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
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SOCIETAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT THINKING:  
AN INVENTORY OF ISSUES

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This paper is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate a dialogue on this subject even at this stage of the research.

This paper, first presented at the GPID III meeting, Geneva, 2-8 October 1978, can be considered a contribution to the Concepts of Development and the Theories of Development sub-projects of the GPID project.

## INTRODUCTION

While economic and political emancipation have for long been recognized as central issues in development it is only in recent years that *intellectual* emancipation has received a more systematic attention. This paper attempts to contribute to this as yet underdeveloped field of research by focussing on what we call the *contextual dimension* in development thinking. By this we refer to the need to analyse ideas in terms of the concrete situation in which they emerge.

The foremost problem in any study of the intellectual and cultural aspects of the dependency relation between the West and the Third World is not only the dearth of systematic data but also the lack of appropriate concepts and theories through which intellectual penetration and response could be analysed. Consequently our study will have to proceed simultaneously at different levels of analysis. In the project underlying this paper<sup>+)</sup>  we have adopted a three-pronged approach each with their own emphasis and planned outcome in terms of publications:

- intensive case-studies of Western intellectual penetration and response. Essentially these are of three types: one pertaining to the overall societal level (e.g. India, Mexico); one focussing on the institutional aspect, primarily universities; and one dealing with delimited fields of knowledge such as the social sciences and their transplantation.

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+) 'Societal Change and Development Thinking' carried out at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Gothenburg University (Sweden)

- a comparative overview of these cases in order to assess the possibilities and constraints of intellectual emancipation.
- a more synthetic discussion of these experiences with the purpose of improving the analytical and theoretical framework.

It is primarily to the last of these that this paper is related. As each approach has by necessity to be linked to the others while still retaining its own focus, what follows is neither a report properly speaking nor an independent essay. If anything it is a stocktaking **of the present** stage of our work, which accounts for its rather encyclopedic scope and tentative form.

## I. THE CONTEXTUAL DIMENSION

The concern with the need for another development constitutes what is probably the most prominent theme in the current, international as well as intranational, debate on development. Although the prevailing pattern has been under heavy fire for quite some time the present mood differs from the earlier in that what is being argued is not only an overhaul of the *assymetrical structure* of the world order (viz economic and political dependence) but equally of *development thinking*: what are we to mean by a desirable and better society/world? In scope, therefore, concepts such as 'alternative development' or 'another development' cover not only structural re-alignments in favour of the weak or the periphery, be it in terms of reform or revolution. They also embody a search for new ways and categories by which to concieve man and society, another paradigm to supplant the dominant one of Western industrial society. In this note we will explore what we believe to be a neglected and important direction that this search has taken, namely what has sometimes been called *indigenous development thinking*. In essence this stands for a perspective on development rooted in the historical, cultural and social specifics of any given society, thus emphasizing contextual factors rather than universal values and needs.!)

Trends in development thinking

It needs to be emphasized that the search for 'another development' is certainly not new although it may appear thus from the sudden and rather bewildering multitude of declarations, strategies and programmes put forward in the last few years by multilateral bodies as well as other international organizations and assemblies. What is perhaps new is that this debate has made a breakthrough at an international level where it was just a decade ago regarded as utopian nonsense or else part of a world-wide leftist conspiracy. It is now a force to be reckoned with even by those that do not believe at all in the need for changing a global pattern and mode of thinking "that has served us so well in the past".

Although by now familiar the background of this breakthrough of alternative development thinking may bear a brief recapitulation that would also serve as an introduction to the approach we would like to explore in this note.

First, one strand of the current debate relates to the realization in Third World countries that the Western development model was not only unattainable within a colonial or neo-colonial framework, it is also alien in terms of its underlying worldview or cosmology. This made for a debate on and reaction to Western intellectual and cultural penetration (as much as it did to the economic and political) that is as old as the colonial expansion itself. Naturally the degree of alternativeness both to the West and to the own pre-colonial past varied in scope and feasibility, from the very sophisticated debate to be found in India propped by its complex high civilization to the traditionalist and self-destructive response of the cargo-cults in Melanesia.<sup>2)</sup> Nevertheless, these reactions also con-

stitute a broad range of fundamental criticism of Western cosmology over and above the more tangible economic and political domination.

But such a fundamental criticism stood little chance of gaining any wider credence or impact until the dominant West began to experience the shortcomings of its own development thinking: growing ecological spoliation, de-humanization, technocratic centralization etc, all of which have emerged as crucial public issues within the industrialized countries. With that the search for fundamental alternatives could be made a global and international concern and the by now battered or simply ignored debates in the periphery were seen as potentially relevant also for the centre and thereby for the world as a whole. Indeed, much of the inspiration of the more influential trends in alternative development thinking has been explicitly drawn from non-western cultural traditions and debates as witnessed for example by the works of such people as Schumacher, Freire, Illich, Brox etc (not to speak of the hippie-wave and the 'youth-culture').<sup>3)</sup>

Viewed historically therefore the search for another development should not be seen only in relation to the present world crisis, it is as much a continuation of a longstanding debate carried on both within the Western world and in the subjugated periphery. In this perspective we believe it fruitful to distinguish three broad trends in development thinking.

First of all there is what may be called the *mainstream*, i.e. the rise of Western development thinking from being 'merely' Western to becoming the globally dominant one. This is not to argue that the mainstream is to be seen as one rigid, monolithic pattern of thought as there is indeed a prolific and dynamic variation to be found within it as will be pointed out below. Suffice it here to mention the obvious dichotomy of liberalism versus marxism that has for long been the dominant alternatives in conceiving and organi-

zing the industrial society. But in terms of the points raised by the other trends they still belong to an essentially Western mode of thought however alternative they may be within the West. Apart from an orientation towards individualism, materialism, economic growth etc. this mainstream is perhaps most marked out by the intrinsic value it accords to science, technology and industrialism<sup>4)</sup>.

Ranged against this we find the contemporary *universalist and globalist critique* which attempts to transcend the euro-centric bias of the mainstream and its limited conception of development. One might here mention the Basic Needs approach with its emphasis on true universals as well as such documents as 'What Now' projecting a truly global approach based not on dominance but on mutual interdependence.<sup>5)</sup> Broadly speaking this means an insistence that the contextual limitations of Western development thinking can be overcome only by evolving a truly universal development paradigm, an insistence that is based on the fact that the present world order is an integrated (though asymmetrical) whole. One basic feature of this trend is consequently that it reacts as much against the contextual determinants as against the narrow conceptions in Western development thinking. The historical and cultural specifics of any given society are relevant and crucial to the extent that they afford the means whereby the universals of development can be meaningfully translated into that society.

Typically this trend is promoted by sections of the international academic community and also, in a somewhat more partisan and diffused way, by actors in international politics as well as by multilateral organizations, thereby ensuring a certain publicity if not always clarity to this search for 'another development'.

The third trend and the one that concerns us here is made up of what we would like to call the *contextually specific counterpoints*.



At the core of this trend lies the attempt to overcome the contextual bias of Western development thinking not by a search for universals but by making the specific cultural and historical roots of one's own society or surroundings the basis for 'another development'. One might accordingly say that whereas the second trend referred to above stands for a search for a true universalism this one can be seen as a search for a *true contextualism*, of coming into one's own rather than conforming with the strait-jacket of an alien culture and mode of thought.

#### Indigenous development thinking

In standard social science parlance this trend is often referred to as populism, the 'third way' etc. or at a more intellectual level as indigenous development thinking. More specifically it covers such phenomena as gandhism and maoism in Asia, 'African socialism', 'communocracy' etc in Africa, the emergent 'indigenismo' in Latin America<sup>6)</sup> as well as the neo-populist currents in the West.<sup>7)</sup> One might here also include the rise of Islam as a rallying point for 'another development' as witnessed by the examples of Iraq, Tunisia and later also of Iran. It is important to emphasize that what we wish to denote by this trend is neither a 'traditionalist' response with its exclusive emphasis on anti-westernism or -industrialism (e.g. the 'green wave' in the West, hindu or muslim revivalism, 'tribalism' etc), nor is it a question of making traditional or pre-colonial institutions the vehicles of modernization (e.g. the various government sponsored community development programmes). Rather it is the articulation of what has been called the colonial situation, i.e. the specific logic and dynamics (or lack of it) of a society marked by its subordinate role in a world dominated by Western industrialism, Western institutions and Western development thinking.<sup>8)</sup> For example, it has been increasingly realized that the Latin American dependency paradigm may be distortive rather than clarifying unless it is located in the specific history of the region. Similarly, the search for an 'African socialism' cannot be seen merely

as a contextualized version of general (i.e. Western) socialism, it is above all African in articulating the specifics of the colonial situation. Finally, such Asian development thinking as is embodied in gandhism and maoism are not only fundamental responses to particular forms of Western penetration and Western modes of thinking, they also express the cultural and ideological specifics of a peasantized agrarian order and its complex civilization.

A common denominator of most discussions on 'alternative development' is the notion of *self-reliance*. In terms of the indigenous approach this means above all to answer the question 'what is self?', making the formation of a self-identity an integral and fundamental part of development thinking. For what Western penetration brought about was not only pillage and exploitation but also a distortion and destruction of precolonial social bonds without, however, generating new ones in their place: class-formation remains as distorted and blocked as the peripheral capitalism itself, power is in the final instance determined by processes beyond the confines of the penetrated society, transplanted institutions are imposed on rather than fused with known patterns of organization etc. More than according a role to the various units of society, development thinking has therefore to accord a relevant meaning to them based neither on the destructed past of traditional society nor on the vision of an unattainable and alien future but on the exigencies of the present. The strength of this contextualized development thinking is exactly that it draws on what Gandhi called 'the immediate surrounding' in evolving a vision of and strategy towards the future<sup>9)</sup>. It is because of this that the most formidable challenges to the mainstream has come from this trend rather than from a universalist and globalist critique that on the one hand tends to become entrenched in established international politics (e.g. NIEO/<sup>10)</sup> Third World versus Basic Needs/First World) and on the other runs the danger of becoming 'super-eclectic' and purely academic in its

attempts to supplant the dominant mainstream. One need here only point at the resurgence of gandhism in the form of the JP-movement in India bringing about the downfall of the very mainstream Indira Gandhi regime,<sup>11)</sup> or the current uprising against an equally mainstream Shah of Iran. These examples also point at the necessity to study indigenous development thinking in relation to the different forces at work in any given society. This does not mean that it is to be treated as mere reflections of various interests (class, ethnic, religious etc). The logic of the outside penetration often means that the narrow interests of any segment of the society will have to be transcended to embrace the problems of the society as a whole.

However, given the fact of an integrated world order sooner or later these contextually derived development models will perforce have to be brought in line with each other to bring about a world order based on mutual compatibility rather than on the imposed dominance of one. While this trend of indigenous development thinking therefore in no way diminishes the need for a universal and global development paradigm it is nevertheless our contention that it needs to be understood in its own terms as well as affording a potential inroad to such a paradigm. Starting from this contextual perspective we see the following points as a framework for analysis:

1. the historical preconditions and constraints of Western development thinking;
2. the penetration of Western development thinking in the Third World and the form this has taken in different societies;
3. the responses to this penetration, particularly in terms of generating indigenous development alternatives rooted in and derived from the particulars of the penetrated society and the 'contact situation!';
4. the attempts to overcome the shortcomings of Western development thinking within the industrialized countries themselves (e.g. neo-populism).

## II. AN INVENTORY OF ISSUES

### 1. Is There a Western Model of Development?

One often hears about a Western development model which tends to colour most Western contributions to this field, be they theoretical or practical. This may not appear as a very persuasive assumption to those who think of Western culture in terms of pluralism. It is, however, basic to our approach that there exists a unifying and simplifying picture of reality underlying the multiplicity of world views within Western culture and it is our intention to try to make this picture more explicit. We shall furthermore assume that there are a number of supportive institutions associated with the Western development model, such as the *state*, the *market* and the *techno-scientific establishment*<sup>12)</sup>. These institutions are so closely related to the Western model that sometimes their growth is more or less identified with development (the imitative approach). Obviously the diffusion of the Western model and its transplantation into other cultural spheres often takes place through the spread of these institutions and it may be possible to account for the various strategies of modernization (= westernization) by an analysis of their relative strength.

Now back to the problem of identifying the Western model as such. For analytical purposes we have found it fruitful to make the following two distinctions: *first* between a general philosophical level of Western "cosmology" or "belief-system" on the one hand and its more concrete manifestations in contextually and historically specific development models on the other; *the second one* between what may be called the mainstream of Western development thinking and its "counterpoint" - the populist and neo-populist tradition.<sup>13)</sup>

As we all know it is very difficult to say something about what generally characterizes one's own society.<sup>14)</sup> It has been the *raison d'etre* of social anthropology that knowledge about man is achieved through the process of translation between cultures. The problem

in this case is, however, that this translation at present takes place only in one direction. One seldom hears about non-Westerners making anthropological field work in Western societies. Waiting for the north-south intellectual relations to be more symmetric, we have to be content with a few relevant Western contributions to this problematic field of study.

According to R A Nisbet *developmentalism* is one of the oldest and most powerful of all Western ideas. The core of the Western thinking on development is, still according to Nisbet, the metaphor of *growth*. Thus, development is conceived as organic, immanent, directional, cumulative, irreversible and purposive, and, furthermore, it implies structural differentiation and increased complexity. Certainly, the emphasis within this basic perspective must have shifted and new elements been added during the history of Western civilization.<sup>15)</sup> Thus, the emergence of capitalism, the bourgeoisie as a ruling class and the industrial system must have given a certain shape to Western developmentalism. This is the reason why some writers stress the intellectual movements in 17th century Europe as the cradle of Western development thinking.

One significant change in emphasis was the identification of growth with the modern idea of progress, although even this concept had its precedents. The most forceful expressions of this idea may be found in Comte, Marx and Spencer, although they differed a lot as to the *locus* of progress. For Comte human knowledge was in focus whereas Marx in contrast emphasized the productive forces. Here many would object to the inclusion of marxism in the Western development thinking since adherents to marxism usually stress its universal applicability.

Of course this is very much a matter of interpretation. It is only natural that the most *typical* expressions of a tradition of thought are not the most *sophisticated* variants, since sophistication implies a certain awareness of problems of application and other qualifications. When discussing marxism in this context we are primarily interested in the *ideology* of marxism rather than marxism as

a *scientific method*. But even so, can marxism or the larger socialist tradition be thought of as one of several manifestations of Western development thinking, considering the historical polarization between liberalism (the very essence of Western thinking) and socialism? In fact there would not have been any polarisation at all were it not for a basic paradigmatic unity. Between different paradigms there cannot be any debate, which for example is shown by the lack of dialogue between neo-poulists and the establishment, whereas liberals and socialists can argue for hours about for example the size of the public sector. We shall later make the suggestion that populism should be regarded as the counterpoint, i.e. the complete opposite to Western industrialism and its various connotations. Liberalism and marxism on the other hand are, if we may believe Johan Galtung, "two ways of being Western". Galtung feels that it would be strange if Liberalism and Marxism should not be more similar than different since they developed at about the same time, in the same place and both reflected a particular culture dominated by the capitalist system<sup>16)</sup>.

A fundamental contrast to liberal and marxist development thinking is provided by the populist model which is taken to constitute a counterpoint to the dominant Western philosophy of development. It is rooted in and articulating what in standard (and western!) sociological parlance has been called the *gemeinschaft* type of society whereas the dominant thinking in the West rationalizes the *gesellschaft* variety of society. The classical form of populism is the Russian *narodnik* movement but it can be seen as a worldwide phenomenon, articulating the interests and values of peasant societies threatened by the penetration of north atlantic capitalism. The Russian populists were the first to raise the peculiar problem of backwardness *co-existing* with advanced economic systems and the special problems and possibilities connected with development in this context. This is also the main problem of contemporary underdevelopment.

Populism was not confined to Russia although it was here that the ideological trend was most manifest and intellectually most articulate. It may be seen as the survival of pre-capitalist values in accordance with Wertheim's theory of *counterpoints*. If this theory is correct such values are not dead, only dormant. The present populist upsurge in the Western world can be interpreted not as a reaction to industrialism as such, but rather to the extreme consequences of unlimited industrialism, threatening the global ecological balance. The similarities between this movement and the classical populism are clear enough to justify the term *neo-populism* for this phenomenon.

In a more historical perspective we believe it is possible and useful to distinguish between at least four varieties of development thinking within the mainstream Western tradition: the classical liberal model, state capitalism, the Soviet model and Keynesianism. Of course mercantilism may be thought of as another model but this one seems to be less relevant from the point of view of intellectual penetration. Rather it belongs to the early history of the liberal model. The differences between the models (or rather sub-models) could be explained by different historical circumstances, particularly the uneven development of the supportive institutions referred to above (the state, the market and the techno-scientific establishment).

Obviously the *classical liberal model* constitutes "the typical case", the most consistent expression of Western development thinking, which attained a definite form when a specific economic science developed on the basis of the philosophy of natural rights and utilitarianism. The mechanistic and atomistic view of society as a structural arrangement based upon contract and market relations was retained in liberal "political economy". Although this perspective was widespread in 18th century Western Europe we may

regard *Adam Smith* (The Wealth of Nations - 1776) as the one who was able to provide the most forceful formulation of the new paradigm. It presupposed both a strong state (to the extent that it criticized state power), a functioning market (including a particular entrepreneurial class) and an urge for continuous technological innovations. Even if this paradigm has been considerably modified it may be argued that its crucial dimensions are basically intact.

To turn to the *state capitalist model* we shall by this concept refer to attempts to enforce capitalist development in primarily agrarian economies. This implied a strong state which had to fulfil tasks which in the classical liberal model were performed by the market and the entrepreneurial class. Technology was wholly imported and capital was accumulated through exploitation of the peasants.<sup>17)</sup> Before the Russian revolution and the subsequent evolution of the Soviet model "state capitalism" and "populism" were the two main alternatives for backward countries wanting to develop. Particularly in pre-revolutionary Russia there was a confrontation between these two alternatives. While "state-capitalists" like Witte and Stolypin tried to develop Russia by imitating Western institutions and technologies, populists like Mikailovskij and Vorontosov wanted a development rooted in Russian institutions and values. They argued that the development of capitalism in Russia was both impossible and undesirable. The "state-capitalist" approach to state-fostered industrial development was later developed by Stalin into the *Soviet model of development*, which was astonishingly similar to the approach of Sergei Witte in its emphasis on heavy industry, advanced technology and exploitation of the peasants. Authoritarian socialism was a more effective political framework for this development process than Tsarism, but in both cases the state was emphasized rather than the market.



Granted that Stalinism, upon which the modern Soviet state and society was built, can be seen as a variety of Marxism which fundamentally corresponds to the Western tradition of materialism and growthmanship, there should be no controversy about looking at both the liberal and the Soviet models (however different they may look in terms of political organization) as related to the Western development paradigm. Stalin's five year plans were part of a *substitution process* in which alternative means were made use of in order to reach similar ends as in Western Europe.

As for the *Keynesian model* it may be argued that this approach does not differ enough from classical liberalism (or neo-classicism) to be treated as a development model in its own right. Our reason for doing this is that keynesianism for historical reasons was the concrete form in which liberal development thinking was exported to the "developing" world. In the context of Western economic development the keynesian model is associated with the problems of mature capitalism. Its deviation from the classical model consisted in granting to the State a responsibility for the stability and continuous growth of capitalist systems, occasionally threatened by overproduction and underconsumption. Thus, it was mainly concerned with imperfections of the market. The elaboration of keynesian dynamic theory in the famous Harrod-Domar model led to an exaggerated interest in capital investment as the main instrument of development, reflected in the writings of Rosenstein - Rodan ("the big push"), Rostow (the "take-off" stage) and Hirschman ("unbalanced growth").<sup>18)</sup> All these approaches assumed that the state, at least during a transitional period, had to play a role in the process of development. Therefore the five-year plan (which was not acceptable to the "industrial democracies") was considered a must in developing countries even among liberals.

This historical and national diversity of the Western model implies that the content of penetration into non-western societies differed through time as well as between the colonial/Western powers.

## 2. Western Intellectual Penetration and the Logic of Modernization Strategies

In this elusive field of research haunted by grand concepts such as "western impact", "intellectual imperialism", "modernization", "self-reliance" etc it is of utmost methodological importance that the contact situation between the "giver" and the "receiver" (or challenge and response) is clearly specified. As one spokesman for the field of intellectual history once emphasized: "in dealing with the encounter between the West and any given society and culture, there can be no escape from the necessity of immersing ourselves as deeply as possible in the specificities of both worlds simultaneously. We are not dealing with a known and unknown variable but with two vast, everchanging, highly problematic areas of human experience"<sup>19)</sup>.

Thus, the contact situation or encounter may be identified in a number of ways: at particular points of history, between specific countries (ranging from simple pairings such as India and Britain to more complex relations such as Mexico and Spain/France/Britain/USA), within specific institutions (universities would be the relevant case here) and finally in particular intellectual systems, such as ideologies and the various social sciences.

As has been emphasized by development theory of the historical - structural kind the centre-periphery relationship has developed over a period of 500 years during which time it has continuously changed its nature and impact. Just to give one obvious example the role as leading imperialist power has shifted from southern Europe over north-western Europe to USA. Furthermore various parts of the "external arena", to use Wallerstein's expression, has been peripheralized at different points of time and with different implications for the process of intellectual penetration which is of concern here<sup>20)</sup>.

The universities may serve as the best illustration of this as they were established at very different points of time for very different reasons in the various parts of the Third World. The earliest Latin American universities were founded in the 16th century mainly to protect the medieval Christian culture of the settlers in the new and "barbarian" environment. This meant that the universities, as part of the conservative creole establishment, were attacked by the liberation movements in the 19th century and had to be completely remodelled after independence. In the case of Asia universities were established during the latter part of the 19th century, in Japan and China to provide for what was known as "Western learning" and in India to create an army of clerks and minor officials required for the cheap and smooth running of the machinery of British administration. If Latin American universities signified the beginnings of colonialism and the Asian universities its consolidation and reproduction, African universities heralded the eclipse of direct and overt Western dominance and its transformation into neo-colonialism. Unlike universities founded elsewhere by the colonial powers the African ones were established on the tacit assumption that direct rule was not to last for very long.<sup>21)</sup>

If we turn our attention to the transplantation of ideologies (liberalism and marxism) we can note how certain elements and forms of these ideologies have been more easily accepted than others as well as how these elements have changed in the new environment. To take the example of liberalism those dimensions pertaining to basic rights and freedoms succumbed to a new and hostile climate and more authoritarian varieties of liberalism such as the ideas of Comte were spread (particularly in Latin America) to an extent quite out of proportion to their importance in the West. Furthermore they came to take very different shapes, as for example in Mexico where comtism constituted the dominant ideology during the Diaz regime, and in India, where it took a basically sectarian form.<sup>22)</sup> As for Marxism, it began to conquer the Third World only after the Russian revolution and then most commonly in the more programmatic form of

Leninism or Stalinism. As the interest in the example of the Soviet model was gradually replaced by a deeper probing into marxism as a theory and worldview, Marx own writings may not always have made pleasant reading in view of his sometimes markedly eurocentric expositions. This has raised the problem of the relevance of marxism for the peripheral situation, a problem which in China was solved by "sinification" but which left India with a more orthodox and less dynamic Marxist tradition.<sup>23)</sup>

A more distinct sphere of influence where the process of intellectual penetration can be analysed and compared are the various social sciences, primarily economics, sociology and political science. The comparative study of social sciences is for several reasons an underdeveloped field of research. Systematic information about social science organisation and policies in different countries is not easily available and at present we have neither the theory nor the concepts through which the dynamics of social science development can be analysed. If (as suggested by Paul Streeten)<sup>24a)</sup> social sciences are treated as intellectual technology, the problem of "imposed" versus "appropriate" technology arises. As in perhaps no other science the western bias of the social sciences is too obvious to need elaboration.

It is our impression that economics is particularly strong in Latin America whereas sociology and political science are "leading sectors" in Asia and Africa respectively. Usually economics and political science have been more closely associated with the power centre, while sociology (including social anthropology) has been part of the liberal opposition. At least this is suggested by the Chinese case which furthermore indicates that an outright indigenization of sociology implies its disappearance.<sup>24b)</sup>

There are two distinct reactions to the challenge implied in the global imposition of Western development thinking: *first* the imita-

tive approach which rather is an acceleration of the process of penetration. *Second* the more indigenous approach, to be dealt with in next chapter. Obviously there can be no clear-cut division between those two and one has to be able to manage a number of in-between-cases sharing elements from both "ideal models".

The consequence of the first approach in terms of development is the "modernization strategy". 'Modernization' implies a comparison between two units. The development perspective associated with this concept is that the unit which is found to be "old-fashioned" should try to catch up with the unit which is more "advanced". Because of the international power structure created by imperialism this comparison, along with the obvious conclusion to "modernize", was more or less forced upon the non-European world. The option was to modernize or to be destroyed by imperialism.

Thus the quest for modernization constitutes a strong historical tradition underpinned by a continuous flow of ideas from the West. In comparison the roots of self-reliance thinking appear as rather weak in most countries. Even in the case of "civilizations" such as the Muslim World, India and China a closer study will reveal how strong traditions of self-reliance repeatedly succumb to the lure of Westernization.<sup>25)</sup>

There are few countries that have a real option with regard to self-reliance versus westernization and among those India and China are undoubtedly the most well documented. It is also here that this option has been a major political issue from time to time. Both India and China were deeply affected by Western imperialism and their response to the Western challenge has a long and varied history. After having been colonized at a very early stage India did not have the option to follow the Japanese example. Instead the ideals of modernization became part of the freedom struggle where they competed with Gandhi's ideals of self reliance. The

former conquered the Indian elite (although there was a split among the modernizers between "capitalists" and "socialists") whereas the latter were more instrumental in mobilizing the masses. After independence and until the "JP movement" 1973-75, however, the gandhians have been rather silent.

In China the "self-strengthening movement" in the 19th century was too weak to repeat the Japanese example and as the Chinese communist party took the lead in the movement for liberation, the Soviet way of development became the model to emulate in all respects. Only in the late fifties was this model challenged by the Maoist vision of the 'beautiful world'.

At present the economic policy of China is outward looking whereas that of India is inward looking. This, however, means very different things to the two countries. In the case of India the issue of "Nehruism" versus "Gandhism" is probably raised too late, at a time when many constraints implied in the evolving economic structure makes a consistent implementation of self-reliance rather difficult. China, in contrast, will modernize from a position of strength, achieved by a rather forceful policy of self-reliance carried out since the late fifties. The problem is whether this new departure implies far reaching compromises with the tradition of self-reliance and if Maoism thus will have to face the same fate as Gandhism, that of ritualization. There is obviously a risk. It is not only (or perhaps not even primarily) the inherent strength of the complex of ideas we have called modernization that account for its success. Rather, one has to look for the "supportive structures" (the state, the market and the scientific-technological complex) in order to understand why it is so difficult to implement an alternative. A successful implementation of "another development" will necessitate another political structure, new methods of economic organization and integration, and new modes of research and innovation.

### 3. The emergence of indigenous paradigms.

The fundamental issue of concern here is the universal claims of Western social sciences and the obvious risk of implanting "foreign" ideologies and values through Western concepts and methods in social science. This is what indigenization of development thinking really is concerned with. The radical approach to the problem, to do away with Western concepts altogether and build up "national schools", might even from a detached and sympathetic Western view look a bit adventurous as the result may be a fragmentation of social science, not only between different disciplines (which is a problem by itself) but also in particularistic national traditions.

One may perhaps look into this problem in the familiar terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. As "thesis" we may then see the Western intellectual challenge. The cry for a radical indigenization is very clearly a process of building an antithesis, which then would precede the synthesis: a global social science. If the first process is referred to as *penetration* and the second as *indigenization*, we may term the third one *universalization*, implying a *true* universalization, transcending the assumed universalism of Western social science. The antithesis can then be seen to provide the ideological and moral commitment for intellectual emancipation and, granted that the challenge is taken seriously among Western social scientists, an opportunity for Western social science to free itself from excessive universalistic claims. We regard such a self-critical attitude a necessary precondition for the development of a truly universal theory of development.

The reasons for the differential emphasis on indigenization and universalization are very complex and may be due both to differences in cultural context and level of "sophistication". By this is meant mainly the development in terms of academic infrastructure and professionalization. Even the broad tri-continental scheme of

Latin America, Asia and Africa point at the extreme variation in terms of cultural complexity, viable social counterpoints and values, resource base, scale of society etc., all of which influence the form, content and impact of the intellectual response.

To start with *Latin America* we here find a case of strong cultural similarity with the West at least in countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In consequence the trend towards universalization is much more obvious than indigenization trends. Thus, the Western values are not questioned to the same extent as in Asia and Africa. The things that are questioned are the weakness of Western social science, particularly liberal science, in describing social reality and generating feasible strategies for change. This intellectual attitude is very similar to the one taken by the growing nations of the 19th century, viz Germany and the United States. The obvious example is the Latin American discussion on dependence.

The most important intellectual background to the breakthrough of the dependence paradigm in development theory is the Latin American *dependencia*-school rooted in specific economic and intellectual experiences of Latin American countries particularly during the depression of the 30's. A new strategy emphasizing *desarrollo hacia adentro* (inward looking development) instead of *desarrollo hacia afuera* (outward looking development) was popularized by ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) with headquarters in Santiago de Chile from 1948. The main theme that was brought up by the ECLA-team of economists was that economic theory as expounded in developed capitalist countries was inadequate and that there was a need for a more structural approach including an appreciation of different historical situations and national contexts. The remedy on the level of economic policy was found to be industrialization by way of import substitution.<sup>26)</sup> Later developments showed that the strategy was if not wrong so at least inadequate. This situation



provided the incentive for elaboration and extension on the dependency approach resulting in a variety of dependency schools, some of them continuations of the ECLA-strategy, others oriented towards marxism. At the same time the whole concept of dependence has been increasingly attacked both by marxist and non-marxist scholars. The bulk of this criticism, however, has a 'universalist' rather than a 'nationalist' orientation.

The further theoretical development of the dependence paradigm seems to imply a general theory of global capital accumulation. An extension should, however, also include analyses of more specific sub-national conditions, but very little seems to have been done along these lines so far. It is uncertain to what extent such efforts would necessitate *specifically* Latin American concepts and perspectives. As far as we are aware there exists no "Latin American", not to speak of "Chilean" or "Brazilian", sociology.

One may, however, point to concepts such as 'marginalidad' (marginality), which was developed by Pablo Conzales Casanova in his "Democracy in Mexico".<sup>27)</sup> The marginality is here found to be a rural phenomenon, implying an extreme poverty and certain indigenous (in this case Indian) cultural traits which are more persistent. The fact that the various manifestations of marginality are correlated shows that it is an integrated phenomenon which does not seem to be affected by development. The continuity of a marginal population in Mexico raises some doubts about the validity of conventional development theory and its insistence on the spread effects of economic growth.

The fact that Western development thinking on the whole seems to be more integrated in the Latin American thought does not mean that efforts on a more philosophical level to search for a specific Latin American historical identity are completely lacking. These, however, seem to be mainly confined to authors and philosophers. The famous

Mexican poet Octavio Paz for example refers to the existence of a counter-culture (somewhat similar to what Werthem has called counterpoint) which he for lack of a better word calls "the other Mexico" <sup>28)</sup>.

Where should one look for "the other Mexico" or for that matter "the other Latin America"? In pre-conquest civilizations? Many would reject these traditions as violent, repressive and inhuman, although it may be true what Paz says that "it is a mistake to study the totality of Meso american civilization from the Nahua point of view (and, worse, from that of its Aztec version) because that totality is older, richer and far more diverse."

*Ināigenismo* has also found expression in the Peruvian APRA (Haya de la Torre), in the Guatemalan Revolution under José Arévalo and in the Bolivian Revolutionary Party (MNR). Another Mexican intellectual, José Vasconcelos, has defined the alternative in a more synthetic and universalistic way. He hoped for the emergence in America of a "cosmic race", a "new cultural being" that combined Indian, African, and European elements. <sup>29)</sup> However, very little work has as yet been done on the actual or potential role of the pre-conquest traditions in Latin American thought.

Turning to *Asia* it may first be interesting to see whether there has been any parallel to the Latin American discussion on dependency. In India there was in fact a similar discussion already in the late 19th century, namely the so called drain theory of Dadabhai Naoroji. According to Naoroji, India's development problems were mainly a consequence of the resource drain from India to Britain, and his description could as well have been concerned with the problem of dependence today. <sup>30)</sup> In the contemporary situation the dependence theory is, however, less popular in India, which probably has something to do with the fact that many Indian intellectuals of today have become "depenetrated" to some extent and tend to feel that

India's economic problems are something more than external exploitation.

It is not easy to tell whether this reaction against overemphasis on external factors is "indigenous" or whether it simply reflects the state of the international discussion, where it now increasingly is being felt that underdevelopment and dependency theory is no longer servicable and must be transcended.<sup>31)</sup> It is admittedly a weakness of the thesis - antithesis - synthesis model proposed above that the debate cannot be nicely ordered in "stages" but instead takes place simultaneously on all fronts. It is nevertheless likely that an inward orientation of the social sciences in Third World countries will take place in the years to come. The obvious reference point for any indigenization of Indian social science is Gandhi<sup>32)</sup>. This is widely recognized among social scientists in India, particularly on the occasion of Gandhian anniversaries.

Gandhi's ideas on development is too big a subject to go into here<sup>33)</sup>. The main problem as regards his relevance for development theory and social sciences in general seems to be the fundamentalist approach of many of his followers. On many points Gandhi however appears as strikingly modern. His approach may be described as *action oriented* (the oppressive environment was his laboratory), *normative* (his viewpoint was that of the poorest of the poor) and *global* (the ultimate goal was a non-violent world order). These same principles may be found in current ideas on problem-oriented social science research, like peace research and development research.

If Latin American social science has made very important contributions to the problem of dependence while (in relative terms) neglecting internal structure, Asian social scientists are obviously more advanced as far as internal possibilities and constraints in development are concerned.

In strong contrast with India, *Africa* (we are here referring to sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of South Africa) is a case of fairly recent intellectual penetration, a comparatively weak academic infrastructure and a corresponding lack of indigenous responses. The criticism of *status quo* usually takes the form of "Africanization" but this seems to take place in terms of personnel rather than in terms of concepts and theories. At least, this observation can be exemplified by recent developments in the *Institute of Development Studies* (Nairobi) which was established as a "neo-colonial" institution but later gradually africanized. This africanization, however, did not involve criticism of prevalent schools and traditions of research. As far as the process of africanization did concern the *content* of research, the changes were limited to a stronger emphasis on *pragmatic* research objectives which were instrumental from the point of view of the administration, rather than *alternative* perspectives. The dissatisfaction with the Western bias in university courses and research programs is very real but in general teachers find it very difficult to find good substitutes more relevant in the African context<sup>34)</sup>.

The earliest African indigenous theoretical efforts, clearly related to a Western challenge, were of course based on the concrete experience of imperialism. For Marxist-Leninists the main issue has been what economic forces made the capitalist world imperialistic, whereas African theorists were more concerned with the incapacity of Africa to withstand imperialism and what imperialism did to Africa<sup>35)</sup>. This theorizing implied a reinterpretation of the civilization/barbarism thesis proposed by Western apologists of imperialism, a reinterpretation which occasionally took the form of populist views about the undesirability of industrial civilization in general.

A later example of what might be considered as an indigenous response, and to some extent a continuation of this populist theme was the concept of *African Socialism* which although primarily a

political one, nevertheless has got a certain theoretical significance. It covers a wide ideological spectrum from more or less pure marxism-leninism to populist ideas very similar to the Russian Narodniks or Gandhi in India. It is the latter more indigenous thinking which is of most relevance in this context. It seems that a fairly articulate spokesman for this line of thought is the Senegalese economist Mamadou Dia who has tried to work out an alternative economic system, at the same time Africanist and democratic-socialist and preserving the best in the values of traditional society.<sup>36)</sup> However, Africa is still the stronghold of neo-colonialism and increasingly the victim of super-power operations. Critical radicalism at present moves towards marxism rather than more indigenous patterns of thought.

Even on the basis of this admittedly superficial overview one may discern certain distinct features as regards the scope and direction of development thinking in Latin America, Asia and Africa respectively. In Latin America the dominant theme has been to question not the Western industrial model but the dominant role of the West within it, implying a concern with the global economic pattern rather than the internal specifics of Latin American society. At the same time the classical question of whether industrial capitalism can at all flourish in the periphery of the world order has been put. However, the possibilities of evolving an indigenous alternative seem rather uncertain given the early collapse of pre-conquest civilizations and the complete dominance of Western culture. In Asia the colonial penetration, however deepgoing in the economic and political spheres, still left the cultural complex as a viable framework. The response was therefore articulated from the perspective of non-western cultures and world-views and not only from the position of a periphery. As a result the internal dynamics and need to reorganize one's own society loom much larger than in Latin America. This does not mean, however, that indigenous thinking is here automatically more viable politically as the fate of gandhism in India shows. Turning to Africa it is perhaps this political dimension that has stood in the fore-

ground of development thinking, viz in the form of 'nation-building'. Whereas in Latin America the creation of nation-states was brought about on top of a thoroughly destructed or marginalized pre-colonial society and in Asia the colonies as well as the 'new states' coincided with socio-cultural blocs or earlier empires, the African political units lacked any natural cohesiveness save the administrative exigencies of the colonial power. Consequently the problem of how to create functioning political systems emerged as a crucial component of development.

Naturally, such differences in cultural complexity and degree of resilience, of intensity of penetration as well as period of integration into the Western dominated world order give rise to a wide variation in development thinking. Nevertheless there is one feature that Third World alternatives seem to have in common. Granted that the emphasis may shift from case to case, indigenous development thinking appears as being intellectual, philosophical, political and ideological at one and the same time. This is further underlined when comparing it with the emerging counterpoints in Western society to which we will now turn.

#### 4. Counterpoints and protests in industrial societies.

As we have pointed out in chapter two the concrete manifestation of the Western model in mature capitalism is Keynesianism. Today the efficiency of Keynesian policies are increasingly being questioned. The national economies no longer respond the way they should, which may have to do with changes such as monopolization, transnationalisation, innovation crisis etc.<sup>37)</sup> It seems as if the supportive structures have reached the limit of their system-maintaining capacity. At present new solutions are experimented with but their effectiveness are still most uncertain and in solving one problem they tend to contribute to the worsening of another. Problems such as "stagflation", consumerism and alienation, bureaucratization, marginalisation, the military-industrial complex and the environmental problems obviously relate to each other and may be said to constitute a vicious circle which must be attacked on all fronts. The problem is therefore not only whether the present system can generate viable solutions but also whether any integrated and consistent alternative model can at all be found.

It is therefore but natural that the Western development model has met with resistance not only when applied to non-Western cultures but also within the Western world itself and there is by now a fairly intensive debate going on in all capitalist countries.<sup>38)</sup> In the socialist world things are a bit different. The dominant Soviet model of development, though not hit by stagflation, gives rise to similar predicaments as Keynesianism in the West. On top of consumerism, marginalization, social dissolution, ecocrisis etc you also find repression of the rights of freedom and expression.

The fact that there *are* counter-currents to the dominant trend is a partial confirmation of the existence of these problems. In the Socialist bloc protests appear in disguised form, for instance as literary movements. In the West there are at present a variety of

new social movements, ranging from terrorist groups and separatist movements through environmental activists and women's liberation to individualist solutions such as transcendental meditation etc. It ought to be a major task of contemporary social science to investigate the meaning of the new tendencies. What are their social and historical roots? Do they articulate a common understanding of our predicaments and do their proposed solutions transcend Western development thinking? If so, what is the content of the new models and under what conditions will they constitute a viable alternative?

Even though the search for alternatives within the industrialized West seems at least as widespread as that in non-western societies there is a peculiar difference. In the latter the vision of and strategy towards a better society are typically articulated by "philosopher-activists", i.e. people at the forefront of socio-political movements. Theirs is not a partial reaction to a particular grievance but a conception of another society as a whole. In the West on the other hand the overall societal alternatives are typically the product of professional academics while the actual struggle against the deformities of the mainstream is carried out by movements centred on particular problems and usually with rather limited conception of what the future society should be. The West therefore presents a curiously truncated picture with on the one hand a plethora of academic, more or less practical, holistic utopias and on the other a perplexing variety of counter-movements with rather disparate visions of environmental <sup>39)</sup> alternatives, feminist alternatives, simple-living alternatives etc.

The disparate nature of the various movement and action-groups could be explained by the high degree of horizontal differentiation in industrialized society. In highly differentiated societies people encounter difficulties and react to problems as they manifest themselves in the separate sectors of society. All-embracing mobilization is impeded by institutional insulation of the process. A holistic overview can develop only where the separation of institutional spheres has been



overcome.

This is the case in intellectual circles with a humanistic and interdisciplinary orientation. One example is the recent breakthrough of future-oriented research. Leading futurologists like L. Mumford, E.F. Schumacher, I. Illich, R. Junk and J. Galtung seem to converge in their criticism of modern industrial society and in their visions of a future alternative. They all argue in favour of a decentralized and pluralistic society organized in small-scale units, preferably local communities having a high degree of self-determination and self-reliance.

Theirs is the notion of a complete human being who realizes all his different talents and abilities in a harmonious balance with each other. They also maintain ecological and physiocratic ideas about the primacy of the production of basic life necessities as against over-industrialization and predatory exploitation of natural resources. Truth and righteousness are seen as forces in history that must be used in devising the means for bringing a new society about as well as in organizing it.

If such a vision can be said to summarize the views of innovative thinkers in the West it is clear that it differs in content but little from classical populism or utopian socialism. Like the classical populism of the Russian narodnik movement neo-populism has its main adherents at the universities. But there is a decisive difference, namely that the present neo-populism lacks a functioning social counter-structure from which to launch the quest for an alternative. Classical populism had its given social referent in the pre-capitalist agrarian order, its peasant villages and tradition of self-reliance. Neo-populism, on the other hand, has to wage a two-front struggle: to articulate an alternative world-view as well as to create a social form embodying this world-view. So far neo-populism has got something like a mass-base only in countries having a relatively large sector of self-employed producers whereas elsewhere it has remained an affair of middle-class youth and fairly educated people.

The neo-populist current seems to have emerged through a three stage process. The *first* tendencies appeared during the 50's in the form of protests against nuclear weapons. This represented a militant pacifism which, however, lacked a clear vision of an alternative society. The break with the establishment had more to do with new and unconventional methods of struggle such as sit-ins, teach-ins, demonstrations, boycotts, street theaters etc. An entire spectrum of non-violent direct action in which ordinary citizens could engage was developed. It is to be noted that already at this stage that a key-figure in classical populism gained widespread attention, Gandhi, although as yet more through his thoughts on non-violence than through his vision of development.

Towards the end of the 60's these movements turned into a *second* stage characterized by a more deepgoing protest against the centralized and technocratic society and its ideals of massconsumption, especially among students and intellectuals. The foremost expression of this was the so-called New Left which was critical of modern industrial society both in its capitalist and state socialist form. It wanted to substitute the onesided economic-technical rationality of industrial society with radical humanist values. The New Left actually contained many ideological currents. One of them was marxism but it is probably correct to characterize the main current as a crude form of populist socialism.<sup>40)</sup> This was especially the case in USA where there are strong populist traditions as compared to continental Europe where marxism has been the dominant ideology of opposition. However, even in Europe the New Left felt a strong attraction towards the premarxist period in the socialist movement. Utopian socialism, anarchism, syndicalism and guild-socialism were revived because of their critical attitudes to universal industrialism and their ideas about how to integrate advanced tools and machines into a local community structure.

But the ideas of the New Left derived not only from the Western cultural sphere. It was strongly influenced by the liberation movements in the Third World where the populist peasant socialism of Mao Tse-Tung was a particularly influential example of a development model "in which people really mattered".<sup>41)</sup>

If the New Left was a challenge to the establishment on a political and intellectual level there also emerged a counter-culture challenging the socio-cultural and emotional poverty of Western society.

A salient feature was the marked orientation towards Eastern philosophy in such forms as Zen Buddhism, tantric Yoga, transcendental meditation and astrology. The New Left can be said to have engaged in a political struggle against the present society (the macro rebellion) whereas the counter-culture tried to bring about an alternative way of life (the micro revolution). The two were fused in the protests against the American war in Vietnam.

There are signs that the neo-populist current in the industrial countries now have entered a *third* stage with a broader popular base and at least an embryo of ideological unity. As examples we could mention the remarkable growth of new life style movements such as Future in Our Hands (Norway) and Voluntary Simplicity (USA) along with the environmental movement and the women's liberation movement.<sup>42)</sup> The new trend is also evident in parliamentary politics through the growth of non-traditional parties as well as eco-political tendencies within the established parties. Most of the new social movements have originated with student activists, that is to say with people who have been influenced by the radical intelligentsia at the universities. The neopopulist current therefore can be found within almost all of the new movements. In many cases it is the main innovative force within the movements. The environmental movement, for instance, is in itself a heterogeneous phenomenon containing liberal, socialist, conservative and even fascist currents. The most deep-going current however, though not the one with most followers, is arguing against industrial growth society on the basis of a new holistic and reverential attitude towards nature, towards other beings and towards oneself. This branch of the movement maintains an ecosophically inspired world-view based on principles such as organic wholeness, diversity, autonomy, decentralization and symbiosis - principles which are dear to the populist mind as well but at odds with the mainstream of Western development thinking.

A similar analysis could be made, for instance, of the women's liberation movement. There are liberal and socialist currents within the movement but there is also a feminist branch emphasizing specific female values such as motherly care, the life-giving spirit of Mother Earth, human warmth and closeness, being rather than having or doing etc. This current within the movement is parallel to the ecopolitical current of the environmental movement. Both belong to the neopopulist syndrome of complete human beings living close to nature and to each other in small-scale communities with a high degree of self-determination and self-reliance. Thus, in spite of the admittedly weak ideological coherence one could nevertheless speak of a re-emergence of a populist syndrome as a new force in contemporary society.

### III THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH AND THE SEARCH FOR A UNIVERSAL DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

We have so far dealt only with the emergence of contextually derived development thinking and the various directions this has taken. Let us now turn around and ask what light this may throw on the search for a universal development paradigm. We would like to emphasize, however, that in doing so we go clearly beyond the present stage of our work and the conclusions drawn below are therefore still rather speculative.

First, it is our contention that *indigenous development thinking carries the potentials of the first genuine intellectual and ideological interaction* between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' societies. This may seem a rather paradoxical conclusion in view of the diversity if not particularism that characterizes the contextually rooted notions on development. Nevertheless, we believe the framework for such an intercourse has been laid by the fundamental unity of approach to development of Third World populists and First World neo-populists (e.g. Gandhi, Mao, Nyerere, Freire, Illich, Schumacher, Brox). Indeed, as these examples show an intellectual cross-fertilization is already underway. More to the point may be the cross-cultural relevance of such concepts as decentralization, self-reliance, collective identity, popular participation etc. The significance of these concepts is not only that they embody global development experiences, they all have indigenous terms rooted in the socio-cultural specifics of the different societies (e.g. Tanzanian *ujamaa*, Korean *juche*, Indian *swadeshi* and *sarvodaya*, Kenyan *Harambee*). This is in sharp contrast with the dominant development thinking based squarely on Western experiences and the concepts of which are proverbially untranslatable into non-Western cultures and situations.

But for this global intellectual interaction to become more than just fragmentary or potential a comparative overview of the various indigenous trends *on their own terms* seems long overdue. As long

as they are treated primarily as particularistic expression of anti-westernism or through the Western ideological prism of left versus right they will at best promote a superficial eclecticism. To us, therefore, such a comparative overview appears at least as important a task for development researchers as that of being the progenitors of a new and more relevant set of universals.

And this brings us to a related point. Perhaps the most important requirement of a universal development paradigm is that it should be based on and ensure the mutual compatibility of different development paths, between various societal levels (individual, family, locality, region etc) as well as between societies. In this connection we would argue that such a *compatibility between the different units of an alternative global order is inherent in recent indigenous thinking*. Behind this lies what we believe to be a reorientation in the indigenous response to the penetration and dominance of Western industrialism. In what may be called the classical populist response, ranging from the Narodniks in 19th century Russia to the heyday of Third World populism in the 1950's and 60's, the alternative was typically posed with reference to concrete and specific institutions or characteristics of one's own society on the one hand (e.g. the Russian *mir*, the Indian village with its *panchayat*, the Indonesian *Marhaen* embodying the resilience and vitality of the Indonesian 'essence' etc) and against a specific Western colonial power (Britain, Spain, Holland, France or whatever). From this followed the somewhat remarkable fact that the different populist theoreticians and ideologues were largely ignorant of each other. Early Chinese populists like Li Ta-chao, though echoing the Narodniks, do not seem to have known even of their existence. Similarly Gandhi was familiar only with Tolstoy and the literary Narodnik traditions just as Gandhi himself seems to have stood for but a general non-violence and moralism in the eyes of later Third World populists<sup>43</sup>.

While the confrontation between the self (defined largely in specific

institutional or phenomenological terms) and the West (being synonymous with the Western power in question) was therefore posed in rather particularistic terms, the situation has changed rapidly over the last decade or so. The second generation of populists such as Jayaprakash Narayan, the 'new' Nyerere (in his role as party-leader rather than head-of-state), the 'cultural revolutionaries' in China etc. seem more prone to talk in terms of more generalized principles instead of culturally specific institutions. If this assessment is correct one would expect that this less particularistic intonation of populist thought also improves the possibilities to have a meaningful intercourse and sharing of experiences.

This process of generalization is further enhanced by the change in the world order from being an international one, i.e. one made up of nation-states as the significant actors, to a *transnational* one dominated by supra-national interests such as the TNC:s. This implies that from the perspective of Third World countries the 'West' no longer signifies a particular Western country with its structural and cultural idiosyncracies. Instead it has increasingly come to stand for a syndrome of principles of organisation and cultural values: Western Industrialism.

These two processes - the emerging intellectual interaction and the trends towards generalization - mutually support each other and pave the way for a more coherent alternative. If one looks at the current situation primarily as one of fragmented and particularistic protests against a distortive mainstream of Western industrialism then the priority of development research must clearly be one of arriving at a universal development paradigm from which practical utopias can be drawn. If, however, one can discern the potentials for a self-sustained process towards such a paradigm, brought about by development practioners rather than academics, then the priority of development research would likewise shift to assisting such a

process rather than initiating it. Depending upon how one conceives these alternatives the role of the development researcher could be either that of a 'mid-wife' or a 'procreator' of a universal development paradigm.

Finally, even if one may not share our assessment of the potentials of indigenous development thinking it nevertheless drives home one important point. Given the fact that the mainstream is not only a system of ideas but also the ideological expression of a power-structure it is not enough to counter it with another development model, however rational and perfect that may be. It must also be related to and fused with current socio-political counter-movements in the society. This implies the *necessity to contextualize the universals of 'another development'*, of making them meaningful and creative guidelines for action in any given situation.

This problem is perhaps most acute when we turn to the Western world itself. The devastating effectiveness with which industrialism has demolished and transformed the social fabric in its own image leaves very little of identifiable counterpoints left which could serve as means and concretization of 'other' universals. Neither do we have any natural social base in the name of which the political form of the 'other' universals could be formulated.

Both these problems can be illustrated by the example of the Swedish welfare society. To start with the structural problem Sweden, the prime case of the 'mainstream model', has been so effective in modernizing that whatever is left of a *gemeinschaft* society falls under the jurisdiction of tourist authorities. Even a quick glance of neighbouring Norway with its much more viable periphery, will bear this observation out. As far as the social base is concerned there are in Sweden at present a lot of issue-specific action groups with little perception of a common vision.



This somewhat amorphous social base is also reflected in parliamentary politics. The Swedish electorate which has been extremely stable in the past shows many signs of a new mobility in the 70's. Change in party affiliation has increased from 7% in 1956 to 20% in 1976. Public confidence in politicians and political parties is decreasing and the old correlation between social background and voting no longer holds. A number of issues no longer follow the traditional left-right-scale, the most important one being the nuclear power issue. This instability makes dramatic changes as possible as unforeseen. The neo-populist current is evidently at work on the attitudinal level but it has yet to crystallize into a coherent political force. The possibilities of this happening may in the end depend, somewhat paradoxically, on the effectiveness of the welfare policies themselves. For the material welfare of the many has in a large measure been bought at the cost of a marginalization of the many, a social dissolution as it were. People are assured a high standard of living while at the same time being estranged from the process of decision-making, from congenial social milieus, from jobs and from themselves. To the extent that this trend persists, and the logic of the welfare system seems to ensure this, it is likely to bring about new and more dynamic social alignments superceding the old system-derived ones of classes, income groups and professions. Such new alignments may then constitute the social base of an alternative development at present lacking, if inspired by something more than just a protest against the present.

NOTES

- 1) By this we do not imply that 'contextual' is the logical opposite of 'universal'. Perhaps it would be more correct, but also more cumbersome to talk of two different syndromes, the one emphasizing contextual/particular/specific/circumstantial factors and the other global/general/universal/absolute ones.
- 2) For an overview, see P.Worsley: The Third World (London, 1964).
- 3) The highly disparate and voluminous debate on alternative development as regards the industrialized world is excellently surveyed in M.Marien: Societal Directions and Alternatives - A critical Guide to the Literature (La Fayette, N Y, 1976).
- 4) J.Galtung: 'Two ways of Being Western. Some Similarities between Liberalism and Marxism' (Oslo, mimeo n.d.).
- 5) Employment, Growth and Basic Needs (ILO, 1976) and What Now? Another Development (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1975) are generally looked upon as the breakthrough of this type of approach.
- 6) Introductory surveys of these trends can be found in C.Geertz: 'The Integrative Revolution' (in Geertz (ed): Old Societies and New States, New York, 1973); P.E.Sigmund: The Ideologies of Developing Nations (New York, 1969) and P.Worsley op.cit.
- 7) M.Friberg: 'The Resurgence of Populism in the Industrialized Countries, Gothenburg, 1979 (Project Paper no 17).
- 8) I.Wallerstein (ed): Social Change. The Colonial Situation (New York, 1966).
- 9) For a brief discussion of Gandhi's development strategy and its similarities with the maoist one, see B.Hettne and G.Tamm: 'The development strategy of Gandhian economics', Journal of the Indian Anthropological Society Vol 6:1 1971.
- 10) J.Galtung: 'The New International Order and the Basic Need Approaches' (Genève, 1978, mimeo).
- 11) G.Tamm: 'The JP-movement and the fate of an alternative development strategy', Gothenburg 1977 (Project Paper no 7).
- 12) Cf J.Galtung's emphasis on the influence of the bureaucrat-capitalist-intellectual (B-C-I) complex.
- 13) For the concept of counterpoint, see W.F.Wertheim: 'Society as a Composite of Conflicting Value Systems' in his: East West Parallels - Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia (The Hague, 1964).
- 14) M.N.Srinivas: 'Reflections on the Study of One's Own Society', in his Social Change in India (Berkeley, 1969).
- 15) R.N.Nisbet: Social Change and History (Oxford University Press, 1969).
- 16) J.Galtung: 'Two ways of Being Western. Some Similarities between Liberalism and Marxism'.
- 17) A.Gerschenkron: Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

- 18) P.N.Rostenstein-Rodan: 'Notes on the Theory of the Big Push' , in H.S.Ellis and H.C.Wallich (ed): Economic Development for Latin America (1961); W.W.Rostow: The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, 1960); A.C. Hirschman: The Strategy of Economic Development(1955).
- 19) B.Schwartz: In Search of Wealth and Power- Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, Mass.,1964).
- 20) I.Wallerstein: The Modern World System (New York, 1974).
- 21) For an historical account of the transplantation of universities, see E. Ashby : Universities - British, Indian and African.(London,1966).
- 22) On positivism in Mexico, see Leopoldo Zea: El Positivismo en México (México, 1943); on India, see G.H. Forbes: Positivism in Bengal (South Asia Books, 1975).
- 23) H. Carrère d'Encausse and S.R.Schram: Marxism and Asia (Allen Lane, 1969).  
Although the relative sterility of the marxist tradition in India has been widely recognized the reasons for this are more obscure. A philosophical incompatibility has been stressed by P. Bowes (Hindu Intellectual Tradition, South Asia Books, 1977), while B.Chandra has stressed the anti-intellectual heritage of marxism in India ('Total Rectification' in Seminar no 178,1974) and B.R.Nanda the success of Gandhi as divesting marxism of its otherwise natural starting point, the anti-imperial struggle ('Socialism in India, 1919-1939: A Restrospect' in Socialism in India, New Delhi, 1972).
- 24a) P.Streeten: 'The Role of Social Sciences in Development Studies' in The Social Sciences and Development (IBRD, 1974).
- 24b) B.Hettne: 'The Rise and Fall of Chinese Sociology' (Project Paper no 12, 1978).
- 25) B.Hettne: 'Self-Reliance' versus 'Modernization'. The Dialectics of Development Strategies in India and China (Project Paper no 18, 1978).
- 26) P.J.O'Brien: 'A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency in Oxaal et.al.: Beyond the Sociology of Development (London 1975)
- 27) Pablo Gonzales Casanova: La Democracia en México (México, 1965).
- 28) Octavio Paz: The other Mexico - Critique of the Pyramid (New York, 1972).
- 29) M.Jorin and J.D.Martz: Latin American Political Thought and Ideology (Chapel Hill, 1970).
- 30) Sudhar Chandra: Dependence and Disillusionment. Emergence of National Consiousness in Later 19th Century India (New Delhi, 1975).  
For a historical overview of the Indian debate, see G.Tamm: Intellectual Penetration and Response in India(Project Paper nos 10 and 16, 1978/9).
- 31) Colin Leys: 'Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes', Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol 7, No 1, 1977.
- 32) G.Tamm: Sociology in India. Transplantation and Indianization (Project Paper no 15, 1979).

- 33) B.Hettne and G.Tamm, op.cit
- 34) Interviews with P.Mbithi and K.Kinyanjui (IDS, Nairobi).
- 35) T.Hodkin: 'Some African and Third World Theories of Imperialism' , in R.Owen and B.Sutcliffe (eds): Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972).
- 36) M.Dia: Reflexions sur L'Economie de l'Afrique Noir (Paris, 1960).
- 37) How global corporations are able to frustrate standard Keynesian remedies has been thoroughly investigated by R.Barnet & R.Müller: Global Reach. The Power of Multinational Corporations (New York, 1974).
- 38) A synopsis of the new tendencies in the Western World is given by L.S. Stavianos: The Promise of the Coming Dark Age (San Francisco, 1976).
- 39) This has been emphasized in rather stronger words by Michael Marien: " This pluralism is beyond the point of healthy diversity and well into the realm of intellectual incest and impotent atomization.... ... Before chiding politicians, one should recognize that the failure of political leadership are abetted by the failures of intellectuals to communicate with each other, with the public, and with decision makers" (' The Banner of Babel', Social Policy Vol 5 no 5, 1975).
- 40) George R.Vickers: The Formation of the New Left. The Early Years (Lexington Books, 1975), and Gianni Statera: Death of Utopia. The Development and Decline of Student Movements in Europe (Oxford, 1975).
- 41) For an analysis of the populist heritage of marxism in China, see M.Meissner: Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (New York, 1970).
- 42) See for example, Duane Elgin & Arnold Mitchell: "Voluntary Simplicity (3)", The Co-Evolution Quarterly Summer 1977; and A.Naess: 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement, A Summary. Inquiry, Vol 16 No 1, Spring, 1973.
- 43) It is interesting to note that Mao and Gandhi, although both had evidently heard of and read about each others standpoints, had nothing positive to say about each other. To Gandhi Mao was a communist first (thus bracketed as antithetical to Gandhis's political philosophy) and chinese only second (which would have put him in the fraternal category of non-western, i.e. Asian, counterpoint to the colonial and capitalist onslaught). To Mao Gandhi appeared to have been an Indian first (and thus in chinese eyes inferior) and an anti-imperialist co-fighter only second. For a discussion of Sino-Indian attitudes from a cultural and ideological point of view, see K.P.Gupta: 'Indian Approaches to Modern China', China Report vol 8, nos 4 & 5, 1972)