More importantly, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesman for the Islamic Emirate, said at a ceremony attended by university lecturers: “According to religious principles, anyone can criticize for the purpose of reform.” However, he then added: “The manner of criticism, following ethical guidelines, is that if someone has a criticism of the emir, a person in charge, minister, deputy minister, or director, Islamic ethics suggests that it is better not to denigrate him and to respect his dignity. Through a safe, discreet, and protected manner, approach him so that no one else will hear, and then mention the criticism, which is the great Islamic ethic.” Finally, he mentioned that if the criticism is made respectfully, then: “The system officials should be patient to listen to the people’s criticisms and questions.” [6]
CPI Geneva
These statements have led some journalists to theorize that Hibatullah Akhundzada may be overthrown or that there will be armed clashes among the Taliban, as the influential Afghan journalist Bilal Sarwary mentioned on Twitter: “What began as whispers and rumours of rifts within the ranks have now turned into words of soft weapons spoken behind the mics. How long before the actual weapons are pointing at each other.” [7]
It is no secret that the Taliban are not a monolithic group. Some, like Hibatullah Akhundzada and his close circles, want to impose the same social restrictions as twenty years ago. Others, like Sirajuddin Haqqani, are more open-minded on various societal issues. This split is well-known and has existed for many years. Those who favour Hibatullah Akhundzada’s decisions are foot soldiers who have spent the last twenty years fighting and feel entitled to impose their views. On the other hand, some have travelled internationally and have been more exposed to different ways of thinking, such as Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, who was involved in the Doha agreement. Despite their government posts, they can only do so much because Hibatullah Akhundzada has the final say.
These different views are bound to cause some friction. But Bilal Sarwary and other like-minded journalists have not considered religious thought in their analysis.
Whatever they decide, the Taliban must act within a specific Islamic framework. Regarding day-to-day administration, the Taliban consider the religious science called al-Siyāsa al-Shar’īa, which can be defined as the management of society’s affairs according to the Sharī’a. This science deals, for example, with the requirements for someone to become a leader. The Islamic Emirate’s trademark administrative guide is called “The Islamic Emirate and its Functioning,” written by its Chief Justice, Abd al-Hakim Haqqani. The contents of this book are strikingly similar to other texts in this field written centuries ago. In this respect, it is not surprising that the Taliban continue to emphasize traditional concepts such as bay’ā (allegiance) or the amīr (leader) having the final say in all matters. Furthermore, in his book, Abdu al-Hakim Haqqani thoroughly examines cases where advisors and the people can replace the de facto leader.
Here is a non-exhaustive list of cases:
• If he commits an unequivocal act of disbelief;
• If he commits major sins;
• If he forces people to disobey aspects of the religion;
• If he takes the wealth of the people unjustly;
• If he loses his mind;
• If he becomes physically disabled, preventing him from performing his duties. [8]
If one of these situations occurs, delegates from different communities can speak to the leader and ask him to step down. If he doesn’t, these representatives technically have the right to remove that amīr by force, but only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the harm. This last condition is crucial. It stems from the fact that the Islamic tradition is very pragmatic on this issue. During the first two centuries of Islam, many great Islamic thinkers fought against leaders who were known to oppress their citizens. However, most of these attempts to overthrow rulers resulted in more harm than good. As a result of this realization, a significant number of scholars have stated that there is now a consensus (which is disputed) that it is impermissible to rebel against a head of state who claims to be Muslim unless two conditions are met:
1. The ruler commits a clear act of disbelief;
2. The Muslims can dispose of this apostate amīr without causing too much bloodshed. [9]
The Taliban only partially adhere to this consensus, with Abdu al-Hakim Haqqani stating that there are reasons other than disbelief that can allow the overthrow of the leader. Nevertheless, we can see that the Chief Justice shares this pragmatism, as he repeatedly emphasizes that the removal of the ruler should not lead to more significant harm. He repeatedly reminds Muslims to be patient in the face of oppression and that if they can’t improve the situation by force, they should at least denounce what is happening with their hearts. He quotes several narrations attributed to Prophet Muhammad, saying that evil people will rule over Muslims who shall remain patient.
Based on Abdul al-Hakim’s argument, it would be difficult to argue that the Taliban would want to remove Akhundzada by force. Indeed, for most Taliban, much of the Afghans’ suffering is the fault of the West. And even if the Taliban were to look introspectively and admit that Akhundzada’s decisions have directly caused some of the problems, his questionable decrees have not risen to the level of disqualifying him according to the above cases.
A good example is the controversy over girls’ education, which is the main source of discontent within the Taliban ranks. Not even this issue can theoretically disenfranchise Akhundzada. Abdu al-Hakim Haqqani briefly mentions that if a ruler makes a decision that leads to the oppression of his people based on a mistaken religious interpretation, he should not be overthrown. [10] The Taliban have said countless times that their decision to ban girls from going to school is rooted in a particular religious vision.
And say, for the sake of argument, that the Taliban felt that Akhundzada’s rule was bad enough to be challenged. It remains to be seen whether the benefits of a possible ‘coup’ outweigh the harms. Knowing the predicament in which the Taliban find themselves, a struggle would be extremely damaging. All their efforts to date would be in vain, and the security situation would be likely to break down catastrophically. Despite the apparent frustration of some Taliban members, it is not yet known how many are angry and want change, so it is impossible to judge how widespread the uprising would be.
The Taliban are aware that their opposition is waiting for a slip-up. Even traditional scholars have joined the opposition. For example, Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, one of the key leaders of the fight against the Soviets and an acquaintance of Ben Laden, urged the National Resistance Front, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud’s son, to continue its struggle. The functioning of the Taliban government is similar to that of a Hobbesian state. The Taliban want a strong unitary state, based on the previous decades of war, in which the ruler, who is in control of both secular and religious matters, must not be challenged so that the population does not return to its “Shari’a-less” violent and immoral nature.
Hassan Abbas, in his latest book, “The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan After the Americans,” emphasizes the need for unity. He says of the intra-Taliban squabbles:
“Their dynamics are reminiscent of the Italian Mafia, with rivalries seeping all the way to the topmost echelons. However, it stops there—these are not divisions that can become anything bigger than attitudes of pettiness and childlike jealousy. They would not risk separation because they know there’s far greater benefit in being in the group than being separate and thus vulnerable, with no critical access. During the weekend, they may send spies to monitor each other’s every move, but when Monday comes with a threat, they are united again, hand in hand. At the end of the day, their sense of brotherhood acts as a veil—thin as it may be—of protection from any true animosity.” [11]
Let’s not forget the plight of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K). The Taliban consider this faction to be followers of the Khawārij. This group appeared after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and was cut off from the majority of Muslims because, according to the Khawārij, many Muslims had fallen into disbelief. Therefore, it was permissible to kill these “infidels.” The supporters of Hibatullah Akhundzada’s decisions have a powerful weapon at their disposal: they can easily label the unhappy outspoken Taliban as causing “fitna” (sedition) similar to IS-K, thus further discouraging their disaffected members from leaving their bonds. To really understand what it means to have the Khawārij label on your back is like being labeled a communist in the United States in the 1950s. Not surprisingly, members of Hibatullah’s faction have repeatedly stated that anyone who speaks out against the Amīr should be killed. [12] For example, Neda Mohammad Nadim, the Taliban’s Minister of Higher Education, said: “Anyone who weakens the system (the Taliban regime), whether by word, pen, or deed, is a rebel and must be killed.” [13]
This harsh judgment comes from the fact that they equate such an act with the behavior of the Khawārij. However, when reading such statements, we should not take them at face value, meaning that they will literally purge the dissident voices such as Sirajuddin Haqqani in a Stalinist manner. Instead, this unyielding tone is used to deter them and keep the tensions internal.
In his book, Abdu al-Hakim Haqqani was not clear on the judgment of openly criticising the legitimate Muslim ruler without intending to revolt. Returning to the literature of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, the standard should be to advise the ruler privately, as the Prophet Muhammad said: “Whoever has advice for the ruler, let him take his hand and give it privately. If he accepts it, then he accepts it. If he rejects it, his duty is fulfilled.” [14]
However, Hanafi scholars disagree on the permissibility of open criticism without intending to abolish the Amīr. Obviously, the supporters of the Amīr al-Muminīn believe that it is impermissible because it creates hatred among the masses and will eventually lead them to revolt, similar to the Khawārij. As for the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani, they may take the opposite view, that is, that denouncing those in authority is halāl since it is a way of advising the leaders if, for example, it cannot be done privately. It is also likely that Haqqani’s or Stanikzai’s statements are directed at international actors to show them that not all Taliban think like Hibatullah Akhunzadah. Thus, even in their criticism, Stanikzai or Haqqani come from a Hanafi paradigm where any comments on the decisions of a legitimate ruler are usually meant to advise and not to incite hatred.
In conclusion, despite the internal differences that exist within each group, the only way Akhundzada could be removed would be behind the scenes. It is, therefore, highly doubtful that it would be through an armed conflict. The various factions of the Taliban are more than aware that unity is vital in an environment that is waiting for their demise. Even critics within the Taliban do not want to remove the Amīr al-Muminīn because, as we have assessed, his decisions are not “controversial” enough from a purely theoretical point of view. We must also consider the intention of the back and forth between the loyal supporters of the Amīr al-Muminīn and his critics. The harsh statements calling for severe punishment of those within the Taliban ranks who criticize the Emirate’s policies should be seen as hyperbola and not an actual call to murder. On the other hand, the comments of Taliban officials such as Stanikzai are rooted in a Hanafi paradigm in which open criticism does not constitute a call to revolt.
[1] https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1625185936928567296
[2] https://twitter.com/paykhar/status/1625400530452246530
[3] https://twitter.com/TOLOnews/status/1660606591161229314?t=sH0Jwdd1yY4_JqIZ9h48xA&s=19
[4] https://www.ariananews.af/iea-officials-should-communicate-with-the-people-stanikzai/
[5] https://twitter.com/SadiqullahAfgha/status/1624764969014161410
[6] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-182031
[7] https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1624787937979256834
[8] Abdul Hakim, Ishaqzai. Al-Imārah al-Islāmīyah wa niẓāmuhā. Kabul: Maktabah dār al-’Ulūm al-Šar’, 2021, pp.127-137.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Abbas, Hassan. The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan after the Americans Left. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023, p.150.
[12] https://twitter.com/natiqmalikzada/status/1634931286627450880?t=gxX_hecbF1BsnLnjp41R6Q&s=19
[13] https://twitter.com/natiqmalikzada/status/1634931286627450880?t=gxX_hecbF1BsnLnjp41R6Q&s=19
[14] Ibn Abī ’Āṣim. Kitāb al-Sunnah. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmi, 1980, p.522.