The Persian Gulf War and the Gulf Peace Team

TRANSCEND MEMBERS, 14 Apr 2025

Robert J. Burrowes, Ph.D. – TRANSCEND Media Service

Prelude: Some weeks ago, my friend and colleague René Wadlow wrote the ‘TRANSCEND Media Service’ weekly editorial titled ‘Beyond Watching, what Can We Peacebuilders Do?’ in which he again raised the possibility of nonviolent interposition by a peace team in a war zone, which he has discussed previously in ‘Ukraine-Donbas-Russian Frontier: Is a Non-governmental Interposition Peace Team a Possibility?’ In the editorial he mentioned the experience of the Gulf Peace Team and in the earlier article his own experience of such efforts, and effectively invited discussion of the possibility of nonviolent interposition in current and future contexts.

As a contribution to this discussion, I decided to submit this chapter, originally written in 1993 and later published in the book edited by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan & Thomas Weber titled Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A Recurrent Vision published by the University of Hawai’i Press in 2000.

Introduction

The Gulf Peace Team had its origins in the idea of sending a team to the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia as part of the struggle to prevent war in the Persian Gulf in 1991. The idea in one form or another had occurred to several people simultaneously around the end of September 1990. However, it was Pat Arrowsmith, a veteran peace activist in England, who took the initiative of ringing several people and organizations in order to gauge the level of interest in the idea. Subsequently, Arrowsmith and David Polden – secretary of a local Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament branch – called a meeting of interested people on 1 October 1990.

The meeting discussed several possible projects including the idea of standing in for the western hostages held by the Iraqi government. From this meeting a working committee evolved. It decided on the name ‘Gulf Peace Team’ and used the name in a letter released to the press calling for volunteers and donations. It also drafted the policy statement which included the important words:

We are an international multi-cultural team working for peace and opposing any form of armed aggression … by any party in the Gulf. We are going to the area with the aim of setting up one or more international peace camps between the opposing armed forces. Our object will be to withstand nonviolently any armed aggression by any party to the present Gulf dispute….

We as a team do not take sides in this dispute and we distance ourselves from all the parties involved, none of whom we consider blameless.… 1.

In November the composition and objectives of the Advance Party were decided. Given the refusal of the Saudi government to respond to its approaches, the working committee decided that the Advance Party would proceed to Baghdad and attempt to negotiate an acceptable ‘protocol’ for the peace camp with the Iraqi authorities. 2 It also decided that the Advance Party would seek a series of assurances, including the following: the camp would be located ‘near the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, between the Iraqi army and the Saudi border’; the camp would be autonomous both logistically and in terms of internal management; the policy statement would be published in the Iraqi press and there would be freedom of communication and travel. 3.

The Advance Party

On 16 November the Advance Party travelled to Amman where some preliminary arrangements were made and a member of the party met Princess Zein of Jordan. The party flew to Baghdad on 18 November and was accommodated at the World Peace and Friendship Camp on al Aaras Island; this became the Baghdad base of the Gulf Peace Team.

After three weeks of meetings with officials of the Organization of Friendship, Peace and Solidarity as well as members of the Iraqi government, on 6 December the Advance Party was informed that permission had been granted to establish a camp. A few days later a site was chosen at Judayyidat Ar’ar on the Iraqi-Saudi border about 420 kilometres south-west of Baghdad. It was a pilgrims’ resting place at the Iraqi border post on the road to Mecca.

It was agreed that the camp would be autonomous and that there would be media access to the camp. However, while the Team would buy its own food and pay for transport, water would have to be supplied by Iraqi tankers. Despite some obvious logistical dependency and some concern that they were accepting too much from the Iraqi authorities, members of the Advance Party felt that they had largely achieved their original objectives.

The Gulf Peace Camp

The Gulf Peace Camp was established on 24 December 1990 when the first group of activists travelled from Baghdad to Ar’ar. The camp was about 500 by 200 metres in area and enclosed by a high perimeter fence. It contained a long line of corrugated iron roofs (without walls) under which there was a line of joined tents. There were showers and squat toilets in two old caravans. A kitchen area was created in a large shed.

On 31 December, some Iraqi officials, several television crews, a member of the European Parliament and several more volunteers arrived. During a news conference, an open letter which Team members wished to present to the ‘Commanders of the International Armed Forces’ on the Iraqi-Saudi frontier was read out. After some initial encouragement, this proposal was blocked by the Iraqi government. On 1 January 1991, the Iraqi officials, media and many volunteers left. There were just ten activists left in the camp.

In the Baghdad village during the early days of January, there was evident fear among activists about being in the camp at the expiry of the UN Security Council deadline on 15 January. Regrettably, the poor organization and communication which had characterized the project so far reinforced this. There were rumours about large contingents of people coming but little of substance. Accordingly, the number in the camp built up only gradually. After twelve last minute departures, at the expiry of the UN deadline at 8am local time on Wednesday 16 January 1991, there were 73 people (45 men, 28 women) from 15 countries in the Gulf Peace Camp.

At 3am the following morning the entire camp was woken by the sound of heavy bombers heading for Baghdad; the Gulf War was about to begin. It is impossible to adequately describe the impact which the outbreak of war had on the Gulf Peace Camp given its implications for the camp as a whole and for the individuals within it. Physically, it meant an immediate, indefinite and unknown threat to our collective and personal security which was complicated by our limited supplies of water, food and fuel. Politically, it challenged our commitment to nonviolence and raised new questions about the relevance of our presence. Emotionally, it was highly disturbing as people dealt with their anger, fear, sadness and despair.

Nevertheless, from the outbreak of war until we were evacuated to Baghdad on 27 January, we had the chance to discuss and explore many aspects of our nonviolent vision.

Life in the Camp

While the routine and community spirit evolved slowly in the camp as we improved our processes for working together, it was clear that particular issues as well as the special needs of some people were going to cause ongoing problems. Moreover, there was some tension in the camp between those people inclined to use traditional ways of dealing with conflict and those committed to trying more creative ones.

Most major issues discussed at camp meetings entailed both ideological and practical considerations. They included debates about the decision-making process itself and the approach to problem-solving (typified by the discussions over the diminishing food and fuel supplies). In addition, two other important issues were discussed informally and in the affinity groups. One concerned how to deal with the personal problems caused by the stress of living through the war. The other concerned how to deal with the problems created by people with special psychological needs.

Decision-making

Some time after the camp was established, it was decided to use consensus rather than majority voting as the basis for decision-making. While numbers in the camp were low, this was practical even at full camp meetings. However, as the numbers grew, it became apparent that a declining proportion of people were genuinely involved in camp decision-making – fewer people were attending camp meetings and relatively few had the chance to speak. This was complicated by the number of activists who did not speak English or for whom it was not their first language. In addition, several meetings were poorly facilitated or were not well focused. The latter problem was often the result of peoples’ genuine fears about the war or the result of little self-discipline – the camp had its share of people, especially men, who seemed unaware of, or unconcerned about, the rights of others to public space.

At a meeting on 16 January the camp decided to form affinity groups. While the Australians and Indians had always functioned as national affinity groups, it took a day or two for the new groups to settle. Eventually, six affinity groups emerged: they became known as the Australian-American group, the Circle Song group, the Dutch group, the Indian-Japanese-Belgian (Indian) group, the Rainbow group and the Tent group. The next day the camp decided to form a Steering Committee: it consisted of one representative from each affinity group and its purpose was ‘to make decisions between camp meetings’. It was agreed that affinity groups would rotate their representative every few days and that attention would be paid to national and gender balance. In practice, this committee subsequently took responsibility for coordinating camp activities. From this point onwards, more emphasis was placed on involving people through their affinity group. However, six people were never involved in any affinity group and several others only participated on the margin.

While the process of discussing issues in the affinity groups and reporting group decisions through the Steering Committee representative worked quite well, and several issues were satisfactorily resolved in this manner, the camp was never able to reach consensus on the question of how to make decisions if and when this process did not work! Only one affinity group was against using ‘majority vote if necessary’; it favoured persevering with the affinity groups and steering committee structure even when consensus was difficult to achieve. We were evacuated before this issue was resolved.

Problem-solving

Dealing with problems in the camp entailed a great deal of emotional and practical energy. This was characterized by the problems related to the declining food and fuel supplies. The food shortage had an increasing impact on camp life. At the outbreak of war, and given the uncertain duration of our stay, we decided to ration food stocks by having only two meals each day. These meals became progressively lighter. With time and increasing hunger, disputes over how long our food stocks would last, disagreement over how much food should be cooked at any one meal, and concern over whether we could replenish our supplies (which effectively depended on whether our main Arabic speaker, Saadallah Atrib, could get permission and a vehicle to travel out of the camp) were all causing tension and arguments in some quarters.

After several attempts to deal with elements of the food problem, the matter came to a head one week after the war started when it became clear that there were serious problems associated with the food supply. Specific concerns included the fact that cans of food were ‘disappearing’ and that some people were feeding the stray cats. The people concerned were unresponsive when approached by members of the Food Committee and were largely outside the affinity group structure. Members of the Food Committee were obviously frustrated and clearly felt that attempts to use trust had failed. The Food Committee was now strongly suggesting that the kitchen be locked and the Steering Committee wanted feedback on this suggestion. Again, the camp was evacuated before this issue was resolved.

Coping with the Stresses of War

While living in the camp, people dealt differently with the stresses of war. Some appeared largely unaffected; at least in the sense that they were clearly functioning normally. Others were deeply affected and responded in different ways.

One popular response was to keep busy by performing a range of camp tasks. Others participated in some of the many workshops on such topics as nonviolence, Middle Eastern politics and learning Arabic. Some played games – including table tennis or soccer with the Iraqis – and others engaged in a sunset routine of singing and dancing. Some meditated or put more time into their religious practices. A tent was set aside for meditation and prayer. Junsei Terasawa, the Buddhist monk, spent each sunrise and sunset chanting. Father Bob Bossie S.J. and Uniting Church Reverend Neville Watson organized a daily bible study session. Peggie Preston offered her time as a listener for anyone who wanted to share their feelings privately.

In contrast to the military which presumably copes with the stresses of war by relying on such factors as discipline, obedience and routine instilled through training, it was clear that in our participatory and egalitarian community whatever discipline and routine evolved had to do so in a very different way.

People with Special Psychological Needs

The camp routine was regularly disrupted by the activities of some people with special psychological needs. This caused considerable frustration and tension at times and complicated attempts to deal with a range of issues from the camp decision-making processes to the food shortage.

While it may have been possible to marginalise those people with special psychological needs in the same way that mainstream society had done, this would have further complicated camp life. And it may have been disastrous. Because of the confined space our community occupied, it was not possible to escape from the problems within it. Moreover, there was considerable energy in the camp to listen to these people in order to find meaningful ways of addressing their particular needs. In this way, some became contributing members of the camp community within the short duration of the camp’s life.

For the camp to evolve into a genuine community, it was clearly imperative that its structures and processes were designed to satisfy the needs of the people within it. In addition, we needed a process designed to restore people’s sense of responsibility for their personal behaviour. Some members of the camp were committed to trying to facilitate this.

Evacuation

Ten days after the outbreak of war, two buses and a truck arrived to evacuate us. We left the Gulf Peace Camp at 11am and arrived at the Al Rasheed Hotel in Baghdad that evening. There was an excited reunion with 11 team members still in the capital. There was no electricity; water was only available in the hotel for one hour each day. We had a very light meal in the dining room which made us immediately aware that there was a severe food shortage in Baghdad as well.

After dinner we were urged to go immediately to the bomb shelter. Several of us decided to return to our rooms first and when we did so we were immediately caught by the display outside our heavily sound-proofed windows. We could see the bombing and the anti-aircraft fire right across the horizon. We could see plumes of black smoke where bombs hit and the red line of tracers racing into the sky. Sometimes the noise was so loud that we could hear it despite the sound-proofing; on at least one occasion we all ducked instinctively for cover as a loud bang went off near the hotel.

During our four days in Baghdad we asked the Iraqi officials to show us civilian damage caused by the war. We were taken on a tour of the milk factory – supposedly a chemical weapons plant – destroyed by US bombing. We were shown around Yarmuk Hospital where we saw civilian victims of the war and noted the severe shortage of instruments, bandages, medicines and anaesthetics. We were also shown a suburban shopping centre and other buildings that had been bombed. A brief expedition to a Baghdad bazaar gave us the chance to talk to Baghdadis and gauge their reaction to the war. They were still very warm towards the ‘peace messengers’. We shopped briefly which allowed us to gauge the sudden increase in price of some commodities; bananas were now $US1.50 each!

On 31 January we travelled west along the secondary highway to Jordan; there were several bomb craters in the road as well as several burnt-out vehicles including a truck carrying grain that was still burning. We arrived in Amman at 3am on the following day.

The Gulf Peace Team: An Assessment

The Gulf Peace Team experience allows the opportunity for a new and wider round of debate, as well as a critical reassessment. Like its historical antecedents, the Gulf Peace Team raised several issues which are critically important to the theory and practice of nonviolent interposition. These include vital questions in relation to politics, strategy and organization. Some of these questions are discussed below.

Political questions

The Gulf Peace Camp raised at least three important political questions. The first relates to the camp’s purpose. The existence of the Gulf Peace Camp represented the idea (and the ideal) that a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis was possible if appropriately selected nonviolent actions and problem-solving processes were employed. Was it merely symbolic? Or did it have real potential to intervene? Is the main impact of interposition physical or political?

Was the real aim of the camp simply physical interposition, intended, as the policy statement and constitution suggested, ‘to withstand nonviolently any armed aggression by any party’? Was this even realistic – particularly given the numbers involved? Or was the aim of the interposition primarily political – designed to help build a global consensus against war? To the extent that these questions had been considered, there were clearly different views in the camp itself. For example, thirteen activists – presumably committed to the importance of the physical nature of their interposition – chose to resist evacuation on the basis that they might be able to physically resist violence by the Iraqi army at least. It was patently clear however that 73 people were not going to be able to physically resist the violence of two military forces totalling a million combat personnel, although, in some circumstances, there would have been political and symbolic value in trying to do so. The difference in numbers does not, in itself, make physical resistance impossible nor morally inappropriate. However, it does raise important questions about strategy and tactics and the wisdom of these.

It is evident that the Gulf Peace Camp was primarily a symbol that carried political, psychological and moral weight. And it was clearly the physical location of the symbol which gave it power. It was a symbol of nonviolence that challenged the legitimacy of war. It was a symbol of courage that inspired people to act. And it was a symbol of morality that touched the conscience.

The second question concerns the camp’s precise location: should the camp have been nearer the Kuwaiti-Saudi border? While the Advance Party’s concern that such a site may have been seen to be defending the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, it seems clear (at least in retrospect) that the final site offered and accepted on the Iraqi-Saudi border was too far from Kuwait, particularly if physical intervention during the land war was seriously envisaged. More fundamentally however, did the Gulf Peace Camp, located on a land border between two armies, serve the interpositionary purpose in the context of a war fought essentially in the air? The early ‘battles’ of the Gulf War were bombing raids on the cities of Iraq and Kuwait; they were not land battles fought across territorial boundaries. Should there have been several Gulf Peace Camps located in Baghdad, Kuwait City, Riyadh and Tel Aviv?

The third question concerns the camp’s neutrality. Given that the Saudi Arabian government refused to respond to requests for a camp on the Saudi side, was the Gulf Peace Team genuinely neutral? Was it seen to be neutral? Neutrality is defined as ‘(n)ot assisting either party in the case of a war between … states’4 and the Gulf Peace Team’s constitution made its neutrality explicit: ‘We … do not take sides in this dispute’. But the question of neutrality is not a simple one. What constitutes ‘assisting either party’? The camp was clearly located on the Iraqi side of the border. Did that compromise our neutrality? The Gulf Peace Team was not on the side of any government; but that did not stop various parties trying to use it for their own ends. Did that compromise our neutrality? As a camp, we were clearly not on the side of the Iraqi government, but we were logistically dependent on it. Did that compromise our neutrality?

It is evident that the location of the camp at the Iraqi border post – rather than on neutral territory or in conjunction with a second camp on the Saudi border – was a second best option given the refusal of the Saudis to negotiate. But, in itself, this did not constitute a violation of our neutrality: it was not ‘assisting either party’. Nevertheless, the camp’s location did improve its potential as a propaganda tool. While there is little evidence to suggest that Iraqi officials used the Gulf Peace Team explicitly or widely for this purpose,5 it clearly had some value in this sense. More importantly perhaps, some critics (including some in the media) associated with the US-led coalition were keen to discredit the camp on this basis or to use it for wider criticisms of the peace movement generally. It is clear that the camp had some propaganda value for both sides but it would be difficult to substantiate the claim that this compromised its neutrality.

The most difficult aspect of the neutrality question concerns the Gulf Peace Camp’s logistical dependency on the Iraqi government; this was clearly less than desirable. However, while this may have been seen to compromise our neutrality in the opinion of some observers, it did not effect the declared political neutrality of the camp. In this sense, the camp was little different to a Red Cross operation: dependent on a host government for a range of services, but politically neutral. What seems clearer is that once the war broke out, our continuing dependency on the Iraqi government for supplies and transport used increasingly scarce Iraqi resources and, in that sense, we were obviously assisting (in a very small way) the US-led forces. At this point, it seems clear, the camp was no longer technically neutral.

Strategy

While the Gulf Peace Team had a stated policy of ‘working for peace … in the Gulf’, it never had a strategic aim and a strategic plan to guide its efforts. Moreover, the conditions necessary to make the project practicable – including knowledge, skills, independent access to resources, high degree of philosophical cohesion, organizational framework, communication channels (especially links with grassroots networks) and determination – were insufficiently met. In addition, the Gulf Peace Team did not attract enough participants who were deeply involved in, and representative of, their local grassroots networks and who, by their presence, could provide the rallying point necessary to galvanize substantial numbers of people to resist the war. How was the Gulf Peace Team supposed to help stop the war?

At no stage did the Gulf Peace Team consider formulating a strategy of its own or consider how its initiatives fitted any wider peace movement strategy to stop the war. The goal of establishing the Gulf Peace Camp was always the focus of attention. And while the camp itself did have a vaguely worded aim – ‘to withstand nonviolently any armed aggression by any party’ – as the main tactical expression of the Gulf Peace Team project it was devoid of strategic guidance. Nonviolence theory would suggest that the power to stop the war rested largely with the domestic constituencies of the nations in the US-led coalition. The Gulf Peace Team’s power hinged on its capacity to influence and mobilize those constituencies. Lacking a clearcut strategy for doing so, any successes in this regard reflected the initiative of particular support groups or were incidental.

Despite these shortcomings, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the Gulf Peace Team still had impact on grassroots consciousness in some parts of the world and that this stimulated greater nonviolent resistance to the war. In the eyes of some people, whatever it lacked in strategic conception, the camp made up for with integrity, courage and vision. As the history of nonviolent struggle clearly demonstrates however, while inspirational examples have their role to play in galvanising greater spontaneous resistance to violence or injustice, this is rarely enough to compensate for the lack of a comprehensive strategic orientation. Good nonviolent struggle, like any struggle, requires a sound strategic plan.

Organizational issues

A major shortcoming of previous attempts at nonviolent interposition has been the lack of an organizational infrastructure. The Gulf Peace Team suffered the same shortcoming. In part, this reflects the lack of a well-developed and worldwide nonviolent action network which, it seems clear, is necessary if initiatives such as this are to have the organizational foundation in order to be successful.

An organizational infrastructure provides the framework in which ideological, political, strategic and moral questions are resolved. It is also the foundation on which action planning, networking, communication, recruitment, nonviolence education and financial matters are based. Without an adequate organizational framework, the Gulf Peace Team had immense difficulty dealing with basic policy questions and various practical matters such as recruitment and education of activists. Moreover, it directly contributed to a range of complications in the camp itself. Consider, for example, the question of camp membership.

It is clear from the historical record that the preferred organizational unit for effective nonviolent action is the affinity group. An affinity group is a group of five to thirteen people which performs a range of task and personal support functions in an atmosphere of trust developed through periods of time working together. In contrast, the Gulf Peace Camp was essentially a collection of individuals from fifteen countries; there was no single language which everyone spoke. Few had experience of working in affinity groups; not all had experience of nonviolent action. Moreover, there was neither shared cultural identity nor ideological cohesion to bind camp members together. In addition, and typically of social movements which have a tolerant social milieu, the Gulf Peace Camp attracted a disproportionate number of people with special psychological needs. Given the complexities of camp life under conditions of war, all of these factors were challenging complications.

But the organizational problems did not stop at the camp; consider the problems of communication and finance. It is clear that communication is vitally important and should allow regular contact between members of the organization and with grassroots networks. It requires the use of various types of open channels; accurate and adequate information; and conscientious use. On all of these points, however, the record of the Gulf Peace Team – and particularly the London office – was poor. For instance, the London office lacked adequate communication channels – and had none with the camp once the war broke out; it lacked access to grassroots networks; it consistently circulated inaccurate information, particularly in relation to the estimate of the number of activists going to the camp; and it consistently failed to supply reliable information to national support groups.

In relation to finance – given the cost of $2000 to $5000 (depending on their country of origin) to support one activist – there are several important questions to be considered. How do projects such as this raise the necessary money? Is this the best use of money raised to support activist causes? Is this a good use of money for someone who can think of nothing better to do to express their anger? How much local activism could be financed with this money? How much equipment or food or medicine could be bought? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is clear that the financial constraint alone means that such projects cannot involve many ordinary (and particularly African, Asian or Central/South American) activists.

It is evident that if key organizational problems cannot be resolved, then the action itself must be questioned. Integrity of the action alone is not enough.

Conclusion

Whatever its shortcomings, the Gulf Peace Team was profoundly significant both historically and politically. First, after decades of proposals and abortive attempts, it was only the second nonviolent interposition in history. Second, it did constitute a nonviolent presence in the war zone which drew public attention to alternative and peaceful solutions to the Gulf conflict. Third, it did inspire some grassroots resistance to the war. And fourth, it rapidly accelerated our learning in this vital area of nonviolent struggle.

However, it is equally clear that its shortcomings were legion and that the Gulf Peace Team raised a series of questions in relation to politics, strategy and organization which need to be systematically addressed. It is now time for activists and scholars to reflect upon this experience in order to attempt to answer the fundamental question: is nonviolent interposition a viable and effective nonviolent tactic as part of a strategy to prevent or halt war?

Notes

1. Gulf Peace Team ‘Constitution’ 1990. p. 1.
2. Gulf Peace Team ‘Background Notes for 12 November 1990 Meeting’ p. 1.
3. Gulf Peace Team ‘Letter to His Excellency the Ambassador of Iraq’ 13 November 1990.
4. Little, W. et.al. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles. 3rd edn. rev. C.T. Onions. vols. I-II. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
5. The propaganda value to the Iraqi government might have been greater had there been more people in the camp.

Acknowledgments

I thank John Steel, fellow member of the Gulf Peace Team, for his meticulous efforts to identify and locate much original GPT documentation, on which sections of this chapter are based. I also thank the Victoria Regional Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Australia for a grant from the Otto Marx bequest to fund the writing of it.

_______________________________________________

Robert Burrowes, Ph.D. is a member of the TRANSCEND Network for Peace Development Environment and has a lifetime commitment to understanding and ending human violence. He has done extensive research since 1966 in an effort to understand why human beings are violent and has been a nonviolent activist since 1981 and was a member of the Gulf Peace Team in 1991. He is the author of Why Violence? Websites: (We Are Human, We Are Free) (Charter)  (Flame Tree Project)  (Songs of Nonviolence) (Nonviolent Campaign Strategy) (Nonviolent Defense/Liberation Strategy) (Robert J. Burrowes) (Feelings First) Email: flametree@riseup.net

This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 14 Apr 2025.

Anticopyright: Editorials and articles originated on TMS may be freely reprinted, disseminated, translated and used as background material, provided an acknowledgement and link to the source, TMS: The Persian Gulf War and the Gulf Peace Team, is included. Thank you.

If you enjoyed this article, please donate to TMS to join the growing list of TMS Supporters.

Share this article: email mastodon facebook 🔗 copy link

This work is licensed under a CC BY-NC 4.0 License.

There are no comments so far.