The BRICS Plan for a New Financial Architecture
BRICS, 16 Dec 2024
Prof Anuradha Chenoy | InDepthNews - TRANSCEND Media Service
BRICS leaders gather at the group’s 2024 flagship summit in Kazan, Russia, 23 Oct. 2024. Credit: AA
1 Dec 2024 – The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) has established itself as a multilateral organisation distinct from others, evident from its 16th meeting in Kazan (Russia). The BRICS difference can be read as decolonised multilateralism with intent and behaviour as an interdependent, plural grouping, committed to development linked to the global South.
This meeting comes at a conjuncture when unipolar hegemony is challenged by different actors. The Kazan meeting was attended by United Nations (UN) Secretary General António Guterres and heads of the BRICS states, including new and aspiring members making it BRICS+.
The very raison d’être for BRICS was to seek reform of the Bretton Woods system where emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) asked for a greater voice in international decision-making. Since the West did not relinquish control, BRICS started constructing financial institutions.
While trade and finance are primary, the BRICS deliberate on international politics and security. The BRICS leaders emphasise this platform is not against the West or any nation or alliance. BRICS is engaged in constructing institutions “complementary” but different to existing (Bretton Woods) ones.
The 133 paragraphs of the Kazan Final Declaration do not refer to the United States (US), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the dollar. The BRICS agenda is to strengthen the UN and not replace it. Nowhere does BRICS envisage replacing existing established multilateral institutions, while they do ask for their reform and democratisation.
The BRICS political agenda is to ensure the reality of an irreversible multipolar international system based on diffusion of power in contrast to unipolar hegemony. They recognise that the power balance has shifted favourably for them with globalisation. Multipolarity benefits them strategically and economically.
The BRICS affirm there is no single, universal and unilinear path in history and development, so diversity must be accepted. Read this as a rejection of intervention in the name of democratic values. Multipolarity allows countries to exercise strategic autonomy and independent choice. In practice, each BRICS country has different framing, interests and strategies when dealing with the West, other countries or alliances. The BRICS has democratic flexibility, and this allows them to have common agendas without sacrificing individual sovereignty.
The BRICS’ strategic concerns are addressed in a framework of the UN resolutions on wars, security and development, aiming to strengthen the UN and uphold international law as the legitimate legal international body. BRICS members maintain national and strategic positions on critical questions of war, peace and security (as on Ukraine) and yet reach a consensus to favour diplomatic and negotiated resolutions, which contrasts with unilateralism and positions like “with us or against us.”
The growing importance of BRICS financial institutions indicates a gradual democratisation of the global financial landscape, where multiple currencies can be used, and countries’ strategic reserves can shift location and holding pattern, thereby providing a material basis to multipolarity.
Specifically, the Kazan Declaration emphasises the need to respect international humanitarian law, condemns the attacks on Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and on UN employees; the mass killings of civilians by Israel demands the return of all hostages by all sides and an immediate ceasefire and de-escalation in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. It has called for the full membership of Palestine to the UN; welcomed the Haitian Transitional Presidential Council; called for a ceasefire in Sudan; and critiqued the use of double standards and the politicisation of human rights, directly pointing to the situation in Gaza, Occupied Territories and Lebanon. The BRICS has also called on Afghanistan to reverse the effective ban on the girls’ secondary and higher education while welcoming regional platforms’ efforts to facilitate Afghanistan’s peaceful settlement. The BRICS’ Kazan Summit has committed to partner with the global South, especially the least developed countries.
The New Financial Architecture
The 16th Summit of BRICS took significant steps in developing a financial architecture which is distinct from Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) for “implementing the bloc’s Economic Partnership Strategy” which is projected to cover “all areas.”1
Major objectives include:
First, opposition to unilateral economic measures or sanctions. The BRICS see sanctions imposed without UN authority as illegal. More than one in four countries of the global South have faced sanctions by Western governments (Patnaik 2024). The UN Human Rights Council shows the disastrous impact on children in sanctioned countries, as these curb access to food for children. For example, there is acute malnutrition (half a million stunted as a result) in Syria alone where due to sanctions on medicines, 90% of children need humanitarian assistance to survive.2 BRICS is designing measures to safeguard against unilateralism.
Second, BRICS and their partners are encouraged to increase trade in national currencies. In addition, the Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are gaining ground and cutting transaction costs. Inter-BRICS trade increased by 65% between 2017 and 2022 to reach $614.8 billion. With the addition of oil-exporting countries as members, this is likely to skyrocket. Saudi Arabia and UAE who are recent entrants into BRICS look to phase out the “petrodollar” and work out payments with China, India and others in national currencies. Ninety percent of Russia–China trade is in Yuan, and Russia–India trade has a large proportion in rupee–ruble.
Many countries are following this pattern. The ASEAN in May 2023 announced trade in local currencies, Brazil has called on the Mercosur countries to trade in their own currencies, and Africa has made the Pan-Africa Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) to facilitate intra-Africa trade in local currencies. Local currency trade has shown viability, and it is believed that a multicurrency system supports the fiscal and monetary autonomy of countries (Kirke 2024). This attracts countries to join BRICS.
Third, existing BRICS financial structures will be reformed and strengthened to suit the projected expansion of the evolving financial architecture. These institutions include the BRICS bank, called the New Development Bank (NDB), functioning since 2014. The NDB assists states for development projects on a basis that are different to the World Bank. The NDB disburses 30% of loans in the currencies of its members while the rest is through dollars and euros. The NDB is member-led and has demand-driven principles—which means applicants decide their project priorities.3 The bank does not lay down conditionalities but does support “gender and social inclusion” projects that will support access to income, public services and quality jobs, particularly for women. This bank never envisaged replacing the existing monetary system and never planned de-dollarisation. Its agenda is the “construction of a financial structure that bears the mark of multilateralism and a multipolar world.”4
The NDB by 2023 had approved $32.8 billion for 96 projects, focusing on infrastructure and a plan to increase lending in local currencies. The NDB suspended financial transactions with Russia in March 2022 because of the sanctions regime. Its investments amounted to some $33 billion compared with the World Bank’s $67 billion for the year ending 2023. So, the NDB works within the global financial architecture where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continues to control the international monetary system of states that seek debt.
Fourth, the summit seeks to vitalise the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), designed as an alternative to IMF to rescue insolvent countries. The CRA functions under the NDB. Of course, the NDB and CRA are only a sliver of what the Bretton Woods institutions are. The CRA which is designed to have a reserve of $100 billion remains limited while the World Bank–IMF have huge reserves and the ability to pressurise and enforce conditionalities on indebted countries.
Fifth, the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (BICM) is a mechanism created in 2010 to resolve pragmatic issues of trade and investment between BRICS banks. It coordinates local currency credit and development finance between banks, and was particularly useful during the COVID-19 pandemic. The summit wants BCIM to focus on new projects and expand the ways of exchange of local currencies.
Sixth, the Kazan meeting put a seal on putting in place a financial messaging system between BRICS banks for an independent cross-border settlement and depository infrastructure, called the BRICS Clear. (EU has Euroclear, China has a Cross-border Interbank Payment System [CIPS], India has a Structured Financial Messaging System and uses SWIFT and Russia has SPFS.) The BRICS Clear will be in line with the BRICS Cross Border Payments Initiative (BCBPI), which is voluntary and non-binding.
The BRICS Payment Task Force is working on settlements in local currencies (paras 65, 66, Kazan Declaration). Clear, Moscow and Beijing are turbo-leading this messaging system, given that Russia has been debarred from the SWIFT.
Seventh, BRICS in February 2024 initiated a “multilateral digital settlement and payment platform” called BRICS Bridge that functions to bridge the gap between the financial markets of BRICS member countries and increase mutual trade. This essentially digitalises financial transactions which are again based on local currencies but in a digitised format. There is a consultation about digital currency with the distributed ledger technology (DLT) connected to this, so the “BRICS Bridge” is linked with local CBDC. This connection is in the early stages.5 There is also a proposal for “reinsurance,” which is an attempt to localise insurance, which is so far held by a few Western monopolies (for example, Lloyds). They also propose reforms of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Eight, the creation of a new investment platform to boost investments in the global South is on the cards. But this can only be a long-term plan, because none of the BRICS currencies are convertible and will be linked to the other measures outlined. It is evident from earlier BRICS financial models that all new financial instruments will be voluntary, non-binding and only government-to-government systems.
The importance of the BRICS financial institutions indicates a gradual democratisation of the global financial landscape, where multiple currencies can be used, and countries’ strategic reserves can shift location and holding patterns. The confiscation of $300 billions of Russian reserves has led to fear. Since the ruble–yuan trade is almost 90% of trade between Russia and China, the yuan is de facto the strategic reserve for the Russians.
BRICS financial institutions, especially the NDB, have shown that this model of financial architecture: (i) provides financial autonomy; (ii) reduces dollar dependency and the complete reliance on dollars in trade; (iii) assists in diversifying by reducing debt and borrowings away from the dollar in a small way; (iv) it puts pressure on the Bretton Woods institutions to reform and be inclusive of the emerging economies and global South; (v) it gives confidence and strengthens national currencies of BRICS and other countries in the global South; and (vi) the encouragement of bilateral trade in national currencies is increasing. (So recently the South African state backed company Transnet received a five-billion-rand loan.) The BRICS bank is a different, albeit small-scale, model as compared to the dominant financial institutions and represents the material basis of the multipolar economic system.
Other New Initiatives
The Kazan Summit has proposed several other new initiatives. For example, the BRICS countries believe their development has been held back because of the denial of high-end technologies. To bridge this gap, the BRICS has announced its intent to create a “New Technology Platform” to strengthen development cooperation, including the creation of high-tech products. This implies that the BRICS will share their technological progress and systems with developing countries instead of imposing barriers to high technology sharing.
The BRICS grain initiative is announced at the summit. Unpack this as a Russia-led plan in response to sanctions after the Ukraine war that stopped grain exports leading to distress especially in least developed countries. This is a potential challenge to the existing grain monopolies of transnational corporations. This will be an innovative step towards food security.
The BRICS reflected India’s stance on opposing the EU’s carbon tax under the carbon border adjustment mechanism calling these “unilateral, prohibitive, discriminatory and protectionist” measures taken in the name of climate change (Kazan Declaration). The summit, however, endorsed many green and climate change measures adopted by international conferences.
The BRICS agreed to increase cooperation in medicine, vaccine and nuclear medicine development. This is obviously with the COVID-19 experience where countries like India kept pleading at the WTO that patent restrictions on the COVID-19 vaccinations be removed temporarily to enable the vaccine availability for the global South, but this was not complied with.
The BRICS have started a conversation for the creation of “a united transport and logistics platform.” This can be read as the BRICS support for the Belt and Road Initiative, the International North-South Transport and Economic Corridor (INSTEC) that connects Indian ports with Iran, Russia and others.
The Geopolitics of the Kazan Meeting
The Kazan meeting was as much about geopolitical signs and symbols as intent and strategy. President Vladimir Putin showed the support it has outside the West, flanked by President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi as well as South African President Cyril Ramaphosa. Over 30 countries and their heads of state attended the summit.
The BRICS created a second tier of “BRICS Partners” to include 13 countries that expressed interest and were present. This includes central Asian countries of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; Turkey and Algeria from the MENA region; and Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand from ASEAN showing the worldwide expansion methodology. The expansion and solidarity from the global South was evident and stood in contrast to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that took place on the same dates.
As an effect of the BRICS diplomacy, India and China have taken significant steps to initiate a process of de-escalating the standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This enables points of engagement between India and China, which BRICS sees as important for the global South-led multilateralism.
The BRICS function as a coalition and do not have a charter or command structure but have hundreds of thematic working groups. It is built on the legacies of anti-colonial movements, principles and coalitions of the non-alignment (Bandung Conference 1955), ideas of peaceful coexistence, neutrality, common security, and so on. The BRICS can neither be idealised nor can it deliver planetary peace. BRICS countries have their own domestic challenges and strategic interests. However, the very idea of these countries working for an independent position outside a framework of militarist alliances and threats is an important contribution.
Conclusions
The BRICS Kazan Summit has been cautious to show that they are neither rivals, confrontationists, nor competitors to the Bretton Woods in their institutional frameworks but rather they seek to develop complementarities. This declaration, similar to those earlier, is avowedly not “anti-Western” as many strategists claim. Their documents continue to seek reform and accommodation with Western ones. They do not oppose the existing institutions of the Bretton Woods but are building institutions that are complementary but with a difference.
The BRICS security vision and statements are within the parameters of UN resolutions. The BRICS is a non-militarised interdependent platform. It functions horizontally multilaterally but also vertically with a lattice-like frame. Hundreds of working groups with experts work throughout the year. (Russia had 400 and India earlier held a 100.) It has no single centre, and so is an open network with different expressions.
The intent of BRICS+ is to create institutions to build a financial architecture that suits the vision of the BRICS and provides the material reality for multipolarity.
The BRICS narrative and praxis combines “common interests” with “strategic partnership.” Their agenda is strengthening a multipolar global system, opposing unilateralism, especially unilateral economic measures, enabling strategic autonomy to countries of BRICS and the global South, and giving voice to the interests of the global South. They are joined in protecting national sovereignty, do not want to weaponise interdependency and look for an acceptance of different political, social and economic cultures that can still have some lowest common denominator that can work within international law. Coming at a time of global inflection, the Kazan Declaration is a road map for the countries of the global South.
Notes:
1 BRICS 2024, Russia, Kazan Declaration, Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security, 23 October 2024, http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/en/RosOySvLzGaJtmx2wYFv0lN4NSPZploG.pdf.
2 Un General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council, 9 August 2024, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/133/16/pdf/g2413316.pdf.
3 New Development Bank, https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/members/.
4 Dilma Rousseff, President NDB, Report to BRICS at the 15th BRICS Summit, 28 August 2023, New Development Bank, https://www.ndb.int/news/ndb-president-dilma-rousseff-reported-to-brics-leaders-at-the-15th-brics-summit/.
5 BRICS+ expands plans from DLT payments to DLT clearing and depositary, 25 October 2024, https://www.ledgerinsights.com/brics-expands-plans-from-dlt-payments-to-dlt-clearing-and-depositary/.
References:
Kirke, Jan (2024): “De-dollarization and the Path to Global Financial Freedom,” Asia Times, 9 August,https://asiatimes.com/2024/08/de-dollarization-the-path-to-global-financial-freedom/.
Megre, Milena and Gustav Castro Ribeiro (2024): “BRICS and the Multipolar World, Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development,” Winter, pp 126–35.
Patnaik, Prabhat (2024): “The Criminality of Unilateral Sanctions,” Ideas, 2 September, https://www.networkideas.org/news-analysis/2024/09/the-criminality-of-unilateral-sanctions/.
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Prof. Anuradha Chenoy (chenoy@gmail.com) is Adjunct Professor at the School of International Affairs, Jindal Global University (Haryana, India). She retired as professor and dean of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi after many years as an engaged scholar. She completed her studies with scholarships from the Indian Council for Social Science Research and Fulbright Fellowship, University of Columbia, New York. (1983-1985) She is actively engaged with the Asia Europe Peoples Forum and the International Peace Bureau. The author is grateful to Reiner Braun, Joseph Gerson, Walden Bello, Francis Daehoon Lee for discussions on NATO.
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