Fiqhi* Pathways: The Role of Islamic Jurists in Shaping Armed Group Behavior
FEATURED RESEARCH PAPER, 27 Jan 2025
Lakhdar Ghettas | Cordoba Peace Institute Geneva – TRANSCEND Media Service
6 Dec 2024 – The following project brief by Cordoba Peace Institute – Geneva (CPI) supported by the Culture and Religion in Mediation Program (CARIM): Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich (CSS ETH) presents the results of a pilot research project conducted by CPI in 2022. The project was supported by Templeton Charity Foundation Switzerland (TCFS) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). The ideas and concepts in this publication are work in progress and do not necessarily represent the views of the involved organizations or donors.
A follow-up two-year research project on “Engaging Across Religious Difference: Evidence-Based Research on Islamic Jurists Shaping the Actions of Armed Groups and their Ability to Craft Practical Solutions to Conflict” was launched by CPI in partnership with the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich (CSS), in February 2023, with support from the Templeton Religion Trust (TRT) and the Swiss FDFA.
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Aim
This research project aims to understand the structures and roles of Islamic jurists in shaping armed group behavior in the MENA and Sahel region.
Context
Armed groups with Islamic references are active in various conflicts in the MENA- and in the Sahel regions. They govern populations in areas where state government is limited. Such actors, as for example Salafi Jihadi armed groups, tend to operate outside the legal and normative framework of the nation state. At the same time, there are Islamic jurists working within or in proximity to these groups who have the ability and authority to practice fiqh, i.e. the legitimate interpretation of the Islamic textual sources (Quran and Prophetic traditions), in order to make recommendations and guide actions in the present. This potentially shapes the conflict, negotiation and governance activities of such armed groups.
Relevance
Globally, about 52 percent of armed conflicts involve actors where at least one party has made self-proclaimed Islamist claims1. While the potential benefits of engaging with such groups has been highlighted, there is still a research gap on how to do this effectively2. This pilot research begins filling this gap, namely by contributing to better understanding of how Islamic jurists shape armed group behavior. This understanding should ultimately contribute to two broader objectives:
■ First, to the negotiation flexibility of religiously-inspired None-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in a peace process. One reason why peace negotiations may be blocked, is that such groups may say “no” to any compromise if it is not seen as being legitimate within their religious framework. These groups are in a double process: with the other side, e.g. the government; and with their own side, in other words with their respective, often religious, custodians of what is seen as legitimate. This research can improve our understanding of how religiously inspired NSAGs prepare for peace negotiations, or expand their negotiation flexibility during peace negotiations.
■ Second, to more accountable governance mechanisms of religiously inspired NSAGs. Understanding such accountability mechanisms provides opportunities for constructive engagement, for example in the short-term for humanitarian action, in the medium-term to develop hybrid forms of state and none-state governance, and in the long-term to work towards forms of legitimate and effective governance as seen by the people living in these territories3.
Method
The main research question is: “What is the role of Islamic jurists in shaping the behavior of armed groups?”4 The main research hypotheses and questions include the following:
■ Source of legitimacy: Islamic jurists and Muslim scholars are part of religiously inspired armed groups’ governing structures. They function as guardians and interpreters of the frame of legitimacy in which these armed groups operate. Adherence to the Islamic texts (Quran and Sunna) and the legitimacy of the armed group’s behavior are vital for the armed group both internally for coherence and externally in competitive or cooperative relations with other actors. Islamic jurists may be seen as the juridical body of the executive leadership of such groups. What is the relation between the “juridical/legislative” and “executive” bodies in such groups?
■ Process of interpretation: The Islamic process of interpretation involves maintaining orthodoxy to “the sources” while making sense of and adapting to concrete contexts as they evolve5. It involves both continuity as well as flexibility. How does this interpretation process occur and who is involved in it?
To explore these hypotheses and begin to answer these questions, CPI conducted pilot studies on different Islamic groups: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Hurras al-Din in Syria, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali. Furthermore, a peer-review workshop was convened to discuss and improve the papers with about twenty Islamic scholars from Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Mauritania, Mali and Burkina Faso.
Preliminary Findings
The preliminary research findings suggest that Islamic jurists play an important role in religiously-inspired armed groups. They serve as the guardians of the Islamic legitimacy of the actions of armed groups, thereby shaping their behavior. They provide guidance and advice to the executive leadership of the group on issues ranging from fiqhi validation of the use of armed force, to governance matters related to dealing with societal matters of communities under the control of the armed group (e.g. taxation, local dispute resolution etc.). The jurists engage in building the coherence of the rank and file of the armed groups, but also in maintaining their reputation and standing in the eyes of rival armed groups and external religious authorities and references. The influence of these jurists varies depending on at least four factors:
■ Different position of the jurists in the structure of the leadership of the armed group: Jurists, who in addition to their classical role assume responsibility for key portfolios in the group, especially delivering justice (Sharia courts), and recruitment wield greater influence on the executive branch of the armed group. Likewise, executive leaders who are also learned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence counterbalance the views of the jurists allowing for a multiplicity of Islamic jurisprudence interpretations on a given issue within the group. Thus the case studies indicated that three types of relations between “legislative” and “executive” can be detected:
- a separation, with Islamic scholars sitting in the “legislative” and shaping the “executive”;
- a separation, yet with Islamic scholars sitting in both bodies, and their interactions shaping decisions;
- a merging of “legislative” and “executive”, with Islamic scholars shaping decisions as they are in the merged decision making body.
A fourth plausible structure of an interface is where there is a merging of “legislative” and “executive”, but with little role for Muslim scholars, as may be observed in some Islamic State (IS) affiliated groups, even if this was not covered by the case studies.
■ Governance vs. military and political responsibilities: Scholars of armed groups with governance responsibilities towards populations in a given territory are often faced with pressing societal challenges that require addressing in more expedient ways than issues related the conduct of hostilities and interaction with other parties to the conflict. These challenges compel a division of labor and specialization of the jurists of the armed group with some jurists dealing with governance matters, while others, closer to the executive branch, focusing more on military and political positions of the armed group. Thus, there may not only be a separation between “legislative” and “executive” but also between different bodies of “legislative”. Groups with governance challenges seem likely to provide more space to jurists who are rooted in the territory under their governance control than to “foreign” scholars and jurists. Besides, in showcasing sound governance through accommodation of local customs and authorities they may also seek international recognition (e.g. delisting from terrorism lists, a seat at the negotiation table, etc.).
■ Influence and role of jurists varies depending on the historical trajectory and size of the armed group: In relatively small groups (a few 1000s) the scholars are often themselves the founders of the group and assume both judicial and executive roles in the structure of the group. The two roles are not only blurred but merged and represented by a handful of people attending to both military and juridical roles. In larger groups (a few 10’000s) and later in the evolution of the group, greater separation and clarity of different roles can sometimes be identified. Moreover, some high caliber scholars, often learned scholars and veterans of global jihad, exert transnational influence on the opinions of some armed groups scholars and the conduct of the executive.
■ Doctrinal affiliation shapes role of Islamic scholars: The doctrinal affiliation of the armed group to Al Qaeda (AQ) or IS shapes structure and roles of Islamic scholars. AQ recognizes nation-state borders and seeks governance change and establishment of Islamic law through violence and negotiation. IS negates the current political world order and is engaged in a bloody campaign against all regimes and civilians to establish a union of the Muslim nation of sorts. Jurists of the AQ affiliated groups appear to carry more weight within their groups than jurists in IS affiliated groups. Armed groups affiliated or formerly affiliated with AQ seem to have used different ways to harness national and customary religious references and authorities to distinguish themselves wholly or partly from the central religious authority of AQ.
Outlook
The need for dialogue with religiously inspired NSAGs is recognized, as they control vast territories (e.g. Mali), shape states (e.g. Iraq – Afghanistan), negotiate with other actors (e.g. Syria), and take on governance roles. To be effective and avoid doing harm, however, such dialogue needs to be based on solid understanding. This research seeks to contribute to this objective. Further research will be needed on:
- What is the relationship between transnational and local dynamics shaping religiously inspired armed group behavior?
- How can different actors, e.g. humanitarian, peacebuilding, mediation, governance, make use of these findings to improve the way they engage in such contexts and avoid doing harm in the process?
- To what extent do schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Sunni/Shia) affect the role of religious authorities on the conduct of armed groups?
Note:
* Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. It is an Arabic term derived from the root word faqiha, meaning “deep and comprehensive understanding.” Arabic literature uses the word fiqh and its subtracts in seeking of knowledge, wisdom, and in-depth understanding of Islamic laws. (TMS Editor)
References:
- “Islamist armed conflicts: A new challenge for conflict resolution?”. Isak Svensson & Desirée Nilsson. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, FBA Research-Policy Dialogue on Resolving Islamist Armed Conflicts, Stockholm, October 2021. ↩︎
- Challenges and opportunities for conflict resolution with Salafi jihadi armed groups. Véronique Dudouet and Karin Göldner-Ebenthal. Policy Brief No. 10. The Berghof Foundation. March 2020. ↩︎
- For one conceptualization of how to link mediation and governance, see Mediation and Governance in Fragile Contexts: Small Steps to Peace. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi and Simon Mason. Lynne Rienner 2019. ↩︎
- Some scholars are internal and others external to the groups. “External” relates to Islamic jurists and scholars with a regional sphere of influence, while “internal” relates to Islamic jurists and scholars within or close to specific armed groups in a specific context. ↩︎
- “The Role of Value Systems in Conflict Resolution”. Abbas Aroua, Jean-Nicolas Bitter and Simon Mason. CSS Policy Perspective, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich. November 2021. ↩︎
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Tags: Islam, Law, Military, Religion
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