The Al-Qa?da-ization of the Somali ?Deegaan? Conflict
COMMENTARY ARCHIVES, 30 Sep 2008
Kismayo (Somalia)
Already earlier in the 90’s; Somalia was engulfed in endless civil war. The clans have multiplied, the political chaos becomes total and, as usual, the population is the first victim. This conflict, described as chaotic and complex, has evolved to be an ecological conflict in its early years.
Clans and sub-clans shifting alliances has provoked a “deegaan” conflict: a land or resources based conflict. Multiple peace and reconciliation efforts have been held since 1991 with not much result. Shifting alliances were formed between different clans and sub-clans to gain control of strategic deegaan. In particular, the ecological condition of the Jubaland region in southern Somalia is rich compared with the rest of the country, and provide a major source of income to Somalia.
The conflict in Somalia has been basically portrayed as a conflict between warlords or barbaric groups, by mainstream media and many academics until today. This vision of the conflict has neglected what has been mostly a consequence of land and resources scarcity at it genesis (Deegan).
Somalis are a pastoralist people; the majority speaks the same language and practices Islam as their religion. Some live in Ethiopia (Ethiopia-Somalia war 1977-19789) and in Kenya. However, a small minority of agriculturalist people lives near the Kenyan border. The divisions in Somalia, far from being ethnic, are clan-based. Lineages establish the major identity patterns.
Such clan-based society does not require state institutions to exist or function. It is a society with rules but without rulers, as described in “A Pastoral Democracy” by I. M. Lewis, Oxford Press, 1969.
However, some clans are disadvantaged due to their social status, affecting their access to water and fertile land (Deegan). Since then the Somali conflict, which was primarily ecologic (deegan), was internationalised in the 1990s, becoming Bin laden-alized by 2006.
History
Historically, Somalia gains its independence in 1960, after being successively a colony of Italia and Great-Britain from around 1875. Siad Barre was in power until 1990 when he was deposed. General Mohammad Farah Aidid, former Somali ambassador to India and Sri-Lanka, leading one of the rebellion groups –the United Somali Congress– (USC) took over. In 1991, as Chairman of the USC for a third term, his rival Mahdi refused to relinquish power, counting on a massive financial support from Italy. Violent clashes erupted dissolving the state into various armed group clans. Aidid groups expelled Mahdi militiamen into a little portion of Mogadishu. In 1993, the Xeer was adopted by 6 clans sided with Aidid faction. The new allies battled in south Somalia, which was largely responsible for the famine in that region. The Xeer (pronounced ”hair”) is a traditional political system to resolve conflicts. After the western backed Mahdi forces were completely suppressed, the new UN/US authorities refused to recognize Aidid legitimacy, opting to a military intervention to impose a western-like government.
On October 3, 1993, under unanimous support of the UN, the United States decided to organize a rescue operation called “restore hope” to save the population from starvation and disease. At first welcomed by the Somalis, the operation had short outcome as it was militarized and did not include any talk with the major groups lead by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, controlling Mogadishu, the capital. The US intervention was the starting point for the internationalization of the Somali conflict.
The UN/US pursued an extensive military assault to occupy Somalia, and tried to disarm its population. This expensive and abortive aggression fuelled violence as it bought all the Somalis to fight and preserve their traditional system in self-defense. The UN/US overwhelmed by the Somali fire were repulsed outside Mogadishu.
The Clinton Administration aggressively for seven months conducted an attempt to overthrow General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, resulting in thousands of Somali deaths, the famous “Black Hawk” down and the hunting of U.S Special Forces by an angry and offended crowd. These events brought to an end the US/UN intervention in Somalia, and have been labeled as the UN worse operation ever.
After the withdrawal of the US and UN troops, between 1994 and 1995, General Aideed was deposed as chief of the Somali Alliance Congress. He refused and created a faction that elected him as president, and captured the town of Baidoa, creating more clashes affecting Somalia’s exports. Since then Somalia vanished from the Western media until it appeared again after the 9/11 bombing in the U.S. Somalia is among the evil countries that support or harbour terrorists, according to the Bush administration.
In 2004, with massive support of the West, a transitional federal government (TFG) is formed in Kenya headed by the Ethiopian-backed warlord Abdullahi Yusuf. In December of the same year, Prime Minister Mohamad Ali Gedi swears in 27 ministers in Kenya. The government will later have their first meeting home in Baidoa.
The TFG weakness and unpopularity in Somalia will bring the US to support various groups fuelling more violence. In 2006 the Somalia Islamic Court Council (SICC) sizes Mogadishu, popular among the Somali, implements Sharia law and centralised power. For the first time, after 15 years, the SICC bring to lawless Somalia a “semblant” of peace and stability.
Around June 2005, the SICC accused the TFG of selling out the country to foreign enemies, and called for jihad, warning that his faction would not be mere spectators in the Somali crisis. The threat of terrorism in Somalia is indeed a concern, but the attempts to instrumentalize the conflict for political gain, by both Somalis leaders and their various backed exogenous supporters, have increased its complexity. The main figure in the TFG are accused by many Somalis of criminal activities such as kidnapping, corruption and extortion. The TFG receives millions of dollars from the international community for unaccountable use, as the money is not controlled by institutions but by individuals.
From Bagdad to Mogadishu: Al-Qaida-ization
On October 9, 2006 the SICC declared a Jihad on Ethiopia, which was driving its troops dangerously towards Mogadishu. Meles Zenawi declared war and vowed to drive out Islamists from the capital as part of the war against terrorism. The world assisted the Bagdad-ization of Mogadishu, with heavy street-fighting in Mogadishu. Later, American’ missiles striked to terminate suspected “Al-Qaida” members and injuring several villagers.
Meantime, African Union forces are deployed to Somalia on a peacekeeping mission financed by the international community. SICC is driven out of Mogadishu by Ethiopia. In January 2008 President Yusuf arrived in Mogadishu for the first time since his election in Kenya. This has resulted in an occupation by the Ethiopian army, provoking an unlivable climate in Mogadishu.
Remarkably, by the end of September, recovering from their defeat, the SICC super-headed by the Al Shabaab (Youth in Arabic), have taken back the town of Kismayo, threatening to get to Mogadishu. Meles Zenawi’s concern with the war’s economic costs is unlikely to withdraw his troops from Mogadishu fearing the TFG to scramble faster. Meanwhile, the rebels’ attacks on government and Ethiopian targets have not spared African Union (AU) peacekeepers, which number just 2,200, possibly as a warning to the world against more intervention.
The United Nations has been pushing a peace agreement in neighboring Djibouti that would establish a ceasefire, a withdrawal of Ethiopian troops — the insurgents’ main allegation and concern — and then bring some sort of power-sharing arrangement. The violence is also affecting relief groups’ assistance to Somalia’s several million refugees and displaced.
Bringing peace to Somalia
After a decade of war and anarchy, no western power, specially the US and Britain, may pretend to give a democratic lesson to Somalia. Historically, nations subjected to domination seem to unite by the very unfairness of its aggressors. Somalia won its independence in 1960. In 6 months the Union of Islamic Court (UIC) has proven again that through debate and dialogue any people can decide the system and the leaders they aspire for.
The UIC started with one court in the Neighborhood of Mogadishu, from the grassroots, inspiring other neighborhoods to establish their own independent courts. At the end they created a committee to coordinate the structures. After providing law and order, it attracted business in the city, increasing the popularity and power of the courts.
Eventually the court did not succeed in bringing in the flavor of tolerance and acceptance for peace. Instead, they attracted unnecessary attention (religious extremism, bigotry etc..), bringing the war on terror to sabotage what the Somali grassroots movements have succeeded in building after decades of a society near lawless.
Unlikely most interventions in other African countries to end wars, Somalis seem anti-interventionists. The members of TGF, most of them cruel warlords, carefully chosen by foreigners’ foes in foreign countries, to speak for millions of Somalia victimized by the same warlords, must make concrete action toward peace and reconciliation. Their alliance with Ethiopian traditional Somali enemy is jeopardizing the chance of peace and minimizing the security of the population. A more effective way should be:
To carry out a coalition government with the other factions. To declare a total cessation of hostilities, with no further attack to retake the position lost in battle (Kismayo etc…), but to enhance a dialogue, a talk by using wisely the African Union and the UN to facilitate the negotiations. This will bring a clear signal of peace.
For the sake of stability and Peace, the Somali government should relinquish much of its power to localities or villages and let them decide the way the will be ruled; let them debate freely, and gather between elders, women, religious and business groups to decide who will be their leaders, how will they organize their security. The very Somali way of clans and sub-clans consultation should be used, such as the Xeer.
In conclusion, Somalia should be left to make its own democracy, and that will not necessarily be a Western-like democracy.
This article originally appeared on Transcend Media Service (TMS) on 30 Sep 2008.
Anticopyright: Editorials and articles originated on TMS may be freely reprinted, disseminated, translated and used as background material, provided an acknowledgement and link to the source, TMS: The Al-Qa?da-ization of the Somali ?Deegaan? Conflict, is included. Thank you.
If you enjoyed this article, please donate to TMS to join the growing list of TMS Supporters.
This work is licensed under a CC BY-NC 4.0 License.