COGNITIVE BALLISTICS vs. DERIVATIVE CORRELATION IN MEMETIC WARFARE

COMMENTARY ARCHIVES, 30 Mar 2009

Anthony Judge

Suicide Bombing as a Weapon of Mass Distraction?

Introduction

Given the success with which the western-inspired financial bubble of "globalization" was so disastrously exploded, this is an exploration of the possibility that ensuring the strategic focus on suicide bombing as the epitome of terrorism has been the mistaken pursuit of a decoy. Such a possibility would be consistent with the recognized lack of imagination, and the quality of groupthink, associated with the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

The focus here is on the destruction of the financial system as an example of memetic warfare in a global knowledge society. It builds on the understanding of structural violence as developed by Johan Galtung (Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Journal of Peace Research, 1969) who distinguishes between physical violence and structural violence. Physical violence is for the amateur, using weapons in order to dominate. For Galtung, structural violence is the tool of the professional employing exploitation and social injustice to achieve domination. In this sense the question is whether the collapse of the financial system was brought about by professionals who had tricked those complicit in the globalization process into acting like amateurs in its defence.

"Cognitive ballistics"

As defined in Wikipedia, ballistics is the science of mechanics that deals with the flight, behavior, and effects of projectiles, especially bullets, gravity bombs, rockets, or the like; the science or art of designing and accelerating projectiles so as to achieve a desired performance.

The past decade has seen a cognitive focus on linear thinking through which it has been assumed that the higher dimensionality of globality could be encompassed. This argument is developed elsewhere (Engaging with Globality — through cognitive lines, circlets, crowns or holes, 2009), specifically in that part dealing with "points" and "lines" (Engaging with Globality through Cognitive Realignment: making points and aligning a target, 2009).

A prime feature of such linear thinking has been binary logic which has emphasized the focus on various forms of polarization, notably in relation to global governance and the clash of civilizations. This logic is evident in the succinct statement through which the Coalition of the Willing was assembled in response to 9/11: "You are either with us, or against us". This approach has been contrasted with more complex approaches (Towards Polyhedral Global Governance: complexifying oversimplistic strategic metaphors, 2008; Coherent Value Frameworks: pillar-ization, polarization and polyhedral frames of reference, 2008).

However binary logic may be understood as the underlying cognitive framework through which the physical response to terrorism was organized — specifically through physical bombardment using conventional weapons. Simultaneously every variety of measure was taken to develop binary security filters and gateways, effectively: You are either an unacceptable risk, or you are not. The application of these measures has caused untold disruption and unpleasantness wherever they have been applied — disruption that it has been recognized was part of the strategic objective of al-Qaida.

Ballistics may be understood as binary in nature, especially in the sense that some form of projectile is directed forcefully against a target with the expectation of damaging it, if not destroying it. The extent to which "cognitive ballistics" exists may be seen in the manner in which aspects of physical ballistics are used metaphorically in conventional strategic responses to opponents, whether it be "bullet points", "ammunition" or "targets" as discussed elsewhere (Enhancing Sustainable Development Strategies through Avoidance of Military Metaphors, 1998; Missiles, Missives, Missions and Memetic Warfare, 2001). It is of course evident in the efforts to "target" those in Islamic cultures with propaganda.

It is appropriate to note the model developed by Scott D. Brown and Andrew Heathcote (The Simplest Complete Model of Choice Response Time: linear ballistic accumulation, Cognitive Psychology, 57, 3, November 2008) whose simplicity supposedly allows complete analytic solutions for choices between any number of alternatives in a field beset by the tradeoff between complexity and completeness.

More intriguing is the sense in which the "projectiles" of ballistics, and their "projection", are to be found implicit in most forms of strategic undertaking — typically articulated through "projects" (and "bullet points"). This "project logic" might then be understood as "cognitive ballistics" potentially constrained by the mechanics of the process — as with ballistics (Metaphoric Entrapment in Time: avoiding the trap of Project Logic, 2000; Knowledge Gardening through Music: patterns of coherence for future African management as an alternative to Project Logic, 2000).

It is with such thinking that it is has been assumed that battles of "hearts and minds" may be won. This contrasts with other potential forms of engagement that might well be far more credible and viable to the "targets" (Poetic Engagement with Afghanistan, Caucasus and Iran: an unexplored strategic opportunity? 2009).

Binary logic may be understood as fundamental to the economic models so disastrously brought into question by the collapse of the financial system. Their binary nature is only too evident in accounting systems focused on profit and loss — despite a degree of sensitivity to double and triple "bottom lines". The extent of the bailouts required by the largest corporations and financial institutions is indicative of the limitations of this mode of thinking in a supposedly "global" context. Hence the merit of exploring alternatives (Spherical Accounting: using geometry to embody developmental integrity, 2004).

The argument for a richer and more complex understanding has notably been developed by Richard Bronk (The Romantic Economist: imagination in Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2009). With respect to the mindset of the G20 Summit (London, April 2009) endeavouring to respond to the collapse of the financial system, the relevance of that argument has been summarized by the author (Coleridge at the G20, The Guardian, 21 March 2009). Bronk argues:

From a global point of view, we have seen the enormous dangers of economic monoculture. Just as relying on only one seed strain leaves agriculture at risk of catastrophic crop failure when new diseases emerge, the global internalisation in recent years of the monistic world view implied by the Washington consensus and neoclassical economics has left world economies exposed to simultaneous infection by the destabilising and unforeseen effects of financial innovation. The world economy was more stable in the post-second world war period when different economies agreed rules for economic interaction but retained radically diverse economic cultures.

The Romantics understood another peril of using only one set of models or metaphors: because the theories and models we use structure our vision and analysis, relying on only one is like depending on a single lantern to see in the dark, or using one set of cognitive spectacles to make sense of everything about the world. If different countries instead try out different imaginative approaches and internalise different models, there is more chance that some of them will see new problems emerging in time to warn the rest of us.

There is every probability that the G20 Summit will be a quest for a "silver bullet" — exemplifying "cognitive ballistics" at its worst — in the hope that this will magically destroy the demonic process of continuing economic collapse.

The argument here is that the strategic art of underming the globalization agenda — as notably promoted by capitalism and neo-liberal thinking — is to encourage the illusory quest for a "silver bullet".

Strategies of higher order

As a consequence of the acclaimed intelligence failure relating to the "weapons of mass distruction" in Iraq, Josh Kerbel (Thinking Straight: cognitive bias in the US Debate about China — Rethinking Thinking, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, 48, 3, 2004) notes:

Of the axioms, dictums, and mantras echoing through the US foreign policy and intelligence debates in the wake of controversy over estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, none reverberates more than: be wary of mind-set and bias and constantly reexamine assumptions. The fact is, however, that genuine wariness and thorough reexaminations have been rare and attention has tended to focus on the more easily recognizable non-cognitive biases, the "low-hanging fruit," that eclipse much more ingrained cognitive biases and the flawed assumptions they engender.

The question in relation to the manner by which the collapse of the financial system was engendered is whether the focus of attention has been on the "low-hanging fruit" such that higher order strategies were able to operate "under the radar". Is this also liable to be the case in envisaging remedies at the G20 Summit?
Kerbel’s focus on "thinking straight" with regard to China is of much more general significance, notably with regard to the financial system. He argues that there is:

… an unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring cognitive bias that results in the misapplication of a linear behavioral template to China, which, like all nation-states, in reality behaves "nonlinearly."

But Kerbel is subsequently obliged to conclude (Lost for Words: the Intelligence Community’s struggle to find its voice, US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, Summer 2008):

For the intelligence community, the linear mechanical metaphor remains the dominant linguistic and consequently mental model; it is the default setting.

Whilst the "amateur" strategists are distracted by their use of project logic in their endeavour to shore up the financial system — and restore its economic priorities of "business as usual" — it is appropriate to consider what the "professionals" might be doing. One possibility is indicated by the neocon strategy of governance as presented by Ron Suskind (Without a Doubt, The New York Times, In The Magazine, 17 October 2004) following an exchange he had with an aide in the decision-making circle of President Bush:

The aide said that guys like me were ”in what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who ”believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. ”That’s not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. ”We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”

Many of people are now studying the aftermath of the financial disaster. It remains unclear who were "history’s actors" engaged in creating their "own reality".

In the case of "Afghanistan", strategically it is appropriate to consider how a bunch of semi-literate tribes people should be able to resist the full might of the most powerful countries of the world, unconstrained by resources, or the inhumanity of the weapons deployed to achieve their ends (white phosphorous, etc).

The success of their resistance is nevertheless a fact despite a succession of misleadingly overconfident statements to the effect that their defeat is imminent — and with little acknowledgement as to why this proved not to be the case. The fact that these statements wwere made by "professionals", acclaimed as being of the highest competence, necessarily gives pause for thought.

Suppose however that "Afghanistan" was simply a decoy in a larger strategic plan. For if a force is capable of resisting in that manner it is useful to suppose that they may be sustained by a logic that is superior to those of the forces applied against them over decades in what may history may label as one of the greatest military disasters of any asymmetric war.

The decoy would be designed to ensure that those pursuing an economic globalization agenda (within which "Afghanistan" was to be subsumed for its own good) would confidently deploy their overwhelming forces at a lower order of dimensionality — as "cognitive ballistics" — than the strategy undermining that globalization agenda. Being of higher dimensionality, the latter would be virtually undetectable within the framework of "project logic". A concrete trace of this "invisibility" is the acknowledgement by the regulatory agency for the banking system in the UK, the Financial Services Authority, that it had failed to adopt a system-wide approach to identify and deal with macro-prudential risks, limiting its focus to supervision of individual firms in isolation (Turner Review, March 2009).

It would seem to be apparent that an open conspiracy of academics, management schools, financial journalists, economists, etc reinforced that mindset — "a culture that was allowed to develop" according to the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer. In order to escape the attention of this mindset, the strategic art of higher dimensionality would have been to encourage the development of that culture by every subtle means possible. This would not have been too difficult given that its lower dimensionality was easier to comprehend, discuss and achieve consensus around within the Washington Consensus — as reinforced by the various international financial institutions and the eminent economic authorities associated with them.

Some striking examples of what is typically not done to transcend cognitive traps, and will not be done in the elaboration and presentation of the "global plan" on the occasion of the G20 Summit, are identified in "Magna Carta": Configuring interlocking pathways for circular argumentation (2009) in moving Beyond "Mickey-Mouse" governance of crises? (2009).

PLEASE CONTINUE READING IN THE ORIGINAL – LAETUS IN PRAESENS

This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 30 Mar 2009.

Anticopyright: Editorials and articles originated on TMS may be freely reprinted, disseminated, translated and used as background material, provided an acknowledgement and link to the source, TMS: COGNITIVE BALLISTICS vs. DERIVATIVE CORRELATION IN MEMETIC WARFARE, is included. Thank you.

If you enjoyed this article, please donate to TMS to join the growing list of TMS Supporters.

Share this article: email mastodon facebook 🔗 copy link

This work is licensed under a CC BY-NC 4.0 License.

Comments are closed.