency approximate zero, there is no imperialist exploitation relation. Even though in such cases there could still be capital leaks, such leaks cannot be considered exploitative in that they cannot be attributed exclusively to the coincidental relationships between inequality and dependency, and the mutuality between them.<sup>35</sup>

One example will illustrate this observation. US-Canadian relations are not exploitative, because, whatever the disparity may be between US-possessed or controlled capital on the one hand, and Canadian-possessed or controlled capital on the other, in Canada, this disparity, when it relates to Canadian dependency on the US, does not appear to be pauperizing Canada totally while enriching the US totally. The reason for this is that the apparent Canadian dependence on the US in in real terms very small, and for this reason Canada is able to retain a large part of the accumulating capital to its capitalistic advantage within the world-system.

The Canadian case contrasts with the cases of US capital in Latin American countries, for example. In these cases, because disparities in both the inequality and dependency conditions are large, huge capital leaks occur, pauperizing Latin American countries.

The second observation intimates the third, which is that exploitative capital leaks are qualified depending upon the hierarchical standings of the units interacting. This means that the magnitude of real exploitation depends not only upon the degrees of inequality and dependence, but also upon the hierarchical identities of the interacting units. The degrees of inequality and dependence notwithstanding, there is a coefficient which qualifies the resulting capital leaks in all interactions. The values of these qualifications depend upon whether the interacting context is centre-centre, centre-periphery, or periphery-periphery.

Let me explain further. One of the axioms of the capitalist logic is uneven development: the axiom which indicates the biblical position on the fact that to those that have, more will be added and from those that have not, even that which they have will be taken away from them. To the extent that this is true, and we all know that it is true, we suggest that where the interactions are between centre units, the coefficients or the qualifications to the capital leak would tend to be very small; where they are between centre and periphery units they would tend to be large.<sup>36</sup> The third interaction, that between periphery-controlled capital, is rather new to the world capitalist experience. To the extent that such interactions are not proxies for centre-controlled capitals, we will suggest that the qualifications will probably be a little lower than the centre-periphery ones.

The foregoing presents a somewhat static conception of the imperialist phenomenon. What is more interesting for our purposes, because it is analytically more useful, is the conception of imperialism in motion.

It should not be contentious to say that at the initiation of the capitalist exploitation process, there ought to have existed inequality of some kind -- for example, technological superiority in boats and guns, or the structural need to expand and hence the determination to succeed -- between the exploiter and the exploited. Dependency, in the sense presented above, could not have existed at the initial stage of capitalist imperialism. It had to be nurtured or induced by the initial inequality in order to complete the conditions for automatic and efficient capitalist exploitation. This, however, in no way suggests that, in changing capitalist circumstances, an initial non-exploitative dependency could not be converted to serve exploitative inequality.

The interesting thing to note here is that the initial inequality, which was used to induce dependence, is itself augmented in due course by the induced dependence. The two processes go on, and they are mutually supportive.

This is what has made the unequal power premises inherent in the capitalist exploitation process effective enough to encompass the entire world. The strength of capitalist expansion and the resilience of its exploitation are owed to the above mutual relationship between inequality and dependence. The mutual unfolding of the two processes is what accounts for the stubborn persistence of capitalism's historic theme of accumulation of capital in the centre and away from the periphery. The articulation between the two processes is what accounts for the changing nature of centre-periphery relations, for the singular purpose of enabling what Galtung has called "the gradient of



exploitation"<sup>37</sup> to so remain that accumulating capital will continue to desert the periphery for the centre -- the continuity of capitalist imperialism. The periphery parts never interact with the centre parts on an equal footing within the world-economy.

We all know that the exploitation processes within the centre and the periphery parts are not closed systems within the world-economy. They are interdependent, that is, they are open and interrelated processes. From the world-system perspective, it is the world-wide unfolding of these processes which, within the development of the capitalist world-system, accounts for the generally acknowledged secular growth of world accumulated capital, its high distributive incidence in the centre, and its high generation in and desertion from the periphery. The deserting or the leaking capital from the periphery goes to add to the capital stock of the centre.

The exploitation relation between the centre and the periphery has existed all through the nearly 500-year history of the world-economy in formation. What has changed during this period is not the effects of the exploitation phenomenon on the accumulation of capital in the centre and in the periphery, but the forms which this phenomenon has taken. The forms of capitalist exploitation have always been clear; and even the changing forms bear a commonality which Amin has described as still bearing the order of primitive accumulation.

In the early phases of the world-economy, potential capital deserted the periphery in formation in the forms of plundered valuables and potential productive forces. Later, during the colonial era, when capitalism had taken a more distinctive shape, imperialism took the form of huge profits gained from unequal trade. All through these periods, the changing process in the periphery

in formation revolved around the firm institutionalization of the dynamic props of capitalist exploitation. The centre used the inequality in capital stocks to induce dependency of the periphery; and, as the dependency developed, it aided exploitation of the periphery by its magnifying effects on the desertion of capital from the periphery. This is how the mutual relationship, posited above, makes the periphery's exploited subordination to the centre an essential and permanent part of world capitalism.

From the above, it should be clear that the capitalist world-economy has been interdependent, and unequally so, all through the history of its formation. Some observers in the centre, however, underplay the historically unequal interdependent nature of the world-economy. When these observers come to admit the interdependent nature of the world-economy, but not the inequality of it, at its present New International Division of Labour phase, what they seem to be acknowledging is that the periphery parts have matured to become so intractably integrated into the world-economy in their easily exploitable dependent roles that they are needed in these roles to guarantee the normal functioning of the world-economy in its capitalist form. The other side of the conception of the world-economy at its present NIDL phase is the assumption by the periphery parts that their own economies have become so dependent on the centre economies that they cannot hope to accumulate capital in their economies without the continual injection of capital from the centre economies. But this is precisely what the problem is: the periphery economies, by virtue of being dependent, have no internal strength to generate capital which they can retain to their benefit, no matter what the source of the "initial" capital is.

This indeed is the problem: dependency and its pitiful maturation in

the course of the development of the world-economy to the point now where most parts of the periphery do not even need the factual and the visible presence of colonial exploiters, symbolized by feather-hatted colonial governors, to maintain the imperialist link in aid of capital leaks from the periphery to the centre — the "post-independence" reality within the NIDL phase of world capitalist development.

This would have been an appropriate point to refer to the role that the state has played in the development of capitalism at the world scale and the role that the peripheral variants of the capitalist state have played in this development. I shall suspend the detailed treatment of this vital reference in this essay.

Suffice it to say that the imperialist problématique refers precisely and specifically to the way in which the internal conditions of peripheral societies and the peripheral states themselves, having been made to serve as automatic mechanisms for capital leaks from the periphery to the centre, continue to be mechanisms for capital leaks from the periphery to the centre at this post-independence period in the NIDL phase of the development of world capitalism. The existence of this problématique, of course, is explained by the penetration, in fact the creation, of the peripheral economies by the centre economies through the expansion imperative of world capitalism. It may help to say that the effectiveness of the imperialist problématique is due to the strength of the institutionalization of the dependency factor in centre-periphery relations; but its persistence, its development, and its maturation are to be explained differently: the persistence of the problématique is due to the imperialist connection, link, or nexus, which over the years has come to assume the proportion and the potency of the

peripheral state, a facilitator of capital leak from the periphery to the centre.

Let me explain. Every state has a quality. And by the quality of the state, I am referring to a particular property of the state, the particular relevance of its historic nature: the paradox composed by the difference between what the state claims to be about and what it actually is about; and how this paradox relates to the historic theme of the time. This particular nature of the state refers to the extent to which the state is in or out of tune with the requirements and the expectations at historic points in time. Whether a historic epoch is at its thetic or antithetic phase is of extreme pertinence in the evaluation of the quality of the states.

From the very beginning, in the development of world capitalism, the emerging centre states set about interfering with the qualities of the states then existing in the emerging periphery. Whatever the initial qualities of these states in the emerging periphery, they had to be changed to suit the novelty of capitalist development by being converted into organizing nodes for the facilitation of capital leak to the emerging centre.

The process consisted essentially of the development of corps of clientele groups, which over the years have come to serve as the able representatives of the interests of the centre economies in the periphery economies. It is these groups, which with the development of world capitalism now come in the various capitalist ideological hues, that now constitute the peripheral states and serve as their "reserve armies."

If we describe the imperialist problématique in terms of the persistence of the connection between the organizing nodes of the centre and the periphery, then this very persistence must be further explained in terms of the perpetuation of a common interest shared by both ends of the connection.

The common interest is this: both ends of the connection claim the Bourgeois Way of Life as their own. With the development of world capitalism, the periphery ends of the imperialist problématique have come to adopt this way of life as their own. As they understand this way of life more and more, they seek internal and external conditions which would enable them to attain more and more of this way of life exclusively for themselves, thus forcing an increasing number of their population to be subjected to the Proletarian/Proletarianized Way of Life. These periphery ends of the imperialist connections have become, in contemporary capitalist reality, the periphery domestic sources of world imperialism. As these sources understand world capitalism more and more, the majority have been struck not by the painful irrationality and the obscene immorality of capitalist exploitation, but by the smallness of their compensations for serving as the able domestic sources of imperialism in the periphery. As world imperialist exploitation grows in secular terms, they see that they only receive a small part of the exploited proceeds to continue representing the centre's interests.

This realization has been expressed in various development slogans in recent years by these domestic sources of imperialism, as they seek to replicate in their various peripheral economies the exact world imperialist conditions in which they play the subordinate roles. It appears that their intentions are to assume greater control of the periphery economy so that they can reserve for themselves larger and larger parts of the exploited capital from the periphery to enjoy more of the Bourgeois Way of Life.

This ambition is futile, because world capitalism is constantly changing through the increased efficiency of exploitation. The very policies the domestic sources of imperialism had hoped could aid their ambitions have failed to do so. In fact, these policies have deprived them of some of their share

of the products of exploitation, because the changing conditions of imperialism, behind which "developmental" slogans have the tendency to lag, have made the multiplicative effect of periphery dependency more and more pronounced.

Our position on the NIEO, then, is this: if the periphery economies want a really new order, one that is equitable and just, the newness in this order should undermine the old by affecting the internal roots of periphery external dependency on the centre. As long as the new order is directed at the exploitation resulting from capitalist domination alone to neglect the internal roots of the dependency factor, not much of a new order can result.

What has been said should not be confused with the vulgar position taken by some centre sources of imperialism. They suggest that the problem of inequality in the world-economy is more pronounced in the periphery states than between the centre and the periphery, and, for that reason, until the periphery inequalities have been removed, international corrective actions cannot be considered.<sup>38</sup> We are more than aware of the gross inequalities in periphery states, but our sentiments are different. We seek, for developmental strategy, to make the periphery élites aware of the untenability of the belief that the sources of imperialist exploitation must, by logic and fact, always reside where they do not. These élites, whether they reside in the centre or in the periphery, still remain the periphery domestic sources of imperialism. Our arguments do not slow action on the international plane. They indicate that, for the purposes of periphery strategies, the periphery ends of the imperialist connections are what must be recognized and worked on if the intention is to transform the world-economy. In any case, those ends of the imperialist connections ought to be easier to handle than the centre ends.

A novelist, Ayi Kwei Armah, shows he is very much aware of the imperialist problématique when he expresses the following sentiments with specific reference to African political leadership:

The main political characteristic of African leadership since the European invasion is its inability and unwillingness to connect organically with the African people because it always wants first of all to connect with Europe and Europeans.

Hence the chronic inability of African leadership to create the indispensable maji, a workable one.<sup>39</sup>

The term maji is a Swahili word meaning water and, in Armah's context, it derives from the name given to the fierce war fought in East Africa in the 19th century against imperialist encroachment -- the Maji Maji Wars. It is believed that the East Africans lost the anti-imperialist war because the resisting leaders encouraged their people to fight on the superstitious belief that consecrated water had magical powers to deflect bullets.

One should not laugh at this. It contains a profound lesson for the autonomy-liberation processes which constitute the anti-imperialist struggle against capitalist expansion-exploitation processes.

Listen to Armah:

Maji Maji leaders did understand the need to create a means of defense that could operate on two levels:  
1. Psychologically, remove the fear of death, i.e., the fear of . . . agents of death. 2. Practically, neutralize the implements and strategies of death.

Maji Maji leaders understood that their implementation of that understanding was raw, faulty, imaginal, not practical. That is the fault an authentic African leadership would correct. But those with access to practical knowledge of the means are conditioned inevitably to loose sight of the aim. . . .

The maji is not something existent, waiting to be collected and used. It would have to be created, an antidote to the potent poison of European penetration.<sup>40</sup>

For as long as the imperialist connection, the factor linking the peripheral states to world capitalism, exists, then the quality of the peripheral states can be said to be strained. For this reason, we should realize that we have a set of specific and related problems which constitute a single problem for autonomy-liberation processes in the anti-imperialist struggle. This single problem is what I have called the imperialist problématique. The dissolution of this problématique calls for the crucial recognition of the strained quality of the peripheral states.

Creators of an effective maji for the dissolution of the imperialist problématique must know the world for what it is: a capitalist world-economy, composed of central, socialist, and peripheral types, in which capital automatically deserts the peripheral types for the other two types (especially the central type through the historically established mechanism of capital leak).

The paradox involved in the imperialist problématique is plainly that while the peripheral states claim to be mobilizing to liberate themselves from exploitation, they appear to be doing everything to reinforce exploitation. In this sense, the peripheral states are in tune with the thetic requirements of world capitalism, because capital continues to leak out of the peripheral states. The strategic implication here is that the peripheral states should reject the Bourgeois Way of Life and, by means of this rejection, move the peripheral states out of tune with world capitalism and by so doing move it antithetically and transitionally toward a non-exploitative world-economy.



#### 4. THE DIALECTICAL POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION

We have asked above whether the NIEO could succeed where the earlier slogans failed. We meant by this question much more than whether the NIEO could change the world-economy. We meant whether the NIEO could transform the world-economy by affecting its structural-relational characteristics of augmented inequality and induced dependency so fundamentally as to make them unimportant, in that they would no longer result in exploitation beyond a certain "tolerable" minimum. Much more than "in other words," what we are asking is whether the NIEO is a transition. The graduating complexity of the structure of our question is due to the fact that the word change is of little analytic use, and therefore what we are really asking is the following compound question: what is transformation; how does it differ from transition; and what is potentially transitional about the NIEO?

The terms "transformation" and "transition" are congeneric and problematic.<sup>41</sup> One can say that they refer to the obvious truth that any human society, irrespective of time, place, or duration, is always involved in some kind of "transit" from one "form" of society to another. But the problem is that the transformation and transition processes of societies are not easy to detect with any degree of confidence, and hence they do not lend themselves to reliable predictions.

Robert Cox, for example, in considering the role of ideas in relation to the positions of conflicting forces, concluded with the observation that "the significant breaks or turning points in history are points at which mental constructs which have hitherto been recognized as generally valid science... come to be seen as ideology."<sup>42</sup> He further observed, with specific reference to the NIEO, that "it remains an open question whether the debate over the

NIEO indicates such a turning point."<sup>43</sup> This should illustrate the difficulties involved in the detection and the prediction of probable transitions.

The problems with the terms are not entirely removed even when Rodney assures us that "to speak of transition from one mode of production to another allows for a somewhat greater precision,"<sup>44</sup> because he believes transition can be understood inferentially to mean a state which is "a link between two historical epochs and it incorporates elements of both the old and the new."<sup>45</sup> It hardly helps the identification of transition when he adds that, by definition, the state of "transition lacks unique, classical or sharply defined features."<sup>46</sup> Rodney goes some way toward clarity in identifying transition, however, when he states that a transformation is a transition only when it "is a brief interlocking rather than an amorphous and protracted phase between two historical epochs."<sup>47</sup> If, therefore, what determines a transition is the contradictions in the preceding era, then the presupposition is that "the contradictions have reached a point of maturity and their resolution necessarily implies a qualitatively different situation. It is for this reason that transition is a brief period of intensified activity when new social forms triumph over the old in a context of sharp struggle."<sup>48</sup> Transition to Rodney, then, is "the ultimate goal and means of transformation,"<sup>49</sup> because it "equates with guided transformation."<sup>50</sup> We shall refer to this as the "transition equation."

The above suggests clearly that transition is a special case of the ambiguous and nebulous process of transformation. It is that special case of the transformation process where the "transition equation" holds in a context of sharp struggle. But then transformation is a complex phenomenon, and therefore where there is one such special case, the dialectical appreciation

of history can only lead one to suspect another special case which works against it within the total process, if transformation is not to become a daily occurrence. What we suspect, therefore, is that in any transformation process where the materialization of the "transition equation" is held in check, there must be "reasons" which constitute a force to arrest the valid unfolding of the "transition equation." If this is true and conceptually clear, then what we suggest is that within the undisputable transformation process in any human society there are two sets of mutually antagonistic processes. One set of processes makes for the validity of the "transition equation," and the other makes for its arrest. We shall conceive the processes that aid the unfolding of the "transition equation" as having valid transition potential, and those that work against it as having arrested transition potential.

Both of these transition potentials constitute the transformation potential of a given society at a given time; they form a dialectical unity; and they are constantly engaged in a dialectical struggle for immediate transitional superiority within a transformation process. So that in the short run, and in every instance, we can argue that a transformation process is valid to the extent that the valid processes in it overpower its arrested processes; and that the transformation process is arrested to the extent that the arrested processes have the upper hand over the valid processes. These two processes are political; and the differences between their political stances derive from their respective readings, in particular contexts, of what are paradoxes that intimate contradictions and what are their levels of maturity. Therefore, the same policies will be understood and employed differently by each transition politics.

This is precisely where the double-edged property of each probable transformational policy comes in. Each policy can be used to aid either valid politics of transition or its arrested counterpart. The different politics select differently between the two edges of each policy; and it is the coherence between the selections which constitutes the identities of valid and arrested transitions.

Before we proceed with further analysis of the terms transition and transformation, let us ask an important question. It is whether for the crucial "transition equation" to hold, the guide for the transformation, the nature and maturity of the contradictions must be clear to the principal carriers of the transformation. It is generally agreed that this condition need not be and, in fact, has not always been true for all transitions. As Amin puts it, with respect to our present world, "...what counts in history are the unexpected accidents, and there can be some here and there in the periphery and in the centre...";<sup>51</sup> and, as Rodney adds, "all historical leaps have not been consciously directed."<sup>52</sup> Rodney goes on to argue, however, that the present epoch and its transformation properties are unique, "because of the highly developed consciousness of the ... combatants."<sup>53</sup>

So that if the evaluative reactions to the NIEO as a transition tend to come in the forms of extreme rejection and extreme acceptance,<sup>54</sup> then it would be that the guide to the transition is not clear, because either the contradictions are not mature enough to be noticed by its principal carriers or, even though they are mature, the historical background against which the NIEO as an embodiment of a transition is to be judged is not appreciated enough in a manner which highlights both the nature of the contradictions and their levels of maturity.

We would therefore venture, as the premise for further discussion of the NIEO, the cautious proposition that the problem is both the nature and the maturity of the contradictions, and the lack of the proper appreciation of the dynamics of the history which the NIEO is supposed to transform and the product of which it is.

Let us return very briefly to Cox's useful survey of the intellectual literature on the NIEO for some insight. It is clear from Cox's essay that even though the ideological foundations of "science" are being exposed by "radical" departure, "science" is far from being dethroned. Our main concern is not to investigate whether "radical" ideas informing the NIEO are capable of resolving conflicting forces, in the near future, in favour of turning history in a particular direction. It is whether in these ideas, and their relations to conflicting forces notwithstanding, there is a political quality to the NIEO which indicates that it has the ability, bred by historic tensions, to serve as the true organization for turning history -- that is, of satisfying what we have called the "transition equation." To reiterate, our concern is whether, irrespective of intellectual traditions, the negation properties of the history of the development of the world-economy have sufficiently influenced the formulation of the NIEO to make it an effective means of turning this same history towards the realization of the ideals embodied in the NIEO, by employing the same ideals as its means. This concerns whether the NIEO is itself the shape of things to come. And it implies the following analytic questions: 1. What is new about the NIEO, that makes this question worth asking, seeing that its earlier forms did fail? 2. With the principal carriers of the NIEO as a probable transition identified, what should be their strategy, with respect to what is new about the NIEO, if they are to succeed

in turning history in the desired direction?

What is the NIEO?

To proceed, however, we need to see the NIEO for precisely what it is. For the purpose of maximum strategy for the periphery states, we need to approach the NIEO from the reality and the rationality of these states' situation in the world-economy. The rationality of these states' strategy, clearly, ought to derive from the relationship between the reality of their situation, within the world-economy, and the magnitude of their transformational ambition. What we are interested in is the political significance of this derivation, and not the policy substance of the NIEO.

The NIEO is no more than a package of demands presented by the periphery demandeurs of the world-economy to the centre of this economy, and to themselves; and it is intended to make the world-economy more just and equitable. We should note first that there is nothing novel in the history of man about underdogs of a social system demanding changes in the situation in which they find themselves; and second that the nature of these demands and the manner in which they are made and pursued are directly related to the history which shaped and sustains the structural-relational peculiarities of that society.

There is nothing novel in this, except we should add that while the ends to which such demands are aimed could vary, they fall within a given range. They could be aimed at no more than the amelioration of the onus on the underdog; or at the total and complete negation of the existing social order; and, in between, we can have a situation where the underdogs seek not so much to abolish the system as to share the "crown" with the topdogs

in the system.<sup>55</sup> In each of these instances, the probability of success is impaired by the high probability that the stubborn facts and the subtle variations within the particular histories will conspire to make things appear to have changed, while in fact they remain essentially the same.

The principal carriers of the NIEO are the periphery states. To the extent that the NIEO aims to affect the capitalist world-economy at all, it can aim merely to ameliorate the cost of peripheral subordination; or to raise the status of these states to that of the centre, but still within a capitalist world-economy; or it can aim to serve as the vehicle for radical change in the nature of the world-economy so that it will no longer be capitalist, as it would be based on a radically different historic theme and production-distribution culture. This latter kind of change can occur, in the present world circumstances, only when the contradictions within the system are not only mature but also clear. By this we mean that the problems generated by the system within itself would have become so profound and so pronouncedly clear that the system cannot compensate for their transitional effects.

#### The NIEO as the Foreign Policy Consequences of Dependency

With specific reference to the NIEO, and its transition virtue at the present phase of the world-economy, what distinguishes it from earlier forms is not some nebulous conception of contradictions and their maturity, but the presumed developed consciousness of the principal carriers of the NIEO. This consciousness can be credited to a deeper understanding of the world-economy that exposes its exploitation mechanisms and their dynamics, and rejects them as unjust, immoral, and therefore irrational.

We know that transition vehicles do not usually arrive wrapped in packages and labelled as "transition vehicles." We already know that, because

of the different possible ends to which changes in a system may aim, an accurate one-shot prediction of a transition would probably be more of a lucky guess than a scientific exercise. So that if we ask whether the NIEO is a "transition," we are asking a false question. No matter how false the question may be, however, it serves two causes very well. First, it enables us to continue to reason on the cautious but still realistic proposition that the NIEO is not necessarily an assured transition, in that it is not necessarily an immediate product, or an embodiment, of mature contradictions at this phase of the development of the world-economy. The fear betrayed here is the realization that, whatever the contradictions which brought about the package of demands called the NIEO, they can resolve themselves along lines which could validate or arrest the transition potentials which the NIEO may possess. Second, and resulting from the first, we must then ask whether the NIEO's transition has some potential. On this, we reason further that however viewed, whether in terms of its substantial content or its political stance, as indicated by both its long and short histories, the NIEO must possess some transition potential, which must indicate a certain degree of mature appreciation of the exploitation basis of the development of the world-economy and in particular, the form it takes in the present totally interdependent world-system. It is this appreciation of the contradictions within the world capitalist economy that a historic reading of the capitalist history will express as the foreign policy consequence of the main source of capitalist exploitation -- dependency. By this we mean that a historic reading of the NIEO will see it as the foreign policy consequence of the dependency of the periphery on the centre of the capitalist world-system.

This means the NIEO, as a set of demands, was inevitable. It had to come, sooner or later; and this is explained by the fact that the same



history which created the dependencies of the periphery nations and their subordination to the centre, to facilitate the accumulation of capital in the centre and away from the periphery, is the same history which created the contradiction of demands from the periphery which has led to the formulation of the NIEO. The link between the two aspects of this history is that the second is explained by the first: the NIEO is explained by some maturity in the contradiction of periphery dependency on the centre at this NIDL phase of world capitalism.

#### Vindication of a False Question as a Point of Departure

From the above, we can see that even though the question as to whether the NIEO is a transition may be a false question, it is not misleading for it forces us to focus our attention -- critical and analytical -- where it should be: on the transformation potential of the NIEO. As we have indicated above, transformation processes have their valid and arrested transition processes. A valid transition is one that satisfies what we have called the "transition equation"; and an arrested transition consists of the processes which seek to prolong or even reverse the actualization of the "transition equation." This is what makes valid transition the counterpart of arrested transition and constitutes both into a transformation dialectical unity. Every transformational process has its share of the two transition processes. For this reason, the political instance in any transformation process is located in the dialectical conflict between the two transition types.

Given the above, we can reason that, in the short run, a transformation process is valid to the extent that the "transition equation" is satisfied, that is, to the extent that in the dialectical struggle we refer to, the valid overpowers the arrested. A transformation process is considered arrested to

the extent that, in the dialectical struggle, the arrested overpowers the valid. So that, when we question if the NIEO is a transition, and if by this we are betraying our hopes that the NIEO will be a valid transition, then we need to know the identities of the valid and the arrested properties of the transformation process well enough to enable us to aid the resolution of the dialectical conflict between them in favour of the valid.

A large part of the relevant literature on the NIEO dwells on the matter of how to make it a valid transition. They tend to present theoretical analyses of the world capitalist economy and they then proceed to treat either the prescribed strategy itself, or its tactical components. In other words, writers tend to confront directly the question of how to make the NIEO a transition by drawing inferences about the NIEO from their conceptions of the world-economy, and what is desirable and possible within it. In the intellectual debate on the NIEO, controversy attaches less to what is desirable and more to what is maximally possible toward realizing the ideals of the NIEO, at this phase of the world-economy.

In this essay we join the debate on the side of those who argue that we cannot obtain a new international economic order if the capitalist world-economy is not to be radically transformed in the process; and we are on the side of those who see the main problem in this transformation as relating to the phenomenon of imperialism.

Our point of departure is based on the distinction we have established above between valid and arrested transitions and on the position that the political interface between the dialectical counterparts within the transformation process is where the strategies for valid transition must be derived. This is the precise point where we must worry about how the idea of

transformation can be made to serve as its own organization. Further, our approach is in the form of an indirect detection of an appropriate strategy. It is hinged on the detection of the differences between the politics of valid transition and the politics of arrested transition. The sensitive detection of this difference is important because we reason that the ability to detect this difference is itself the source from which to derive strategies, or organization policies, which will enable the valid aspects of the NIEO, as a potential transition, to overpower its arrested counterpart in the dialectical struggle.

Since one strategy can only presuppose another, neither valid nor arrested transition politics can exist or have meaning by itself: Each owes its existence and its meaning to the other. For this reason, the transition relation between them, what we have derived as the transition strategy, cannot be anything more than the mutual and constant reaction to and anticipation of each other. This is the essence of dialectics, the unending drawing of lessons from wanted and unwanted experiences, a learning process.<sup>56</sup>

The dialectical contrast we have established above between valid and arrested transition politics is not enough, however. It does not mention the critical and intricate detail of the antinomy within the two dialectical counterparts of transition politics. The point is that both valid and arrested transition politics each contain within themselves antinomic political counterparts, which are also dialectically related.<sup>57</sup> We shall call these two opposites, within the established opposites, politics of re-creation and politics of de-orientation. As the terms may suggest, re-creation processes seek to maintain their particular transition orientations, while de-orientation processes aim to neutralize them, if not negate them entirely. We should note

carefully that the transition orientations of these two latter politics are reversed within each of the two primary opposites. Valid transition politics has its arrested contents in the form of politics of valid deorientation, which aims to negate the politics of valid re-creation in the overall valid orientation of valid transition politics. The politics of valid transition remains such because its politics of re-creation dominates its politics of deorientation. The reverse holds true in the case of politics of arrested transition, where its politics of re-creation aids the arrested orientation, and predominates over the politics of deorientation which aims to negate the arrested orientation in the primary opposite of politics arrested transition.

The illustration on page 84 summarizes what we have just said.

Essentially, the illustration means that in box A,  $+ \rightarrow -$ ; in box B,  $- \rightarrow +$ ; and that to the extent that a society is in transition, mutuality  $D \rightarrow$  mutuality C and vice versa.

Therefore, we can see that the real source of dynamism in transition politics lies in the mutual reinforcement between valid transition politics of re-creation (VTPR) and arrested transition politics of de-orientation (ATPD) on the one hand, and their dialectical struggle with the mutual reinforcement between valid transition politics of de-orientation (VTPD) and arrested transition politics of re-creation (ATPR) on the other hand.

This further distinction between VTPR and ATPD on the one hand, and VTPD and ATPR on the other, is extremely important in that it makes for increased subtlety in transformation analysis. In the particular case of the NIEO, it can explain why certain transformation arguments emanating from the

central societies sound so similar to certain arguments emanating from the peripheral **societies**, even though the arguments claim to have opposed transition intentions. Further it can help us to realize possible transition political alliances based on the mutualities in transition political orientations. As can be seen from the illustration, VTPR and ATPD can have some arguments and visions in common, for example the need to transcend capitalism and the visions of desirable world and societies. Political alliance can be established on the mutuality between the two. The same goes for VTPD and ATPR.

A full treatment of the NIEO along these lines for the purpose of transition strategy will have to provide contents for the categories established above. What we intend to do next in this essay is to point briefly to some aspects of the contents of ATPR and ATPD (boxes 3 and 4 in sketch), and then proceed to treat the two orientations in the valid politics of re-creation (boxes 2 and 3 in sketch) at some length. In tune with our approach, this latter treatment will take the form of establishing the differences between the two antagonistic types of valid transition politics, if the peripheral societies are to be considered the main carriers of the NIEO's valid transition potential.

##### 5. THE TRANSFORMATION POTENTIAL OF THE NIEO

The Question: Does the NIEO Make a Difference?

We must remember, as we turn specifically to discuss the transformation politics of the NIEO, that we have depicted the NIEO as the foreign policy consequence of the periphery nations' dissatisfaction with their exploited subordinate roles in the capitalist world-economy. We have also said it is the political depth and breadth of this dissatisfaction, as they inform the

understanding of policies, that would indicate the transformation potential inherent in the NIEO. In addition, we have argued that earlier slogans failed principally because they were politically thin and shallow. This latter fact was due to the initial misreading of world-history, which led these slogans to focus on the external aspects of exploitation to the utter neglect of the imperialist problématique.

The conclusion to be drawn from this summary is that the earlier slogans were low on valid transition potential and high on arrested transition potential in the course of the normal articulation of the world-economy's transformation process. The obvious question, then, is this: Does the NIEO make a difference? Are there indications that the NIEO is politically broader in its sweep of policies, and politically deeper in its recognition of the imperialist problématique? Is the NIEO's transition validity more pronounced than that of its predecessor slogans? In this context, Cox's excellent 1979 review of the subject provides more grounds to restate that the appreciation of the NIEO's apparent valid properties is caught between nihilistic rejection and hyperbolic acceptance.<sup>58</sup> There is a reason for this. The NIEO pretends to be nothing less than a "giant" step toward the transformation of the world-economy, but the apparent size of the step can very easily divert attention from the the transitional ineffectiveness of the level at which it operates.

#### Aspects of the NIEO's Arrested Transition Politics

Frank views the NIEO as an "utterly modest proposal for a better and greater integration of the Third World in capitalist world trade..."<sup>59</sup> To him, it is becoming increasingly "evident that the demand for NIEO is a political conflict between the governing class in the Third World and the

political representatives of international capital in the world capitalist economy. The political conflict is about the terms of the former's... integration in the latter."<sup>60</sup> The incorporation proper of the periphery élites could only mean the "use of the political alliance to exploit and oppress the masses in the Third World still more and effectively."<sup>61</sup> This, indeed, is the dreadful fear of the future, projecting from the frightening facts of the present. Frank's views on the transformation potential of the NIEO is crisis-based. He sees crisis within the capitalist world-economy as the only chance that the periphery nations would get to enunciate "relatively more autonomous and 'self-reliant' capitalist development based on a more populist democratic alliance of classes between sectors of the bourgeoisie and the working masses."<sup>62</sup> Such an alliance would still be a part of the capitalist world-order, but then it could lead to its destruction. But for the moment, Frank thinks that "the most realistic prospects would seem to be the maintenance, and indeed the extension and the intensification, of the old international economic order under the guise of a 'new' one."<sup>63</sup>

Galtung sees the transformation potential of the NIEO in these terms: "what the New International Economic Order means, when translated into the world reality, is some kind of 'capitalism for everybody' charter."<sup>64</sup> He states elsewhere:

Very crucial in the evaluation of the NIEO at the international level, which is the level at which it is intended to work, would be the relative weight between 1. improved terms of trade, 2. more control of world economic cycle and 3. improved trade among periphery countries. If the first predominates it might very well freeze the present structure but possibly at a higher level where income to the periphery countries is concerned. If the other two predominate the present structure might be changed, present centre-periphery trade might decrease in relative terms.... One might argue that the first scenario could be a transition on the way to the second.<sup>65</sup>

The argument means that the NIEO is an international deal which could lead to some change within the world-economy, but also that the world-economy would remain essentially capitalist because these changes can be accommodated within a capitalist world-economy. In this respect, both Galtung and Frank appear to agree that, for as long as the NIEO is seen as an international "elitist deal," it can promise some change, but not much of a change, if rapid transformation of the capitalist world-economy is what we have in mind. Unlike Frank's crisis-based discussion of the NIEO, however, Galtung's is Basic-Needs-based.

Galtung argues that "whereas the NIEO is very macro...Basic Needs (BN) is a micro approach going down to the level of the single individual human being."<sup>66</sup> The BN approach sets production and distribution priorities in favour of what is basic to meet human needs, and, in particular, it biases distribution in favour of those most in need. Basic Needs are to be understood in the deep sense of including both material and non-material needs. If the NIEO is essentially international, the BN approach is essentially intranational. Galtung argues that the difference in political stance notwithstanding, there is no contradiction between the two approaches; that indeed the two approaches are compatible and complementary. Galtung's impressive master argument is that making the internal orders of periphery nations more similar to the international order demanded by the NIEO is the surest way to realize the transition potential of the NIEO to its fullest.<sup>67</sup>

From this, it would be quite correct to argue that the transitional challenge of the NIEO deals with the intranationalization of its international nature. We shall adopt Galtung's argument as our own, and it will serve as the criterion for distinguishing the valid from the arrested political clusters.



Otto Kreye treats the rationality and the reality of the NIEO from the point of view of Western Europe's economic and social development within the capitalist economy, and in particular in terms of the contradictions at the present NIDL phase of the world-economy.<sup>68</sup> He argues that the development of the world-economy since the mid-1960s has been marked by far-reaching structural changes. Kreye states:

the most striking features of these changes are the emergence of a worldwide labour market and a world for production sites... These structural changes... have been triggered off by a new set of conditions for valorization of capital, conditions which are themselves the outcome of capitalist development up to this point. This new set of conditions includes, on the one hand, the existence of a practically inexhaustible worldwide reservoir of cheap labour, above all in the underdeveloped countries, and, on the other hand, the technology now available in the areas of transport, organization, and communications, and in the production process itself, which has created the possibility of splitting up production into a series of sub-procedures. It is precisely these technological developments that have rendered the reservoir of cheap labour usable.<sup>69</sup>

It is against this background that Kreye measures the crisis in the present Western European economic and social development to determine which of the NIEO demands will be acted upon and which will be rejected.

Kreye breaks down the long list of NIEO demands into two issue-areas: (1) the adjustments of the supranational trade and monetary political superstructure; and (2) the issues which constitute a potential threat to the capitalist structure of the world-economy itself. He concludes that Western Europe capital, Western European states that is, will fully support demands that seek to align the political superstructure to the structural changes in the world, because they will facilitate and promote transnational reorganization of production and mobility of companies; but that they will reject out of hand those demands which threaten the capitalist nature of the world-economy.<sup>70</sup>

This conclusion is interesting, but even more interesting is Kreye's view that Western European strategy in the politics of the NIEO will consist of clever tactical oscillations between "restrained endorsement and restrained rejection."<sup>71</sup> It could not be otherwise in the dialectical politics of transition. The rationality and the reality of the Western European crisis seem to square the dictates of the NIDL with Western European anticipated reactions to the NIEO. And this can only aim at the arrestation of the transition validity of the NIEO. Insofar as the NIEO is no more than an "international élitist deal" between periphery and centre capitals of the world-economy, the Western European strategy with respect to the NIEO, like the EEC-ACP Lomé deals, will remove the NIEO from the setting of acute confrontation between the centre and the periphery and place it in the setting of a series of gentlemanly negotiations which will lead to a series of NIEOs in the very very long run. In the end, barring "accidents," the cumulative effects of  $NIEO_1 \dots NIEO_n$  could achieve the impossible dream of making periphery societies similar to those of the centre. In the final analysis, should such a thing ever be possible, then, there will be, in Galtung's words, "capitalism for everybody."

Many more references can be cited to underscore the point that essentially there is very little that is new, or potentially valid, about the NIEO. Sauvant, for example, mentions the obvious point that what distinguishes the NIEO from earlier efforts is not its comprehensiveness. To him, and to many others, such comprehensiveness had already been approached in the UN action programme of the Second Development Decade and in the various combinations of UNCTAD resolutions.<sup>72</sup> Much to the point, Amin, in a characteristic mood, has expressed the fact that

the themes of the new order involve the aspirations to control natural resources and to strengthen national states, which imperialism does not accept. Imperialism would therefore like to substitute for the new order the "Rio Project" (Reshaping of the International Order!), which is an ideological formulation of the need to transfer some of the industries of the centre to the peripheries under the wing of the multinationals. 73

So that, to the extent that the NIDL phase of world capitalism has already begun and means no more than that the extensive wings of multinationals are well and flapping insatiably, the attempt to convert the NIEO to what Amin calls the "Rio" is international capital's politics of arrested transition to entrench and legitimize the world capitalist system in its present form.

Thus, if one does not believe in impossible, or even long, dreams, and if one is not to confuse the vital dialectical distinction between the valid and the arrested aspects of the politics of transition, then one would read the brief review in this section as essentially illustrating some, and only some, of the arrested aspects of the NIEO's total transformation potential.

In the precise terms of our perspective, this review points to part of the arrested transition politics of re-creation as one would expect the centre to play it with respect to the NIEO, in order to make the world-economy appear to be changing, while in fact it remains essentially capitalist and therefore exploitative. Its potential and eventual contribution to accomplished transition would appear to be in the very long term. Its immediate ideological objective, it seems, is to reduce the heat in the system, produced by maturation of the contradictions and necessary for transition metabolism, so that concomitant crises can be contained, that is "resolved," in favour of the dominant classes.

There is, of course, the arrested transition politics of de-orientation aspect to the above argument. This other argument (box 4 in sketch) takes a conception of politics that seeks to transcend the present capitalist ethos of the world-economy, but unfortunately usually seeks to do so within "accepted" socialist departures from capitalism.<sup>74</sup> These departures do not necessarily recognize the imperialist problématique as the main transcendental problem. There appears to be the belief that once the centre sources of imperialism and their predator agents of multinational corporations are banished, or at least are allowed to control themselves, the objectives of the NIEO can be achieved. The arrested politics of deorientation, therefore, tends to overlook the importance of the imperialist problématique. It tends to concentrate on such policies as nationalization and Indigenization. These policies could be transitionally useful, but in most cases where the imperialist problématique is ignored they do no more for periphery societies than over-bureaucratize these societies and spread generated wealth unevenly within them, all in the name of development misconceived to mean economic growth in pursuit of industrialization.

The reality of social imperialism is such that it is compatible with the non-recognition imperialist problématique as we have described it. This compatibility notwithstanding, arrested transition politics of deorientation still shares the depicted mutuality with valid transition politics of re-creation by virtue of their shared transcendental aspirations with respect to the world-economy. This mutuality, however, does not go all the way, in that arrested transition politics of deorientation approaches the transcendental intent without much imagination. It seeks to utilize policies which may have some valid potentials but at the same time runs the great risk of being easily

converted to serve the ends of arrested transition politics of re-creation. There is a reason for this. It is principally that the arrested transition politics of deorientation takes its transcendental aspirations from the view that centre sources of imperialism constitute the main transcendental problem. The prominent fact that imperialism has its internal-periphery sources is lost to this orientation.

#### Valid Inputs in the NIEO's Transition Potential

Indeed, what is validly new about the NIEO?

There are many references in the literature that attempt to deal with how the NIEO could benefit the transformation of the world-economy. But because their understanding of the world-economic reality and their meanings of transformation differ widely, the same policy remedy can very easily appear prescribable from different diagnoses. This has led to some confusion in policy prescriptions with respect to the NIEO as a transformation agent. Essentially the problem is this: the utility of economic policies, measured by their immediate economic gains, is confused with, or rather discussed apart from, their contribution to "transformation" by essentially political means.

Admittedly, the distinction between the two could be very fine at times. However, it is precisely upon this fine distinction that our arguments in this essay are based. It is that a large part of the NIEO demands are aimed at immediate economic gains; and, while there is nothing wrong with this, such gains without the proper political guidance are easily dissipated in the false pursuit of transformation, without contributing effectively toward the realization of the transition equation. In fact, such false pursuits do work against the realization of the equation by taking out the heat generated within

the system by its own contradictions. What matters most in our discussion of the NIEO as a transition, therefore, is the political context within which economic and other gains can be measured in terms of their positive and negative contribution to the transition equation.

Given the above and the earlier position that the NIEO is not all that new, it is still in order to ask: no matter how unformed, what appears to be valid about the NIEO's transformation potential?

Sauvant points to what is generally held to constitute the fact, when he states that what distinguishes the NIEO from its predecessors are its "objective and the new environment in which they were formulated and advanced."<sup>75</sup> Specifically the objective was no longer "merely to improve the functioning of the existing international economic system, but rather to change its purposes, mechanisms and structures,"<sup>76</sup> so as to make it more just and equitable. As to the environment, three highly interrelated factors describe it, and, in Sauvant's words, they are: "1. the emergence of the non-aligned movement as an international economic pressure group; 2. the politicization of the development issue; and 3. the growing assertiveness of the developing countries."<sup>77</sup>

These three factors with which Sauvant describes the environmental aspects of the newness of the NIEO really collapse into one, for as Reis puts it, the newness of the NIEO stems "from the sudden coalescence of virtually the entire developing world around a common position."<sup>78</sup> Reis states further that the significance of this event "was enhanced by the fact that, in order to secure the implementation of the NIEO, a complete change in the structure and mechanisms of international relationships were required, going far beyond the established development policies and institutions heretofore relied upon."<sup>79</sup>

We are inclined to agree that what distinguishes the NIEO sufficiently to make it noticeable, as validly new, are constituted by its declared objective to transform the capitalist world-economy and the novelty of the politics of pursuing this transformation. We shall add, however, that these novelties make sense only in terms of the belated discovery by dominant "science" that, despite the novel nuisance of the NIEO, it cannot be ignored because the world-economy has become too interdependent.

The NIEO, therefore, differs from its earlier forms by virtue of the coincidence of three acts by those who are its main carriers, the periphery states. They are: (1) the act of putting the separate demands together in a single package; (2) the act of standing behind these demands collectively; and (3) the act of pursuing these demands self-reliantly. The context which gives these three acts their valid political viability is the acknowledgement by all sides that the world-economy is interdependent. When we translate what we have just said above into more current symbols, what we mean is simply that the NIEO's political viability is located in self-reliance and collective self-reliance as political tools to correct, or negate, the structural-relational underpinnings of the unequal interdependency that characterizes the world capitalist system.

From our perspective, then, what is new about the NIEO is the belated discovery by dominant "science" that the capitalist world-economy has become interdependent and the sudden realization by the subordinate parts of the world-economy that they can use their individual and collective self-reliance, within this interdependent world, as major means to extract enough concessions from the centre to transform the world-economy sufficiently to make it just and equitable and therefore rational. What is new about the NIEO, in our sense of valid transition, is no more or less than the political utilities of

individual and collective self-reliance in the transformation of the unequal interdependent world-economy along the lines indicated by the ideals of the NIEO. As to whether the objectives of the NIEO and the politics of their pursuit differ, our view, from the politics of valid transition perspective, is that they should not, because we believe that a proper organization of an idea is indistinguishable from the idea itself.

Having isolated interdependence, individual self-reliance, and collective self-reliance as the three crucial inputs in the valid politics of the NIEO, we now proceed to establish the characteristic coherence in the differences in the understandings of, and orientations to, these inputs which distinguish valid politics of re-creation from that of valid politics of deorientation. The reasoning is this: since the periphery states are the main carriers of the valid transition virtues of the NIEO, the distinction we establish between each of the three crucial inputs must cohere, consciously or unconsciously, into the two opposed policy packages of valid transition politics of re-creation on the one hand, and valid transition politics of deorientation on the other.

## 6. THE NIEO'S VALID TRANSITION POLITICS OF DEORIENTATION

### Interdependence

The identity of this type of transition politics derives from its peculiar reading of the historic identity of the world-economy, the structural-relational contradictions which it contains, and how both relate to define the nature and the root causes of this economy's interdependence property. It sees the world-economy as interdependent, but it does so from the restrictive perspective that this interdependence is something of a recent (post-World War II)



phenomenon. This politics either cannot or does not conceive the development of the interdependence of the world-economy in terms of the whole history of development capitalism, suggesting that the interdependence is a product of world-history, and that the changing forms of dependency are merely reflections of the changing relations between centre sources and periphery sources of world imperialism.

The argument is not that the valid politics of deorientation is incapable of appreciating the interdependent nature of the world-economy. It is very much capable of doing this. The argument is that apart from seeing interdependence in shortened historic retrospect, it appreciates the interdependence property of the world-economy, and the unequal centre-periphery relations that compose it, in terms of its international referents only. For this reason, this politics comes to identify the main contradictions in the world-economy as international; and strategy comes to be conceived as no more than so acting on the international plane as to oppose these contradictions, while internal-periphery contradictions are ignored.

Again, the argument is not that the valid transition politics of deorientation is incapable of distinguishing the internal from the external aspect of peripheral economies. It surely can; but its domain is the external, or the international, because its strategic aim is to check and utilize the external elements in the world-economy in order to create, internally, miniatures of the very world-economy which it finds untenably contradictory. In this politics, the imperialist problématique features very little in the algebra of the contradictions posed by the development of the world-economy; and therefore, not surprisingly, the arithmetics of the dissolution of these contradictions do not take the dissolution of the imperialist problématique much into account.

This means that the valid transition politics of deorientation proceeds to transform the world-economy without first attempting to sort out the labyrinth of exploitation nodes within the peripheral economies. In short, in this politics, discrete actions are not intended to equate the ultimate goals and the means of transformation with "conscious and guided transformation."

It is for this reason, when considering the so-called "underdevelopment" of peripheral economies within the world-economy and how this relates to the idea of exploitation which explains it, that the valid transition politics of deorientation wrongly begins from the premise that exploitation is something the centre societies do to the periphery societies. In this reasoning, what follows is the unsettling and false conclusion that somehow exploitation can be corrected, if not entirely banished from international relations and by extension from the world, by the systematic negation of exploitation at the international level of world capitalism. This is, of course, wrong and has been wrong for a long time.

Unarguably, exploitation may have been something that the emerging world capitalist centre did to its emerging periphery in the very early phases of their involvements in world-history. Certainly, since the late 19th century, at least, exploitation has been something the periphery élites and ruling classes have aided the centre states in perpetuating upon the masses of the periphery. More certainly, we can argue that at this NIDL phase of world capitalism, the exploitation of the masses of the periphery by the centre is assisted in critical ways by the periphery states themselves, as they are personified by their élites and ruling classes. These classes in each periphery nation are the critical links in the interlocking exploitation chains which constitute the structural-relational totality of the system. This link is

the locus of the strength in the asymmetric interdependent nature of the world-economy.

The élites and the ruling classes hold on to their false belief for many reasons. Among them is that they see the prosperity of their societies in terms of the prosperity of their individual and class circumstances. So long as they can "better" their lots - secret Swiss bank accounts and opulent living style - they believe seriously that everybody else can, if they try hard enough.<sup>80</sup> And so long as their "bettered" lots go with high production figures and there are some appearances of trickle-down effect upon the masses of their nations, they tend to believe that all could be well within the existing system if it is cosmeticized enough to hide its disturbing intranational features. It is primarily because the élites and the ruling classes want, or already have, a stake in the system, that they cannot see and admit that they themselves are important to the exploitation enterprise as a whole. These are some of the reasons that make the classes we have been referring to in the periphery states demand changes which appear to affect international dependency and inequality, but which have little to do with intranational dependency and inequality.

We must remember that valid politics of deorientation is also transition<sup>Y</sup> oriented, except that, because of the reasons given above, we can say very confidently that it goes about its transition intention in the most ineffectual manner. This politics believes that once the peripheral economies come to produce what the central economies produce, or that once, through affordable tokenism from the centre, they come to show healthy balance of payments, all will be well: the unequal interdependent nature of the world-economy would then have changed for the better. Our argument is that a transition strategy

based essentially on these factors will lack the brevity of the transition period, because it would slow down the metabolism of the contradictions in the system, by reducing the heat necessary for the "sharp struggle" that a transition must possess to be a valid transition.

So that if the valid politics of deorientation is a transition of the kind that does not engender the necessary "sharp struggle," it is mainly because it misunderstands and misreads the interdependent fact of the world-economy. It does not respect, mainly because it is unaware of, the fundamentally irreconcilable differentials between the peripheral and the central formations within the world-economy. It sees the peripheral economies as dependent on the central ones only in the sense that the former are merely highly oriented toward the latter, in an interdependent world. It is for this reason that this politics seeks to do no more than to deorient the peripheral economies from the central economies. Such an orientation has transformation potential in the long run, but because of its slow and restrictive transition articulation it runs the grave risk, in fact, of reinforcing the existing order in the respectable short run.

Armed with this misconception of interdependence, the NIEO's valid transition politics of deorientation would see the meanings and the transitional utilities of self-reliance and collective self-reliance in complementary ways, which would cohere into a valid deorientation rationality of transition.

#### Individual Self-reliance

This deals with the part of the NIEO package that the periphery states address to themselves individually. And our objective is to indicate how the logic of valid transition politics of deorientation would tend to

understand and utilize the transition input of individual self-reliance. We would read the political significance of this input to be that, individually, the periphery states have come to realize that they cannot rely on the benevolence of "rich uncles" of the centre, as President Nyerere put it in a speech in the early 1970s, to consider their interest and welfare in the world-economy; and so they are beginning to learn to rely primarily on themselves. But toward what end is this realization? From the view of valid transition politics of deorientation, it is toward the end of individual periphery states relying on themselves to imitate the centre nations, with the hope that having so imitated the centre and having succeeded in looking like the centre nations, there will be no more exploitation of the periphery by the centre because there will be no periphery. All will be centre and centre alike. To achieve this, certain policies are considered indispensable. Parmar describes such policies well in his depiction of the narrow sense of self-reliance. He says it "merely refers to policies that will, over time, ensure a balance in the foreign exchange budget commensurate with a satisfactory rate of growth.... To a large extent this corresponds to the idea of 'self-sustaining growth'.... It is therefore a limited, resource-oriented approach whose central concern is that the country earn enough foreign exchange to be free of foreign assistance."<sup>81</sup>

Thus, we see that, while the policy of self-reliance could be very important as a transition policy, in the context of valid transition politics of deorientation, its transition potency is very much reduced because this politics views self-reliance as just a new word for the old and discredited policy of self-sustaining growth. Within the perspective of valid politics of deorientation, the policy of self-reliance does not hinge on the kinds of meaningful changes which must exist domestically in the individual

periphery societies, if this policy is to contribute to the "transition equation." Self-reliance entails some transitionally effective autarky policies, such as import substitution, political independence, and sovereign non-accountability. However, in the politics of valid deorientation, such policies, since they do not immediately aim at transcending periphery capitalist formations, but rather aim at imitating the central capitalist formations, could very easily degenerate into the retarding and pernicious policy of: "whatever we do inside our countries is none of your business."<sup>82</sup> And since in this politics, interdependence and exploitation are misunderstood, and further since the ambition of the periphery élites and the ruling classes is their integration into the select group of the international system of élites, this degenerate "none-of-your-business" policy could degenerate even further into an even more pernicious policy of "we shall continue to exploit our masses and that is none of your business."<sup>83</sup> In other words, the policy of individual self-reliance could very easily deviate radically, in the valid politics of deorientation, into a policy of "self-help" by the élites and the ruling classes of the periphery societies.

The ruling classes form the critical link between the internal and the external sources of imperialism. To paraphrase Galtung, these sources in the periphery are in the position to tell the external sources of imperialism to give them what they want, and a little over that, to appease their masses, or they will incite their masses against the centre nations so as to interfere with their peaceful accumulation of capital. And while the politics of self-reliance degenerates into that of self-help by the periphery élites and ruling classes, who constitute the periphery capitalist states, and as they entrench their integration into the world-system, they can always point out to their masses the unavoidable pain and suffering involved in the difficult business

of transition from peripheral status to central status in the capitalist interdependent world-economy,<sup>84</sup> in which the exploitation of the periphery societies is externally located and serviced.

Our arguments here should not be confused with the arguments advanced by some in the centre of world capitalism to justify their unwillingness to assist some deserving periphery nations in their efforts to grapple with imperialism. Their arguments are based on vulgar interpretations of the self-reliance and the BN approach to the NIEO.<sup>85</sup> Such policy arguments emanate from arrested transition politics of re-creation sources within the world-system. The two arguments could be easily confused due to the fact that these two sources of the argument share a mutuality with valid transition politics of de-orientation sources (see C in illustration on page 84).

Our main concern here has been to show that it would matter very little what specific policies the valid transition politics of deorientation undertakes in the name of individual self-reliance, because for as long as the élites of the periphery misconstrue the nature of the interdependence of the capitalist world-system and its functional relationship to the exploitation resultant, the imperialist problématique will persist, because its peripheral structural-relational props would be left intact.

#### Collective Self-reliance

In the general context of the periphery nations' strategy for achieving the NIEO, there is no doubt that "the logic of collective self-reliance is indeed compelling."<sup>86</sup> What is more compelling, however, is the transitional end toward which this logic is aimed. In the case of the valid transition politics of deorientation, because it approaches self-reliance in its narrow conception, the logic appears compelling only because it is aimed at deorienting

deorienting →

the transformation potential from fulfilling the transition equation.

Let us agree that the policy of collective self-reliance embraces two elements: "co-operation among developing countries to apply a maximum of leverage so as to increase their bargaining power in negotiations...vis-à-vis the industrialized countries...and efforts to strengthen and intensify trade, investment and technological co-operation among themselves."<sup>87</sup> With respect to the first of those two elements, the valid transition politics of deorientation encourages the élites of periphery societies to band together for mutual negotiating support only when it suits their bargaining ploys to press some arguments in support of increasing the affordable tokenistic ameliorations they can extract from the centre states. The maximum effect of collective self-reliance is lost in this politics, because it holds the narrow conception of self-reliance. The kinds of domestic transformations which would make their collective self-reliance transitionally meaningful are ignored for the most part, since such transformation would work against the integration of the different periphery élites into the international system of élites.

With respect to the second element of cooperating to strengthen and intensify trade, investment, and technological cooperation among periphery states, politics of valid deorientation's conception of self-reliance works against the collective utility of self-reliance, since in this politics the aim of the élites is to rely on and imitate the centre in all things including investment and technological cooperation. This being the case, the periphery nations would have very little confidence in each other and there would be very little in their readings of capitalist history to suggest to them that, to transform the entire system, the periphery nations must act collectively in aiding the transition equation.



NAL  
↓

Again, the valid transition politics of deorientation is transformational in intent, but it lacks the proper conception of the domestic foundations which would provide the moral strength and the structural security needed to make collective self-reliance more effective than the sheer expedient for extracting affordable tokenism from the centre. Let us repeat that the moral strength and the structural security needed to transform the world-economy are to be derived from the dissolution of the imperialist problématique, and that not until this dissolution is undertaken can we be said to be engaging in the fulfilment of the transition equation.

The NIEO is a foreign policy consequence of periphery dependency on the centre in the world-economy. And the valid transition politics of deorientation is the strategy which aims to negate this dependency, but does so not by undermining the deeply sunk internal-periphery sources of dependency but by tinkering with its international superficials. It does not take much of a consequence of dependency, it does not take much of a consciousness, to practise the valid politics of deorientation, at this NIDL phase of the world-economy. All it needs is for the élites of the periphery to interpret the historic aim of the age as the growth of things and to translate this to mean healthy balance of payments. With this done, the élites need only to recognize the BWL as their own and proceed to sacrifice all else, including self and national pride, to appear to be on the winning side in the outcome of the North-South confrontation. In fact, this appears to be the dominant conception of the idea of transformation among the periphery states. A testimony to this fact is that a recent writing on the NIDL points to the disappointing haste with which periphery nations compete among themselves to attract the construction of Multinational branch plants in their various

societies.<sup>88</sup> This testimony may be unhappy, but it clearly speaks to the highly probable fact that the NIEO, as it is presently understood and pursued by the periphery nations, is not capable of transforming the world-economy into one which is more just and equitable in the respectable future. This, in our view, is due to the fact that the imperialist problématique is yet to be seen and appreciated for what its negation would mean in fulfilling the transition equation.

#### 7. THE NIEO'S VALID TRANSITION POLITICS OF RE-CREATION

Strategy is the science, or the art, which enables a party in a conflict situation to so act as to impose conditions favourable to that party as the effective grounds upon which the resolution of that conflict will depend. It deals therefore, with the conception and the management of actions in such ways that a conflict can be resolved as efficiently as possible in favour of a party to a conflict. Strategic actions, therefore, do not necessarily have to appear logical to the unstrategic eye, even though after the fact these actions may display a logic of their own. Furthermore, strategic actions need not necessarily be of the same kind of action as the goal in contention. A strategist, however, must know, or at least must have an idea of, the logic inherent in his conceptions and management of his strategic actions.

If we have conceived the periphery strategy for achieving the NIEO in terms of political actions in pursuit of economic goals, then we must present what we consider the underlying strategy logic linking the valid potentials in our conceptions of interdependence, self-reliance, and collective self-reliance. For, as we have indicated, it is the logical coherence between our conceptions of these terms that should constitute the NIEO as a valid transition strategy for the periphery nations.

### Interdependence

The logic of the NIEO's valid transition politics should be premised on a definite conception of the existing interdependent world-economy. To this politics, the interdependency of the world-economy is not new simply because it conceives the history of this interdependency as dating from the periphery's enforced dependence on the nascent centre to initiate the process of capital accumulation in the developing centre and away from the developing periphery. From this conception, the NIEO's valid transition processes would come to hold the conviction that peripheral economies, in their dependence upon the centre economies, have not merely become oriented by them to service the accumulation of capital in the centre. For this reason, the transition essence of the actual practice of the politics of valid transition is not the practice of mere politics of deorientation, but the practice of politics of re-creation. This latter politics is four-squarely based on the conviction that it is not possible to transform the world-economy to make it just and equitable, while keeping it essentially capitalist. It therefore seeks to recreate this economy by transcending its capitalist form and its goal of BWL. The aim, in this politics, is to creatively transform the existing economy into another, which is not based on the accumulation-disaccumulation contradiction between its parts. Toward this end, this politics identifies a chain of inner contradictions within this major contradiction in the world-economy and acts on them.

With respect to interdependence, this politics further reasons that the incidence of the benefits of interdependence depend on the rules of the games defining this interdependence. It reasons that periphery economies lose out in the interdependence reality because of the capitalist nature of

the economy. That is, that the periphery economies lose out not simply because a division of labour exists in the world-economy, but because of the historic end that this economy serves.

Allied to this conviction is the realization that some of the values which the existing order holds as goals and cherishes (among them the growth of things to feed the BWL) are unacceptable because they are immoral. In their places, this politics would substitute the goal, the supreme end, of the growth of the human being;<sup>89</sup> and it would make the growth of things subject to the growth of the human being.

The politics of valid re-creation would use as its criterion of measurement of success, therefore, not the rate at which things are produced, but the extent to which that which is produced is used to enhance life in aid of human growth. Thus, the politics of valid re-creation returns to the first principle of political economy to aim at fulfilling Basic Needs for all. The fulfilment of basic needs for all is not an incidental by-product of the growth of things but the goal consciously sought.

The politics of valid transition is aware of the internal and the external aspects of the periphery economies and the contradictions within and between them; but it sees the main contradiction as the link between the centre and the periphery. For this reason, it acts on these contradictions in ways which will change, principally, the internal-periphery contradictions. This politics aims to establish, within and between the periphery societies, precisely the kind of economic order it seeks internationally. The politics of valid re-creation is very much aware of the transformational futility of seeking to transform the world-economy while keeping the peripheral economy untransformed. It, therefore, aims to affect the exploitation props of the

capitalist world-economy by concentrating more on internal-periphery transformation. Not that it neglects international reform; it does not. It combats it all it can. However, what is important to this politics is that it uses any gains at the international level to reinforce internal-periphery transformation in order to negate the contradictions that link the periphery with the centre to form the unequal interdependent world-economy. This politics believes that, by isolating and approaching the imperialist problématique in this manner, it can equate the ultimate goal and its means with conscious and guided transformation.

It is important to capture the characteristic difference of the politics of valid re-creation. It is that whatever gains it obtains in concessions from the centre are valued not for the immediate comfort they may provide the élites of the periphery, but for the use to which they could be put to combat inequality and dependency at home, so as to provide both the structural conditions and the moral bases for making interdependence at the international level equitable. The politics of valid re-creation, then, understands the idea of development to mean not the growth of things but the negation of exploitation. This means that development, as a process, is the removal of inequalities and harmful dependencies in order to assure the growth of the human being. We should observe also that the purpose in this conception of development does not exclude the growth of things, except that in the hierarchy of developmental purpose, the primacy of equity, meaning the reductions in inequalities and harmful dependencies to their unimportant minimum, is unchallenged.

### Individual Self-reliance

The kind of politics under discussion will view individual self-reliance as an instrument of policy in a comprehensive way that will embrace the imperialist problématique. Such politics will view this instrument of policy similar to the way in which Parmar views it.<sup>90</sup> Parmar says that comprehensive self-reliance assigns central importance to the process of structural change, which involves more than the mere balancing of accounts in the foreign trade sector of the economy. In this sense of self-reliance, growth must promote social justice and it must engender public participation in the developmental process. This process should aim at the reduction in the concentration of economic power, at both the domestic and the international levels.

All this is true, except that, in the valid transition politics of re-creation, the view of the subject will entail the position that growth, participation, and the structure of the world-economy are important only if they aid the negation of internal periphery inequalities and dependencies, as the bases for a frontal attack on the world capitalist system. Self-reliance as a transition policy may be based on the principle of depending on one's own resources;<sup>91</sup> but from the perspective of the valid transition politics of re-creation, these "resources" are interpreted to include the proper reading of world-history. Such a reading will identify the imperialist problématique as the crucial problem. Self-reliance would therefore mean relying on oneself to herald the transcendence of the capitalist world-system by means of dissolving the centre-periphery imperialist nexus. In this politics, the unquestioned means towards this end is the institution, by self-help, within the periphery states of the non-exploitative economy they claim to seek at the world-level.

### Collective Self-reliance

The compelling relevance of collective self-reliance for the purpose of valid transition politics of re-creation is plainly due to the fact that it is not possible for individual "small states"<sup>92</sup> to mount any valid transition challenge to the existing capitalist economic order, if they were to act singly toward this end. This being the basis, the logic is that these states stand a much better chance of influencing the world-economy if they were to act collectively. But we can see that numbers alone, no matter how large, are no guarantee that such a challenge would succeed. In fact, the argument is that such a challenge would not succeed beyond the limit of affordable tokenism from the centre to the periphery, but then such a success hardly constitutes a serious challenge to the existing system. The reason for this is that the challenge would not be addressed to the dissolution of the imperialist problématique.

In contrast, the valid transition politics of re-creation aims at maximal success, because it aims to approximate the "transition equation." And to achieve this, it knows that it must begin by attacking the imperialist problématique by initiating, through individual self-reliance, the structural and moral preconditions for valid collective self-reliance.

In the strict context of the valid politics of re-creation, collective self-reliance would mean intensified cooperation between periphery countries in the areas of trade, investment, and technology. In this cooperation, a state inspired by the valid politics of re-creation would cooperate most intensely with states of similar inclination. Such states would have confidence in one another, and this confidence should grow, if the situation is really one of valid re-creation. An integral part of this politics would clearly be that states inspired by it should do all they can to influence those states

not so inclined to change their ways.

It is not necessary to say any more than this on the valid politics of re-creation's belated meanings of interdependence, individual and collective self-reliance. The NIEO's re-creative potential is enhanced to the extent that more periphery states understand and practise the principles of these transition inputs along the line indicated above. So that, if at the moment most periphery states are not practising these principles in the proper ways, with respect to the NIEO, then perhaps the sad truth of the matter is that the NIEO is still very low in valid transition potential for the re-creation of the world-economy.

#### 8. IS THE STATE DEAD?

The imperialist problématique was set in a very complex processual context. The context, as Galtung describes it, is "a process with a centre and a periphery, both of them moving, the context of them moving, the exact processes within and between changing, but the gradient of exploitation remains, enriching the centre, impoverishing the periphery in various ways."<sup>93</sup> The point was that the process of unequal development -- the unequal incidence of accumulating capital within the processes of combined accumulation -- is what explains the persistence of the exploitation processes and their reproduction. The interface between the processes of unequal and combined development within the world-economy is where the imperialist problématique is situated, a phenomenon that has its historical utility within the historicity of world capitalism, but its full historic meaning only at this post-independence stage of the world-system.

It is important to realize that what I was referring to was the axial point of contact between the centre and the periphery as they operate



within the contradiction of uneven development within combined world development. But I was in this connection and I am at the moment not referring to the mechanisms of unequal exchange à la Prebisch in the form of terms of trade,<sup>94</sup> or à la Emmanuel in the form of unequal wages.<sup>95</sup> I was and I am referring to the processes that constitute and reproduce the relations which confer organizational sanctity upon the terms of trade and other mechanisms of unequal exchange in aid of capital leaks from the periphery to the centre at this present NIDL phase of world capitalism, where capital itself has become truly trans-statal.

Again I was and I am referring to the state, as the organizing node in societies, the node in any society which manages societal scarcities, contrived or real, by deciding who gets what, when, how, and, most important, why.<sup>96</sup> What is the peripheral capitalist state? This question is of extreme importance, in that whereas exploitation of the periphery has been going on all through the history of world capitalism and whereas exploitation has been resisted all along, exploitation of the periphery survives changing its forms as world capitalism develops. The question, therefore, is both what made resistance to exploitation ineffective at the early phases of imperialism and what makes exploitation continue to be so effective in this late day of world capitalism. The real question, however, is the latter: why the peripheral state has not been used as an instrument for negating exploitation.

I ask, then: what is it about the peripheral state that makes its capitalist historicity persistently exploitation-prone?

Is the answer that the peripheral state like the central state is dead?; or that the peripheral state is not dead, but it is not well because it possesses certain genetic properties which strain its quality?

The imperialist-transformation approach to the examination of the NIEO adopted here was for the purpose of enabling the construction of a bold political confrontation with the most bizarre contradiction whereby the emergence of sovereign periphery states over the last few years seems to have done very little to undermine the imperialist problématique. The approach called for the consideration of the strained quality of the peripheral state. Such a consideration becomes even more urgent in the din of the Eurocentric tolling of the knell for the nation-state.

This may not be the place to raise a full counterpose to the theories of the demise of the nation-state. The arguments involved demand more lengthy treatments. It will suffice, however, to say that the conception of the nation-state as a sort of self-destructing mechanism has a long intellectual ancestry. One cannot escape the impression that as the world-economy develops and as the centre societies come to have less and less obvious need for the state, all kinds of rationales are advanced to the conclusion that the state, as the key organizer of the accumulative enterprise, has become either too vulnerable to be viable<sup>97</sup> or too inconsequential to be needed as much as before.<sup>98</sup> Hence the sure indication that the nation-state is in its death throes or even that it never really was.<sup>99</sup> These theses are good examples of the Eurocentric tendency to universalize the peculiar circumstances of "Europe" within the evolving history of the world-economy, and then proceed to call these universalizations general theories which are supposed to explain world-history, and its processes, to the entire world.<sup>100</sup>

The world-system methodology should not be allowed to lead to the temptation to consider the transformation of the world-system with the role of the nation-state entirely obliterated.<sup>101</sup> The argument is not necessarily

that the centre states have not lost some of their accumulation lustre in the course of world-history. The argument is precisely that because of the imperialist problématique, which explains the differences between peripheral and central capitalist formations, peripheral states must reconceive themselves to enable them to practise the politics of valid re-creation. This means that for these societies the state is far from dying. From the valid politics perspective, one can paraphrase Armah to say that the "beautiful" states are not yet born in most periphery societies.<sup>102</sup>

Our presentation of the imperialist problématique should lead to the realization that the negation of the periphery's dependence is hinged on the emergence of states which would appreciate the valid properties of transformation politics enough to embark on the practice of the politics of valid re-creation.

As we said earlier, economic policies per se amount to very little of transformation consequence, if the political intents behind them are valid. There is no dearth of recommendations as to what the periphery nations must do economically to achieve the NIEO. However, many of these recommendations, in our view, are wrong-headed, in that they are intended to make the peripheral formations convert themselves into crude imitations of the centre formations in a capitalist world. There is practically nothing new in these recommendations that will provide the desired transition validity. What is needed are developmental ideologies that derive their legitimacies from the valid recognition of the imperialist problématique, but then such ideologies are dependent upon states whose qualities are themselves formed by this very recognition.

How this is to be done is the big question. But it is the only legitimate question, because it remains, in our view, the only valid transition

question, in that it will force us to consider the vital difference between the current "independence politics" being practised in the periphery societies and the much needed "post-independence politics" necessary for the negation of dependency.

The difference between the politics of independence and the post-independence politics in peripheral societies is to be located in the quality of the peripheral state. Many peripheral societies behave as though the latter politics is merely a continuation of the former. This is wrong, if what we have in mind is the valid re-creation of the world-economy. The forces which defined the levels of the dissatisfaction - the depth and breadth of the contradictions - which precipitated independence should be different from those which should guide peripheral states after independence, if the valid re-creation aim of the world-economy is to make it more just and equitable.

An appropriate theory of the quality of the state for the purpose of valid re-creation of the world-economy will recognise the basic fact that "direct economic intervention by states is a 'normal' part of the capitalist mode of production."<sup>103</sup> And such a theory will argue to the conclusion that, because of this fact, the direct intervention of the state should be considered a "normal" part in the re-creation of the capitalist world-economy. The substance of the argument in this theory will allow that there are differences in the qualities of states; these differences can be understood along Amin's distinction between peripheral and central formations, and our valid and arrested transition orientations, for example. Such a theory will lead to the posing of the question of what forces in different societies (should) constitute the appropriate qualities of states that would encourage the practice of a valid politics of re-creation.

It is true that the world-system perspective "argues that the political boundaries between states, rather than separating fundamentally independent entities, are simply one of many political institutions used by classes to influence market forces in the competitive world-economy."<sup>104</sup> But it is not correct to infer from this, as Chase-Dunn does, that "as such, the internal-external distinction should probably be either abandoned or more clearly specified so that it does not imply independently evolving systems."<sup>105</sup> The world-system perspective properly understood does not suggest a choice between abandonment of the internal-external distinction or its clear specification. What this perspective should do, and in fact does, is to indicate the importance of the peculiarity of the separate relatedness between the internal and the external, as it differentiates states of the central type from those of the peripheral type in their abilities to accumulate capital internally.<sup>106</sup>

It is this separate relatedness that we have developed in this essay in terms of Amin's peripheral and central formations, into our imperialist problématique. The quality of the state intervenes in the analysis precisely because it is important as the organizing context within which to distinguish between the politics of re-creation and that of deorientation.

In all this, the naked bias in favour of the valid politics of re-creation, as the proper strategic route for periphery states, is to be understood in terms of the tactical subtlety with which it approaches and uses its mutual relationship with arrested transition politics of deorientation, the dialectical antinomy between it and the valid transition politics of deorientation, as well as the arrested transition politics of re-creation. After all, we must admit that the virtue of any strategy lies in its tactical ability to revise itself in changing dialectical situations.

## NOTES

\* Author's Note: This chapter is a product of the Structural Interpretation of International Inequality Project (S3IP), conducted for the United Nations University Project on Goals, Processes, and Indicators of Development (UNU/GPID). The research was done between October 1979 and October 1980. An earlier and a briefer version of this chapter, "Foreign Policy Strategies for Achieving the NIEO: A Third World Perspective," is to be found in Charles Kegley and Patrick McGowan, eds., "The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behaviour," Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, VI (1981), chapter 10. The completed essay for the chapter was presented at the UNU/GPID Expansion-Exploitation/Autonomy-Liberation sub-group meeting at Hotel Normandie, St. Anns, Trinidad, 16-19 January 1981.

Thanks to Lily Addo for her typing and research assistance, to Margaret Blenman-Harris for her editorial services, and to Terance Hopkins for his much appreciated comments on an earlier draft.

1. It is important to say at this early stage that when I refer to the world-economy and the world-system as capitalist, I do not use this reference as ideological opprobrium; neither is it due to any insensitivity to the differences between the economic systems within the world-economy, nor is it without reference to the different social systems within the world-system as such. I call the world capitalist because of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the world formation, which makes other economic forms behave as though they were capitalist, no matter how different or unsuccessful, principally because the principal capitalist condition of accumulating capital consciously and methodically is considered an evolutionary property of the world-economy. This conception of the world-economy derives from the works of Oliver Cox, Paul Sweezy, Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, and others. It differs from other conceptions of the world-system, such as those by Ernesto Laclau and Robert Brenner, which appear to derive from Maurice Dobb's Eurocentric conception of capitalism. See my "Historicity Model of the Capitalist World-System" (mimeograph, 1980). See also note 14 below.
2. Johan Galtung describes the Bourgeois Way of Life (BWL) as "the mode of production, the mode of consumption, and the goal around which motivation and action do cluster in the world today. It is the particular mode of production which encourages the escape from manual labour, the search and the desire for material comfort, familism, or privatism and nuclearism, as a source of security." See his "Global Goals, Global Processes and the Prospects for Human and Social Development" (mimeograph, 1979). See also R. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (London: Calder and Boyars, 1975), pp. 16 and 75; and my review essay on this book, "A Context for Reviewing the Human Prospect," forthcoming in the Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations, 1978. The concomitant to the BWL is the Proletarian Way of Life (PWL). The PWL, I will suggest, deals with the struggle to deprive the capitalist of some of the exploited surplus so that proletarians can also pursue the BWL.

3. Robert Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature," International Organization, 33, no. 2 (1979): 257-302.
4. Samir Amin, "Selfreliance and the New International Economic Order," Monthly Review, 29 no. 3 (1977): 1.
5. What we call here the periphery and centre parts of the capitalist world are what are often referred to as the peripheral and central societies, nations, states, countries, or nation-states. These terms are controversial in their usages, and we shall therefore refer to the periphery and centre parts of the world-economy when we are referring to the world-economy as the seamy unit it is. But we shall use the expressions periphery states and centre states (or variations of them depending upon context) when we are referring to the organizational aspect of the world-system, including the world-economy. These latter aspects are the political links which superimpose themselves on the economic in the unit world-system. This clarification has become necessary as a result of conversations with Terance Hopkins of The Braudel Centre, SUNY, Binghamton. See my "Approaching the Peculiarity of the Caribbean Plight," HSDRGPID-24/UNUP-135.
6. See my 1981 manuscript on "World-System Critique of Eurocentric Conceptions of Development," where I argue that development is the negation of dehumanizing exploitation and not the blind imitation of the BWL.
7. In my 1980 mimeograph on the "Historicity Model of the Capitalist World-System," I argue in favour of the view that the acknowledged uniqueness of the modern world-system is not properly recognized in the realms of history when its historical properties are not sharply distinguished from other historically unique properties. For the purposes of such sharp distinction, I suggest that the term historic be used to describe deserving properties composing the unique identity of the capitalist world-economy in evolution. This distinction is meant to stress the relevantly unique aspects of historical events within world-history — that is, the history of the capitalist world-economy, the roles these events played in the evolution of this economy, how they explain the present state of the world, and how they inform the politics of its probable transformation. In short, the term historic is meant to emphasize the singularity of the development of the modern world-economy.
8. Recall President Truman's Point IV suggestions in 1949 and the subsequent Act of International Development, 1950. See US Government, Staff Papers Presented to the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954).
9. Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950). See also his Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task, a report submitted to the Inter-American Development Bank (New York: Praeger, 1971).
10. Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development: A Report by the Commission on International Development, prepared for the IBRD (New York: Praeger, 1969); Sir Robert Jackson, A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations, a report prepared for the UN International Development Plan (Geneva: United

Nations, 1969); Barbara Ward et al, The Widening Gap: The Development in the 1960s, a report on the Columbia Conference of International Economic Development, Williamsburg, West Virginia, and New York, 15-21 February 1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Jan Tinbergen, Committee for Development Planning: Report on the Sixth Session (5-15 January 1970), UN Document E/4776, ECOSOC, 49th Session, Supplement No. 7; and Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered (Paris: OECD, 1966). See also the collection of speeches by Robert S. McNamara in his One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People: The Dimensions of Development (New York: Praeger, 1973).

11. Raul Prebisch, Toward a New Trade Policy for Development, the Secretary-General's Report to the 1964 UNCTAD (New York: United Nations, 1964). See also various Reports of GATT and UNCTAD.
12. There is easy access to the contents of the NIEO. For some readily accessible sources see the following: United Nations General Assembly, "Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 3201 (SV-1), and 3202 (SV-1), May 1974; United Nations, "Resolution on Development and International Co-operation," 3362 (S-VIII), September 1975; Jyoti S. Singh, A New International Economic Order: Toward a Fair Redistribution of the World's Resources (New York: Praeger, 1977); UNCTAD, "The Recent Economic Experiences of Developing Countries in Relation to the United Nations Development Objective," report by UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva, TD/B/642/Add.2, April 1977; UNITAR, "Progress in the Establishment of a New International Economic Order: Obstacles and Strategies" (Geneva: UNITAR, 1978); and K.P. Sauvant and H. Hasenpflug, eds., The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

Essentially, the NIEO, as it stands, asks for the following:

(1) a new structure to govern trade in primary products; (2) a reformed external framework to govern industrialization of the periphery nations; (3) a new monetary system; (4) co-operation among periphery nations and East European socialist nations; (5) particular attention to the more "handicapped" among the periphery nations; (6) regulation and supervision of transnational corporations' activities in favour of periphery nations' development; and (7) a new institutional mechanism for negotiating the above.

And, further, the above demands are to be negotiated with the following conditions as given: (1) the freedom for nations to choose their economic, social, and political systems and their economic relations; (2) the rights of nations to full permanent sovereignty over their natural resources; and (3) the rights of nations to nationalize foreign property in accordance with their own laws.

This is the programme of demands which some politicians, policy makers, and international civil servants from the periphery nations tend to regard as a giant developmental step forward and which their counterparts in the centre tend to regard as pernicious and unwarranted, if not exactly a quite retrograde step for the capitalist world-economy.



13. Andre Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1978), especially the preface, pp. 11-23.
14. This fact is held at the status of an axiom by the Marxist wing within the adherents of the world-system methodology. See the following: Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Modern Paperbacks, 1968); Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), and Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976); Oliver Cox, Capitalism as a System (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964); Andre Gunder Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan and Co., 1978), and Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969) (also see note 13 above); Paul Sweezy, Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956), and Modern Capitalism and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); and Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Comparative Research on World-System Characteristics," International Studies Quarterly, 23, no. 4 (1979): 601-624. See also many other relevant essays in Review and in Political Economy of World-System Annuals, vols. 1 and 2. This position differs from that wing in the world-system perspective which is concerned with security aspects of the world-system. See, for example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20, no. 2 (1978): 214-235.
15. Samir Amin, Unequal Development (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976), and Class and Nation, Historically and in the Current Crisis (London and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).
16. Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World-Scale, p. 22, and Unequal Development, pp. 75 and 168.
17. Johan Galtung, "Global Goals, Global Processes and the Prospects for Human and Social Development," p. 14.
18. Herb Addo, "The New International Economic Order and Imperialism: A Context for Evaluation," IPRA Studies in Peace Research, 7 (1979): 194-215, and "World-System Critique of Eurocentric Conceptions of Imperialism" (in preparation, 1980).
19. *Ibid.*, especially "World-System Critique," chapters 5 and 6.
20. Oliver Cox, Capitalism as a System (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), p. 136.
21. See note 18 above. See also James Caporaso, "Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence and Exploitation," in Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974), pp. 87-144.
22. In earlier formulations value-inequality represented some vague conception of inequality in national attributes. In this essay we see  $x$  as representing inequality in accumulated capital, dependency as represented by  $y$ , and exploitation by  $z$ . I see the three ideas related

multiplicatively as  $z = xy$ . For some earlier comments on this formulation, see James Caporaso, "International Development and Equality: Comments on the Structural Interpretation of International Inequality Project," and my response to Caporaso, both in Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations, 1977: 255-266 and 267-277, respectively.

23. Andre Gunder Frank, "Rhetoric and Reality of the New International Economic Order," Development Studies Discussion Paper, no. 35 (1977): 37-38.
24. What I am alluding to here is the dialectical sensitivity to distinguishing between forces which seek and aid genuine transformational change and those forces which seek change in order to "share the crown," as Albert Camus put it in his Rebel (New York: Random House, 1956). Even though this latter form of change can have some input in the transformational final analysis, it is precisely for this reason that we should not confuse it with the former. The plea here is for a distinction between anti-systemic and anti-regime forces.
25. I use "respectable future" in this context because too many studies on transformation of the world-system make it appear as though the world can be transformed in a matter of a few years. I read in this a colossal insensitivity to the difficulties entailed in transforming the world, and perhaps even some disrespect for the future. It has taken nearly 500 years to create the present world-economy; and, while nobody knows how long it will take to transform it, it will certainly take "some" many years. Out of respect for these many years, I use the expression "respectable future."
26. See Folker Fröbel et al., eds., Krisen in der Kapitalistischen Weltökonomie (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981).
27. In the precise context of capitalist historicity.
28. See Folker Fröbel et al., The New International Economic Division of Labour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
29. As this scheme has evolved, imperialism is now seen as synonymous with capitalist exploitation of the periphery  $z$ . Recalling note 22 above, where  $x$  represented inequality in accumulated capital and  $y$  represented dependency, the comprehensive scheme now becomes  $z = a \cdot xy + k$ , where  $a$  is a coefficient and  $k$  is a residual.
30. See Heraldo Munoz, "Strategic Dependence and Foreign Policy: Notes on the Relations between Core Powers and Mineral-Exporting Countries," Sage Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, VI (1980). In this piece, Munoz distinguishes between structural dependence of the periphery countries on the centre countries, and the strategic dependency of the centre countries on the periphery. This distinction is useful in the analyses of specific foreign policies, as Munoz demonstrates, but we should be careful not to let strategic aspects of dependency divert our appreciation from the imperialist problématique, as it holds in all peripheral cases whereas strategic dependency does not.

A probable danger inherent in this distinction is that the dependency idea will not be seen as a process which begins with the initiation of (capitalist) imperialism. Attention will stray from the effectiveness

and the predominance of structural dependence to the exaggerated importance and effectiveness of strategic dependence. Strategic dependence may account for shifts in particular foreign policies, but its significance in the transformation of peripheral capitalism is perhaps very little.

31. See Wallerstein, The Modern World-System.
32. For a discussion of the "semi-periphery," see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Semiperipheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis," in his The Capitalist World-Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 95-118.
33. This is an important point. Power is not unrelated to certain crucial historic abilities at points in historic periods.
34. How else can it be in a capitalist world?
35. See the equation in note 29 above.
36. See Ransford W. Palmer, Caribbean Dependence on the US Economy (New York: Praeger, 1979). In this book, Palmer provides tables of figures for the percentage rates of return and reinvestment for centre and periphery countries which, when substituted in the equations above, could give some idea of the flow of capital from periphery countries to centre countries, as compared with the flow between centre countries. See his table 5.7 on p. 75, for example.
37. Galtung, "Global Goals."
38. For a comprehensive treatment of such positions in the centre countries, see C. Reis, "The New International Economic Order: The Skeptic's View," in K.P. Sauvart and H. Hassenpflug, eds., The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Co-operation between North and South, pp. 63-84.
39. Ayi Kwei Armah, Why Are We So Blest? (London: Heinemann, 1974), p. 221.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 222. Emphases added.
41. As illustrations of the difficulties with these terms, see Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800 (Glasgow: Collins, 1977); Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and Rodney Hilton, ed., The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (Norfolk: Lowe and Brydow, 1976).
42. Robert Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order," p. 300.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Walter Rodney, "Transition," Transition, 1, no. 1 (1980): 1.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

51. Samir Amin, Monthly Review, 3, no. 29 (1977): 13.
52. Rodney, "Transition," p. 7.
53. Ibid.
54. Herb Addo, IPRA Studies in Peace Research, 7 (1979): 194. See also Robert Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order," pp. 257-302.
55. See the reference to Albert Camus in note 24 above.
56. I owe a sharp reminder of this interpretation of dialectics to the discussion which followed the presentations of the following papers at the Twentieth International Studies Association meeting in Los Angeles, 19-22 March 1980: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue"; and James Schmidt, "A Paideia for the 'Burgerals Bourgeois': War and Exchange in Hazel's Philosophy of Right."
57. But this makes sense only after the main carriers of a transition process have been identified.
58. I expressed this view in my earlier essay on the NIEO. See note 54 above.
59. Andre Gunder Frank, "Rhetoric and Reality," p. 16.
60. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
61. Ibid., p. 42.
62. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
63. Ibid., p. 65.
64. Johan Galtung, "Selfreliance and Global Interdependence: Some Reflections on the New International Economic Order" (paper presented at the Society for International Development meeting in Linz, Austria, 1975), p. 9.
65. Johan Galtung, "The New International Economic Order and the Basic Needs Approach: Compatibility, Contradiction and/or Conflict?" (paper presented at the UNU-GPID meeting on "Basic Needs," Berlin, 11 June 1979), p. 1. Emphases added.
66. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
67. Ibid., p. 6.
68. Otto Kreye, "Western Europe's Economic and Social Development and the Rationality and Reality of a New International Economic Order" (unpublished UNU/GPID research paper).
69. Ibid., p. 1.
70. Ibid., p. 16.
71. Ibid., p. 17.
72. K.P. Sauvart, "Toward the New International Economic Order," in Sauvart and Hassenpflug, The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Co-operation between North and South, p. 6.
73. Amin, "Selfreliance and the New International Economic Order," p. 20.

74. See, for example, Michael Hudson, Global Fracture: The New International Economic Order (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).
75. Sauvart, "Toward the New International Economic Order."
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Reis, "The New International Economic Order: The Skeptic's View," p. 64.
79. Ibid.
80. The perfect allusion here is the Shakespearian admonition not to, like the unscrupulous clergyman, ". . . show me the steep and thorny way to heaven."
81. S.L. Parmar, "Self-Reliant Development in an 'Interdependent World,'" in G.F. Erb and K. Valeriana, eds., Beyond Dependency: The Developed World Speaks (Overseas Development Council, 1975), p. 6.
82. Galtung, "The New International Economic Order and the Basic Needs Approach," p. 7.
83. Ibid.
84. See note 80 above.
85. See Galtung, "The New International Economic Order and the Basic Needs Approach," and Reis, "The New International Economic Order: The Skeptic's View."
86. UNCTAD, New Dimensions and New Structures for Trade and Development (New York: UN, 1977), p. 54.
87. Ibid., p. 55.
88. Fröbel et al., "The New International Economic Division of Labour."
89. For further discussion of this matter see my "Informing Visions of Desirable Future Societies Through Dialogue of Civilizations: A Peripheral View," in Eleonora Masini, ed., Visions of Desirable Societies, vol. 2 (London: Pergamon Press, in press).
90. Parmar, "Self-Reliant Development," p. 6.
91. Amin, "Selfreliance and the New International Economic Order," p. 1.
92. For my position on the concept of "small-state," see "Approaching the Peculiarity of the Caribbean Plight," as well as "Caribbean Prospects for the 1980s: The Plight and the Destiny" (mimeograph, December 1980), and "Deducing the Small-State Problématique from the Capitalist Problématique," mimeograph, January 1981.
93. Galtung, "Global Goals."
94. Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America.
95. Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).
96. This vital component, for reasons difficult to understand outside Eurocentric methodology, is left out of the liberal (Lasswellian) definition of politics.

97. John Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics, 9 (1957): 473-493, and The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: David McKay, 1976); as well as C.W. Kegley and E.R. Wittkopf, The Transformation of World Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 1981).
98. E. Gellner, "The Withering Away of the Dentistry State," Review, 1, no. 1 (1979): 461-472.
99. Karl Polanyi, "The Economic Fallacy," Review, 1, no. 1 (1977): 9-18.
100. This tendency is common to all shades of "European" thought on the world, and it is what is often referred to as the Eurocentric view of the world. For further discussion, see my manuscript on "World-System Critique of Eurocentric Conceptions of Imperialism" (1980).
101. See Terence K. Hopkins, "Notes on Class Analysis and World-System," Review, 1, no. 1 (1977): 67-72, especially p. 71.
102. This is an allusion to Ayi Kwei Armah's The Beautiful Ones Are Not Born (London: Heinemann, 1968). This is an excellent book which addresses the imperialist problématique with an admirable use of potent imagery which befits Ghanaian post-1957 politics.
103. Chase-Dunn, "Comparative Research on World-System Characteristics," p. 603.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 604.
105. *Ibid.*
106. See note 92 above.

RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE DIALECTICS OF TRANSFORMATION

