

A Structural Theory of Imperialism *

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1. Introduction

This theory takes as its point of departure two of the most glaring facts about this world: the tremendous inequality, within and between nations, in almost all aspects of human living conditions, including the power to decide over those living conditions; *and the resistance of this inequality to change.* The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery. Hence, our concern is with the mechanism underlying this discrepancy, particularly between the center in the Center, and the periphery in the Periphery. In other words, how to conceive of, how to explain, and how to counteract inequality as one of the major forms of *structural violence*.¹ Any theory of liberation from structural violence presupposes theoretically and practically adequate ideas of the dominance system against which the liberation is directed; and the special type of dominance system to be discussed here is *imperialism*.

Imperialism will be conceived of as a dominance relation between collectivities, particularly between nations. It is a sophisticated type of dominance relation which cuts across nations, basing itself on a bridgehead which the center in the Center nation establishes in the center of the Periphery nation, for the joint benefit of both. It should not be confused with other ways in which one collectivity can dominate another in the sense of exercising power over it. Thus, a military occupation of B by A may seriously curtail B's freedom of action, but is not for that reason an imperialist relationship unless it is set up in a special way. The same applies to the *threat of conquest* and possible occupation, as in a balance of power relationship. Moreover, *subversive* activities may also be brought to a stage where a nation is dominated by the pin-pricks exercised against it

from below, but this is clearly different from imperialism.

Thus, imperialism is a species in a genus of dominance and power relationships. It is a subtype of something, and has itself subtypes to be explored later. Dominance relations between nations and other collectivities will not disappear with the disappearance of imperialism; nor will the end to one type of imperialism (e.g. political, or economic) guarantee the end to another type of imperialism (e.g. economic or cultural). Our view is not reductionist in the traditional sense pursued in marxist-leninist theory, which conceives of imperialism as an economic relationship under private capitalism, motivated by the need for expanding markets, and which bases the theory of dominance on a theory of imperialism. According to this view, imperialism and dominance will fall like dominoes when the capitalistic conditions for economic imperialism no longer obtain. According to the view we develop here, imperialism is a more general structural relationship between two collectivities, and has to be understood at a general level in order to be understood and counteracted in its more specific manifestations — just like smallpox is better understood in a context of a theory of epidemic diseases, and these diseases better understood in a context of general pathology.

Briefly stated, imperialism is a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of *harmony of interest*, and other parts in relations of *disharmony of interest*, or *conflict of interest*.

2. Defining 'conflict of interest'

'Conflict of interest' is a special case of conflict in general, defined as a situation where parties are pursuing incompatible goals. In our special case, these goals are stipulated by an

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outsider as the 'true' interests of the parties, disregarding wholly or completely what the parties themselves say explicitly are the values they pursue. One reason for this is the rejection of the dogma of unlimited rationality: actors do *not* necessarily know, or they are unable to express, what their interest is. Another, more important, reason is that rationality is unevenly distributed, that some may dominate the minds of others, and that this may lead to 'false consciousness'. Thus, learning to suppress one's own true interests may be a major part of socialization in general and education in particular.

Let us refer to this true interest as LC, *living condition*. It may perhaps be measured by using such indicators as income, standard of living in the usual materialistic sense — but notions of *quality of life* would certainly also enter, not to mention notions of *autonomy*. But the precise content of LC is less important for our purpose than the definition of conflict of interest:

There is *conflict*, or *disharmony of interest*, if the two parties are coupled together in such a way that the LC *gap* between them is *increasing*;

There is *no conflict*, or *harmony of interest*, if the two parties are coupled together in such a way that the LC *gap* between them is *decreasing down to zero*.

Some points in this definition should be spelled out.

First, the parties have to be coupled together, in other words *interact*. A difference between mutually isolated parties does not in itself give rise to problems of interest. There was neither harmony, nor disharmony of interest between the peoples in Africa, Asia, and America before the white Europeans came — there was *nothing*.

Second, the reference is to *parties*, not to actors. In the theory of conflict of *interests*, as opposed to the theory of conflict of *goals*, there is no assumption that the parties (better: categories) have crystallized into actors. This is what they may have to do after they see their own situation more clearly, or in other words:

the conflict of interest may have to be transformed into a conflict of *goals*. Thus, if in a nation the center, here defined as the 'government' (in the wide sense, not the 'cabinet') uses its power to increase its own LC much more than does the rest of the nation, then there is disharmony of interest between government and people according to this definition. This may then be used as a basis for defining the government as illegitimate — as opposed to the usual conception where illegitimacy is a matter of opinion, expressed in the legislature or in the population. The trouble with the latter idea is that it presupposes a level of rationality, an ability of expression and political consciousness and party formation that can only be presupposed at the center of the more or less vertical societies in which human beings live. It is a model highly protective of the center as a whole, however much it may lead to rotation of groups within the center, and hence protective of vertical society.

Third, there is the problem of what to do with the case of a *constant gap*. The parties grow together, at the same rate, but the gap between them is constant. Is that harmony or disharmony of interest? We would refer to it as disharmony, for the parties are coupled such that they will not be brought together. Even if they *grow* parallel to each other it is impossible to put it down as a case of harmony, when the distribution of value is so unequal. On the contrary, this is the case of disharmony that has reached a state of equilibrium.

Fourth, this definition has the advantage of enabling us to talk about *degrees of harmony and disharmony* by measuring the angle between the two trajectories, perhaps also taking speed into account. Thus we avoid the difficulty of talking simplistically in terms of polar opposites, harmony vs. disharmony, and can start talking in terms of weak and strong harmony and disharmony.

Fifth, there is an implicit reference to *time* in the two terms 'increasing' and 'decreasing'. We have not been satisfied with a time-free way of operationalizing the concept in terms of static LC gaps. It is much more easy with conflict of *goals*, as we would then be dealing with

Table I. Four types of harmony/disharmony of interest

		gap	
		decreasing	increasing
gap	narrow	A	C
	wide	B	D

clearly demarcated actors whose values can be ascertained, and their compatibility or incompatibility likewise: there is no need to study the system over time. To understand conflict of *interest* it looks as if at least a bivariate, diachronic analysis should be carried out to get some feel of how the system operates.

But we should obviously make a distinction between the *size* of the gap, and what happens to the gap over time. If we only had access to static, synchronic data, then we would of course focus on the magnitude of the gap and talk about *disharmony of interest if it is wide, harmony of interest if it is narrow or zero.*

As a first approximation this may not be too bad, but it does lead us into some difficulties. Thus, how do we rank these combinations in terms of increasing disharmony of interest? (Table I). As we see from the Table, the only doubt would be between combinations B and C. We would favor the alphabetical order for two reasons: first, becoming is more important than being (at least if the time-perspective is reasonably short), and second, the diachronic relationship probably reveals more about the coupling between them. For example, the gap in living condition between Norway and Nepal in 1970 is not significant as an indicator of any imperialism. If it keeps on increasing there may be a bit more basis for the suspicion, but more evidence is needed to state the diagnosis of imperialism. The crucial word here is ‘coupling’ in the definition. The word has been put there to indicate some type of social causation in interaction relation and interaction structure which will have to be demonstrated, over and above a simple correlation.

Let us conclude this discussion by pointing out that a gap in living condition, of at least one important kind, is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for conflict or disharmony of

interest. If in addition the gap can be observed over time, a more satisfactory basis for a diagnosis in terms of imperialism may emerge.

And then, in conclusion: it is clear that the concept of interest used here is based on an ideology, or a *value premise of equality*.² An interaction relation and interaction structure set up such that inequality is the result is seen as a coupling not in the interest of the weaker party. This is a value premise like so many other value premises in social science explorations, such as ‘direct violence is bad’, ‘economic growth is good’, ‘conflict should be resolved’, etc. As in all other types of social science, the goal should not be an ‘objective’ social science freed from all such value premises, but a more honest social science where the value premises are made explicit.

3. Defining ‘imperialism’

We shall now define imperialism by using the building blocks presented in the preceding two sections. In our two-nation world, imperialism can be defined as one way in which the Center nation has power over the Periphery nation, so as to bring about a condition of disharmony of interest between them. Concretely,

Imperialism is a relation between a Center and a Periphery nation so that³

- (1) there is *harmony of interest* between the *center in the Center* nation and the *center in the Periphery* nation,
- (2) there is more *disharmony of interest* within the Periphery nation than within the Center nations,
- (3) there is *disharmony of interest* between the *periphery in the Center* nation and the *periphery in the Periphery* nation.

Diagrammatically it looks something like Fig. 1. This complex definition, borrowing largely from Lenin,⁴ needs spelling out. The basic idea is, as mentioned, that the center in the Center nation has a bridgehead in the Periphery nation, and a well-chosen one: the center in the Periphery nation. This is established such that the Periphery center is tied to the Center center with the best possible tie: the tie of harmony of interest. They are linked so that




Fig. 1. The structure of imperialism

they go up together and down, even under, together. How this is done in concrete terms will be explored in the subsequent sections.

Inside the two nations there is disharmony of interest. They are both in one way or another vertical societies with LC gaps — otherwise there is no possibility of locating a center and a periphery. Moreover, the gap is not decreasing, but is at best constant. But the basic idea, absolutely fundamental for the whole theory to be developed, is that *there is more disharmony in the Periphery nation than in the Center nation*. At the simplest static level of description this means there is more inequality in the Periphery than in the Center. At the more complex level we might talk in terms of the gap opening more quickly in the Periphery than in the Center, where it might even remain constant. Through welfare state activities, redistribution takes place and disharmony is reduced for at least some LC dimensions, including income, but usually excluding power.

If we now would capture in a few sentences what imperialism is about, we might perhaps say something like this:

In the Periphery nation, the center grows more than the periphery, due partly to how interaction between center and periphery is organized. Without necessarily thinking of economic interaction, the center is more enriched than the periphery — in ways to be explored below. However, for part of this enrichment, the center in the Periphery only serves as a

transmission belt (e.g. as commercial firms, trading companies) for value (e.g. raw materials) forwarded to the Center nation. This value enters the Center in the center, with some of it drizzling down to the periphery in the Center. Importantly, there is less disharmony of interest in the Center than in the Periphery, so that *the total arrangement is largely in the interest of the periphery in the Center*. Within the Center the two parties may be opposed to each other. But in the total game, the periphery see themselves more as the partners of the center in the Center than as the partners of the periphery in the Periphery — and this is the essential trick of that game. Alliance-formation between the two peripheries is avoided, while the Center nation becomes more and the Periphery nation less cohesive — and hence less able to develop long-term strategies.

Actually, concerning the three criteria in the definition of imperialism as given above, it is clear that no. (3) is implied by nos. (1) and (2). The two centers are tied together and the Center periphery is tied to its center: that is the whole essence of the situation. If we now presuppose that the center in the Periphery is a smaller proportion of that nation than the center in the Center, we can also draw one more implication: *there is disharmony of interest between the Center nation as a whole and the Periphery nation as a whole*. But that type of finding, frequently referred to, is highly misleading because it blurs the harmony of interest between the two centers, and leads to the belief that imperialism is merely an international relationship, *not a combination of intra- and inter-national relations*.⁵

However, even if the definition given above purports to define the pure case of imperialism, we may nevertheless fruitfully think in terms of degenerate cases. Thus, the first point in the definition about harmony between the two centers is obviously the most important one. If the second point does not hold, and consequently not the third point either, it may still be fruitful to talk about imperialism. But in this degenerate case the two peripheries may more easily find each other, since they are now only kept apart by geographical distance (assuming

that the two nations are nation states, often even located far apart), not in addition by disharmony of interest. Thus, if the relationship between the two peripheries and their centers should become more similar, periphery alliance formation might easily be the result, and the two centers would have to resort to more direct means of violence rather than, or in addition to, the delicate type of structural violence that characterizes the pure type of imperialistic relationship.

But what if there is no distinction between center and periphery in the two nations, what if they are completely horizontal societies? In that case, we should not talk about the dominance relationship whereby the Center nation extracts something from the Periphery nation as an imperialistic one, but rather as something else — looting, stealing, etc. Where there is no bridgehead for the Center nation in the center of the Periphery nation, there cannot be any imperialism by this definition.

From this an important methodological remark may follow. Imagine we now start from the other end and discover that over time some nations increase their living conditions more than other nations — the ‘increasing gap’ so often referred to today — and that there seems to be some kind of structure to this, some kind of invariance. As mentioned, this does not in itself constitute proof of any diagnosis in terms of imperialism, but should prompt the researcher to look for data in that direction. More particularly, we should try to study the precise nature of the interaction between the nations or groups of nations, and see whether the nations can be differentiated in terms of centers and peripheries that relate to each other in the way indicated. But to do this is at all a concrete manner, we must make our definition of imperialism much less abstract. To this we now turn, in successive stages, exploring two *mechanisms*, five *types*, and three *phases* of imperialism.

4. *The mechanisms of imperialism*

The two basic mechanisms of imperialism both concern the *relation* between the parties concerned, particularly between the nations.

The first mechanism concerns the *interaction relation* itself, the second how these relations are put together in a larger interaction structure:

- (1) the principle of *vertical interaction relation*
- (2) the principle of *feudal interaction structure*.

The basic point about interaction is, of course, that people and nations have different values that complement each other, and then engage in exchange. Some nations produce oil, other nations produce tractors, and they then carry out an exchange according to the principles of comparative advantages. Imagine that our two-nation system has a prehistory of no interaction at all, and then starts with this type of interaction. Obviously, both will be changed by it, and more particularly: a gap between them is likely to open and widen if the interaction is cumulatively asymmetric in terms of what the two parties get out of it.

To study whether the interaction is symmetric or asymmetric, on equal or unequal terms, *two* factors arising from the interaction have to be examined:

- (1) *the value-exchange between the actors — inter-actor effects*
- (2) *the effects inside the actors — intra-actor effects*

In *economic* relations the first is most commonly analyzed, not only by liberal but also by Marxist economists. The inter-actor flow can be observed as flows of raw material, capital, and financial goods and services in either direction, and can literally be measured at the main points of entry: the customs houses and the national banks. The flow both ways can then be compared in various ways. Most important is the comparison in terms of *who benefits most*, and for this purpose intra-actor effects also have to be taken into consideration.

In order to explore this, the interaction budget indicated in Table II may be useful. In the Table the usual exchange pattern between a ‘developed’ nation A and a ‘developing’ nation B, where manufactured goods are exchanged for raw materials, is indicated. Whether

Table II. An interaction budget

	A ('developed')		B ('developing')	
	inter-actor effects	intra-actor effects	inter-actor effects	intra-actor effects
<i>positive</i> (in)	raw materials	spin-offs	manufactured goods	little or nothing
<i>negative</i> (out)	manufactured goods	pollution, exploitation	raw materials	depletion, exploitation

it takes place in a barter economy or a money economy is not essential in a study of exchange between completely unprocessed goods like crude oil and highly processed goods like tractors. There are negative intra-actor effects that accrue to both parties, indicated by the terms 'pollution' for A and 'depletion' for B, and 'exploitation' for either. So far these negative spin-off effects are usually not taken systematically into account, nor the positive spin-off effects for A that will be a corner-stone in the present analysis.

It is certainly meaningful and important to talk in terms of unequal exchange or asymmetric interaction, but not quite unproblematic what its precise meaning should be. For that reason, it may be helpful to think in terms of three stages or types of exploitation, partly reflecting historical *processes* in chronological order, and partly reflecting types of *thinking* about exploitation.

In the first stage of exploitation, A simply engages in looting and takes away the raw materials without offering anything in return. If he steals out of pure nature there is no human interaction involved, but we assume that he forces 'natives' to work for him and do the extraction work. It is like the slave-owner who lives on the work produced by slaves — which is quantitatively not too different from the land-owner who has land-workers working for him five out of seven days a week.

In the second stage, A starts offering something 'in return'. Oil, pitch, land, etc. is 'bought' for a couple of beads — it is no longer simply taken away without asking any questions about ownership. The price paid is ridiculous.

However, as power relations in the international systems change, perhaps mainly by bringing the power level of the weaker party up from zero to some low positive value, A has to contribute more: for instance, pay more for the oil. The question is now whether there is a cut-off point after which the exchange becomes equal, and what the criterion for that cut-off point would be. Absence of subjective dissatisfaction — B says that he is now content? Objective market values or the number of man-hours that have gone into the production on either side?

There are difficulties with all these conceptions. But instead of elaborating on this, we shall rather direct our attention to the shared failure of all these attempts to look at *intra-actor* effects. Does the interaction have enriching or impoverishing effects *inside* the actor, or does it just lead to a stand-still? This type of question leads us to the third stage of exploitation, where there may be some balance in the flow between the actors, but great differences in the effect the interaction has within them.⁶

As an example let us use nations exchanging oil for tractors. The basic point is that this involves different levels of processing, where we define 'processing' as an activity imposing Culture on Nature. In the case of crude oil the product is (almost) pure Nature; in the case of tractors it would be wrong to say that it is a case of pure Culture, pure *form* (like mathematics, music). A transistor radio, an integrated circuit, these would be better examples because Nature has been brought down to a minimum. The tractor is still too much iron and rubber to be a pure case.

Table III. Intra-actor effects of interaction across gaps in processing levels

Dimension	Effect on center nation	Effect on periphery nation	Analyzed by
1. Subsidiary economic effects	New <i>means of production</i> developed	Nothing developed, just a hole in the ground	Economist
2. Political position in world structure	Central position reinforced	Periphery position reinforced	International relationists
3. Military benefits	<i>Means of destruction</i> can easily be produced	No benefits, wars cannot be fought by means of raw materials	
4. Communication benefits	<i>Means of communication</i> easily developed	No benefits, transportation not by means of raw materials	Communication specialists
5. Knowledge and research	Much needed for higher levels of processing	Nothing needed, extraction based on being, not on becoming	Scientists, Technicians
6. Specialist needed	Specialists in <i>making</i> , scientists, engineers	Specialist in <i>having</i> , lawyers	Sociologists of knowledge
7. Skill and education	Much needed to carry out processing	Nothing needed, just a hole in the ground	Education specialists
8. Social structure	Change needed for ability to convert into mobility	No change needed, extraction based on ownership, not on ability	Sociologists
9. Psychological effects	A basic psychology of self-reliance and autonomy	A basic psychology of dependence	Psychologists

The major point now is the *gap in processing level* between oil and tractors and the differential effect this gap will have on the two nations. In one nation the oil deposit may be at the water-front, and all that is needed is a derrick and some simple mooring facilities to pump the oil straight into a ship — e.g. a Norwegian tanker — that can bring the oil to the country where it will provide energy to run, among other things, the tractor factories. In the other nation the effects may be extremely far-reaching due to the complexity of the product and the connectedness of the society.

There may be ring effects in all directions, and in Table III we have made an effort to show some types of spin-off effects. A number of comments are appropriate in connection with this list, which, needless to say, is very tentative indeed.

First, the effects are rather deep-reaching if this is at all a correct image of the situation. And the picture is hardly exaggerated. It is possible to set up international interaction in such a way that the positive intra-actor effects

are practically nil in the raw material delivering nation, and extremely far-reaching in the processing nation.⁷ This is not in any sense strange either: if processing is the imprint of Culture on Nature, the effects should be far-reaching indeed, and strongly related to development itself.

Second, these effects reinforce each other. In the nine effects listed in Table III, there are economic, political, military, communications, and cultural aspects, mixed together. Thus, the nation that in the international division of labor has the task of providing the most refined, processed products — like Japan with its emphasis on integrated circuits, transistors, miniaturization, etc. (or Eastern Europe's Japan: the DDR, with a similar emphasis) — will obviously have to engage in research. Research needs an infra-structure, a wide cultural basis in universities, etc., and it has obvious spill-over effects in the social, political, and military domains. And so on: the list may be examined and all kinds of obvious types of cross-fertilization be explored.

Third, in the example chosen, and also in the formulations in the Table, we have actually referred to a very special type of gap in processing level: the case when one of the nations concerned delivers raw materials. But the general point here is the *gap*, which would also exist if one nation delivers semi-finished products and the other finished products. There may be as much of a gap in a trade relations based on exchange between textiles and transistors as one based on exchange between oil and tractors. However, and this seems to be basic: we have looked in vain for a theory of economic trade where this gap is meaningfully operationalized so that the theory could be based on it. In fact, *degree of processing*, which is the basic variable behind the spin-off effects, seems absent from most thinking about international exchange.

This, and that is observation number *four*, is not merely a question of analyzing differences in processing level in terms of what happens inside the factory or the extraction plant. It has to be seen in its social totality. A glance at the right-hand column of Table III immediately gives us some clues as to why this has not been done: academic research has been so divided that nowhere in a traditional university set-up would one come to grips with the totality of the effects of an interaction process. Not even in the most sophisticated inter-, cross- or trans-disciplinary research institute has that type of research been carried so far that a meaningful operationalization has been offered. Yet this is indispensable for a new program of trade on equal terms to be formulated: *trade, or interaction in general, is symmetric, or on equal terms, if and only if the total inter- and intra-actor effects that accrue to the parties are equal.*⁸

But, and this is observation number *five*: why has the idea of comparing the effects of interaction only at the points of exit and entry been so successful? Probably basically because it has always been natural and in the interest of the two centers to view the world in this way, not necessarily consciously to reinforce their position in the center, but basically because interaction looks more like 'inter-action

only' to the center. If the center in the Periphery has based its existence on being rather than becoming, on ownership rather than processing, then the inter-action has been very advantageous to them. What was formerly Nature is through the 'beneficial interaction' with another nation converted into Money, which in turn can be converted into many things. *Very little effort was needed*: and that this was precisely what made the exchange so disadvantageous, only became clear after some time. Japan is, possibly, the only nation that has really converted the absence of raw materials into a blessing for the economy.

Some implications of the general principle of viewing intra-actor in addition to inter-actor effects can now be spelled out.

One is obvious: *asymmetry cannot be rectified by stabilizing or increasing the prices for raw materials*. Of course, prices exist that could, on the surface, compensate for the gap in intra-actor effects, convertible into a corresponding development of subsidiary industries, education industry, knowledge industry, and so on (although it is hard to see how the psychology of self-reliance can be bought for money). Much of this is what raw material producing countries can do with the money they earn. But this is not the same. One thing is to be *forced* into a certain pattern of intra-actor development *in order to* be able to participate in the inter-actor interaction, quite another thing to be free to make the decision without having to do it, without being forced by the entire social machinery.

The second implication is also obvious, but should still be put as a question to economists. Imagine that a nation A gives nation B a loan L, to be repaid after n years at an interest rate of p % p. a. There is only one condition in addition to the conditions of the loan: that the money be used to procure goods at a high level of processing in A. Each order will then have deep repercussions in A, along the eight dimensions indicated, in addition to the direct effect of the order itself. The value of these effects is certainly not easily calculated, but in addition A also gets back from B, if B has not gone bankrupt through this process in the mean-

time, $L(1 + p)^n$ after n years. If procurement is in terms of capital goods rather than consumer goods (usually for consumption by the center in the Periphery mainly) there will also have been intra-actor effects in B. In all likelihood the intra-actor effects of the deal in A are more far-reaching, however, for two reasons: the effects of the interaction process enter A at a higher level of processing than B, and A has already a socio-economic-political structure enabling it to absorb and convert and redirect such pressures for maximum beneficial impact.

Imagine now that n is high and p is low; the loan is said to be 'on generous terms'. The question is whether this generosity is not deceptive, *whether it would not have paid for A to give L for eternity, at no interest, i.e. as a grant.* Or even better: it might even have paid for A to persuade B to take on L with negative interest, i.e. to pay B for accepting the loan, because of all the intra-actor effects. The situation may be likened to a man who pays some people a certain sum on the condition that they use the money to pay him for an article on, say, imperialism. By having to produce, by having obligations to fulfill, the man is forced to create and thereby expand, and consequently forced to enrich himself.⁹

In short, we see vertical interaction as the major source of the inequality of this world, whether it takes the form of looting, of highly unequal exchange, or highly differential spin-off effects due to processing gaps. But we can also imagine a fourth phase of exploitation, where the modern King Midas becomes a victim of his own greed and turns his environment into muck rather than gold, by polluting it so strongly and so thoroughly that the negative spin-off effects from processing may outstrip all the positive effects. This may, in fact, place the less developed countries in a more favorable position: the lower the GNP, the lower the Gross National Pollution.

But this phase is still for the (near?) future. At present what we observe is an inequality between the world's nations of a magnitude that can only be explained in terms of the cumulative effect of *strong* structural phenomena




Fig. 2. A feudal center-periphery structure

over time, like the phenomena described here under the heading of imperialism. This is not to deny that other factors may also be important, even decisive, but no analysis can be valid without studying the problem of development in a context of vertical interaction.

If the first mechanism, the *vertical interaction relation*, is the major factor behind inequality, then the second mechanism, the *feudal interaction structure*, is the factor that maintains and reinforces this inequality by protecting it. There are four rules defining this particular interaction structure:¹⁰

- (1) interaction between Center and Periphery is *vertical*
- (2) interaction between Periphery and Periphery is *missing*
- (3) multilateral interaction involving all three is *missing*
- (4) interaction with the outside world is *monopolized* by the Center, with two implications:
 - (a) Periphery interaction with other Center nations is *missing*
 - (b) Center as well as Periphery interaction with Periphery nations belonging to other Center nations is *missing*.

This relation can be depicted as in Fig. 2. As indicated in the Figure, the number of Periphery nations attached to any given Center nation can, of course, vary. In this Figure we have also depicted the rule 'if you stay off my satellites, I will stay off yours'.

Some important *economic* consequences of this structure should be spelled out.

First and most obvious: the *concentration on trade partners*. A Periphery nation should, as a result of these two mechanisms, have most of its trade with 'its' Center nation. In other words, empirically we would expect high levels of *import concentration* as well as *export concentration* in the Periphery, as opposed to the Center, which is more free to extend its trade relations in almost any direction — except in the pure case, with the Periphery of other Center nations.

Second, and not so obvious, is the *commodity concentration*: the tendency for Periphery nations to have only one or very few primary products to export. This would be a trivial matter if it could be explained entirely in terms of geography, if e.g. oil countries were systematically poor as to ore, ore countries poor as to bananas and coffee, etc. But this can hardly be assumed to be the general case: Nature does not distribute its riches that way. There is a historical rather than a geographical explanation to this. A territory may have been exploited for the raw materials most easily available and/or most needed in the Center, and this, in turn, leads to a certain social structure, to communication lines to the deposits, to trade structures, to the emergence of certain center groups (often based on ownership of that particular raw material), and so on. To start exploiting a new kind of raw material in the same territory might upset carefully designed local balances; hence, it might be easier to have a fresh start for that new raw material in virgin territory with no bridgehead already prepared for imperialist exploits. In order to substantiate this hypothesis we would have to demonstrate that there are particularly underutilized and systematically underexplored deposits precisely in countries where one type of raw materials has already been exploited.

The combined effect of these two consequences is a *dependency* of the Periphery on the Center. Since the Periphery usually has a much smaller GNP, the trade between them is a much higher percentage of the GNP for the Periphery, and with both partner and commod-

ity concentration, the Periphery becomes particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in demands and prices. At the same time the center in the Periphery depends on the Center for its supply of consumer goods. Import substitution industries will usually lead to consumer goods that look homespun and unchic, particularly if there is planned obsolescence in the production of these goods in the Center, plus a demand for equality between the two centers maintained by demonstration effects and frequent visits to the Center.¹¹

However, the most important consequence is political and has to do with the systematic utilization of feudal interaction structures as a way of protecting the Center against the Periphery. The feudal interaction structure is in social science language nothing but an expression of the old political maxim *divide et impera*, divide and rule, as a strategy used systematically by the Center relative to the Periphery nations. How could — for example — a small foggy island in the North Sea rule over one quarter of the world? By isolating the Periphery parts from each other, by having them geographically at sufficient distance from each other to impede any real alliance formation, by having separate deals with them so as to tie them to the Center in particularistic ways, by reducing multilateralism to a minimum with all kinds of graded membership, *and* by having the Mother country assume the role of window to the world.

However, this point can be much more clearly seen if we combine the two mechanisms and extend what has been said so far for relations between Center and Periphery *nations* to relations between center and periphery *groups* within nations. Under an imperialist structure the two mechanisms are used not only between nations but also within nations, but less so in the Center nation than in the Periphery nation. In other words, there is vertical division of labor within as well as between nations. And these two levels of organization are intimately linked to each other (as A. G. Frank always has emphasized) in the sense that the center in the Periphery interaction structure is also that group with which the Center nation has its

harmony of interest, the group used as a bridge-head.

Thus, the combined operation of the two mechanisms at the two levels builds into the structure a subtle grid of protection measures against the major potential source of 'trouble', the periphery in the Periphery. To summarize the major items in this grid:

- (1) the general impoverishment of pP brought about by vertical division of labor within the Periphery nation, and particularly by the high level of inequality (e.g. differential access to means of communication) and disharmony of interest in the Periphery nation;
- (2) the way in which interaction, mobilization, and organization of pP are impeded by the feudal structure *within* Periphery nations;
- (3) the general impoverishment of the Periphery nation brought about by vertical division of labor, particularly in terms of means of destruction and communication;
- (4) the way in which interaction, mobilization, and organization of the Periphery nations are impeded by the feudal interaction structure *between* nations
 - (a) making it difficult to interact with other Periphery nations 'belonging' to the same Center nations,
 - (b) making it even more difficult to interact with Periphery nations 'belonging' to other Center nations;
- (5) the way in which it is a fortiori difficult for the peripheries in Periphery nations to interact, mobilize, and organize
 - (a) intra-nationally because of (1) and (2),
 - (b) inter-nationally because of (3) and (4),
 - (c) in addition: because the center in the Periphery has the monopoly on international interaction in all directions and cannot be counted on to interact in the interest of its own periphery;
- (6) the way in which pP cannot appeal to pC or cC either because of the disharmony of interest.

Obviously, the more perfectly the mechanisms of imperialism within and between nations are put to work, the less overt machinery of oppression is needed and the smaller can the center groups be, relative to the total population involved. *Only imperfect, amateurish imperialism needs weapons; professional imperialism is based on structural rather than direct violence.*

5. *The types of imperialism*

We shall now make this more concrete by distinguishing between five types of imperialism depending on the *type* of exchange between Center and Periphery nations:

- (1) *economic*
- (2) *political*
- (3) *military*
- (4) *communication*
- (5) *cultural*

The order of presentation is rather random: we have no theory that one is more basic than the others, or precedes the others. Rather, this is like a Pentagon or a Soviet Star:¹² imperialism can start from any corner. They should all be examined regarding the extent to which they generate interaction patterns that utilize the two *mechanisms* of imperialism so as to fulfill the three *criteria* of imperialism, or at least the first of them.

The most basic of the two mechanisms is *vertical* interaction, which in its modern form is conceived of as interaction across a gap in processing level. In other words, what is exchanged between the two nations is not only not the same things (which would have been stupid) but things of a quite different kind, the difference being in terms of where the most complex and stimulating operations take place. One tentative list, expanding what has been said in section 4 about economic interaction, might look like Table IV. The order of presentation parallels that of Table III, but in that Table cultural imperialism was spelled out in more detail as spin-off effects from economic imperialism.

The vertical nature of this type of *economic* interaction has been spelled out in detail above since we have used that type of imperialism to

Table IV. The five types of imperialism

Type	Economic	Political	Military	Communication	Cultural
Center nation provides	processing, means of production	decisions models	protection means of destruction	news, means of communication	teaching, means of creation – autonomy
Periphery nation provides	raw materials, markets	obedience, imitators	discipline, traditional hardware	events, passengers, goods	learning, validation – dependence

exemplify definition and mechanisms. Let us look more at the other types of vertical interaction.

The *political* one is clear: the concept of a 'mother' country, the Center nation, is also an indication of how the decision-making center is dislocated, away from the nation itself and towards the Center nation. These decisions may then affect economic, military, communication, and cultural patterns. Important here is the division of labor involved: some nations produce decisions, others supply obedience. The decisions may be made upon application, as in 'bilateral technical assistance', or in consultation — or they may simply emerge by virtue of the model-imitator distinction. Nothing serves that distinction quite so well as unilinear concepts of 'development' and 'modernization', according to which Center nations possess some superior kind of structure for others to imitate (as long as the Center's central position is not seriously challenged), and which gives a special aura of legitimacy to any idea emanating from the Center. Thus, structures and decisions developed in the 'motherland of liberalism' or in the 'fatherland of socialism' serve as models by virtue of their place of origin, not by virtue of their substance.

The *military* implications or parallels are also rather obvious. It cannot be emphasized enough that the economic division of labor is also one which ensures that the Center nations economically speaking also become the Center nations in a military sense: only they have the industrial capacity to develop the technological hardware — and also are often the only ones with the social structure compatible with a modern army. He who produces tractors can

easily produce tanks, but he who delivers oil cannot defend himself by throwing it in the face of the aggressors. He has to depend on the tank-producer, either for protection or for acquisition (on terms dictated by the Center). And just as there is a division of labor with the Center nation producing manufactured goods on the basis of raw materials extracted in the Periphery nation, there is also a division of labor with the *Center nations processing the obedience provided by the Periphery nations into decisions that can be implemented*. Moreover, there is also a division of labor with the Center providing the protection (and often also the officers or at least the instructors in 'counter-insurgency') and the Periphery the discipline and the soldiers needed — not to mention the apprentices of 'military advisors' from the Center.

As to the fourth type, *communication* imperialism, the emphasis in the analysis is usually turned towards the second mechanism of imperialism: the feudal interaction structure. That this largely holds for most world communication and transportation patterns has been amply demonstrated.¹³ But perhaps more important is the vertical nature of the division of labor in the field of communication/transportation. It is trivial that a high level of industrial capacity is necessary to develop the latest in transportation and communication technology. The preceding generation of *means of communication/transportation* can always be sold, sometimes second-hand, to the Periphery as part of the general vertical trade/aid structure, alongside the *means of production* (economic sector), the *means of destruction* (military sector), and the *means of creation* (cultural sector).

The Center's planes and ships are faster, more direct, look more reliable, attract more passengers, more goods. And when the Periphery finally catches up, the Center will already for a long time have dominated the field of communication satellites.

One special version of this principle is a combination of cultural and communication exchange: *news communication*. We all know that the major agencies are in the hands of the Center countries, relying on Center-dominated, feudal networks of communication.¹⁴ What is not so well analyzed is how Center news takes up a much larger proportion of Periphery news media than vice versa, just as trade with the Center is a larger proportion of Periphery total trade than vice versa. In other words, the pattern of partner concentration as something found more in the Periphery than in the Center is very pronounced. The Periphery nations do not write or read much about each other, especially not across bloc borders, and they read more about 'their' Center than about other Centers — because the press is written and read by the center in the Periphery, who want to know more about that most 'relevant' part of the world — for them.

Another aspect of vertical division of labor in the news business should also be pointed out. Just as the Periphery produces raw material that the Center turns into processed goods, *the Periphery also produces events that the Center turns into news*.¹⁵ This is done by training journalists to see events with Center eyes, and by setting up a chain of communication that filters and processes events so that they fit the general pattern.

The latter concept brings us straight into *cultural imperialism*, a subtype of which is *scientific imperialism*. The division of labor between teachers and learners is clear: it is not the division of labor as such (found in most situations of transmission of knowledge) that constitutes imperialism, but the location of the teachers, and of the learners, in a broader setting. If the Center always provides the teachers and the definition of that worthy of being taught (from the gospels of Christianity to the gospels of Technology), and the Periphery al-

ways provides the learners, then there is a pattern which smacks of imperialism. The satellite nation in the Periphery will also know that nothing flatters the Center quite so much as being encouraged to teach, and being seen as a model, and that the Periphery can get much in return from a humble, culture-seeking strategy (just as it will get little but aggression if it starts teaching the Center anything — like Czechoslovakia, who started lecturing the Soviet Union on socialism). For in accepting cultural transmission the Periphery also, implicitly, validates for the Center the culture developed in the center, whether that center is intra- or international. This serves to reinforce the Center as a center, for it will then continue to develop culture along with transmitting it, thus creating lasting demand for the latest innovations. Theories, like cars and fashions, have their life-cycle, and whether the obsolescence is planned or not there will always be a time-lag in a structure with a pronounced difference between center and periphery. Thus, the tram workers in Rio de Janeiro may carry banners supporting Auguste Comte one hundred years after the center of the Center forgot who he was . . .

In science we find a particular version of vertical division of labor, very similar to economic division of labor: the pattern of scientific teams from the Center who go to Periphery nations to collect data (raw material) in the form of deposits, sediments, flora, fauna, archeological findings, attitudes, behavioral patterns, and so on for data processing, data analysis, and theory formation (processing, in general) in the Center universities (factories), so as to be able to send the finished product, a journal, a book (manufactured goods) back for consumption in the center of the Periphery — after first having created a demand for it through demonstration effect, training in the Center country, and some degree of low level participation in the data collection team.¹⁶ This parallel is not a joke, it is a *structure*. If in addition the precise nature of the research is to provide the Center with information that can be used economically, politically, or militarily to maintain an imperialist structure, the cultural

Table V. Three phases of imperialism in history

Phase	Period	Form	Term
I	Past	<i>Occupation</i> , cP physically consists of cC people who engage in <i>occupation</i>	Colonialism
II	Present	<i>Organization</i> , cC interacts with cP via the medium of international <i>organizations</i>	Neo-colonialism
III	Future	<i>Communication</i> , cC interacts with cP via international communication	Neo-neo-colonialism

imperialism becomes even more clear. And if to this we add the *brain drain* (and body drain) whereby 'raw' brains (students) and 'raw' bodies (unskilled workers) are moved from the Periphery to the Center and 'processed' (trained) with ample benefits to the Center, the picture becomes complete.

6. *The phases of imperialism*

We have mentioned repeatedly that imperialism is *one* way in which one nation may dominate another. Moreover, it is a way that provides a relatively stable pattern: the nations are linked to each other in a pattern that may last for some time because of the many stabilizing factors built into it through the mechanism of a feudal interaction structure.

The basic idea is that the center in the Center establishes a bridgehead in the Periphery nation, and more particularly, in the center of the Periphery nation. Obviously, this bridgehead does not come about just like that: there is a phase preceding it. The precise nature of that preceding phase can best be seen by distinguishing between three phases of imperialism in history, depending on what type of concrete method the center in the Center has used to establish the harmony of interest between itself and the center in the Periphery. This is enumerated in Table V.

From the Table we see that in all three cases, the Center nation has a hold over the center of the Periphery nation. But the precise nature of this grip differs, and should be seen relative to the means of transportation and communication. No analysis of imperialism can be made

without a reference to these means that perhaps are as basic as the means of production in producing social dynamics.

Throughout the overwhelming part of human history, transportation (of human beings, of goods) did not proceed at a higher speed than that provided by pony expresses and quick sailing ships; and communication (of signals, of meaning) not at higher speed than that provided by fires and smoke signals which could be spotted from one hilltop to another. Precise control over another nation would have to be exercised by physically transplanting one's own center and grafting onto the top of the foreign body — in other words, colonialism in all its forms, best known in connection with 'white settlers'. According to this vision, colonialism was not a discovery of the Europeans subsequent to the Great Discoveries: it could just as well be used to describe great parts of the Roman Empire that through textbooks and traditions of history-writing so successfully has dominated our image of racial and ethnical identity and national pride.¹⁷

Obviously, the quicker the means of transportation could become, the less necessary would this pattern of permanent settlement be. The break in the historical pattern came when the steam engine was not only put into the factory to provide new *means of production* (leading to conditions that prompted Marx to write *Das Kapital*) but also into a vessel (Fulton) and a locomotive (Stephenson): in other words, *means of transportation* (the book about that is not yet written). This gave Europeans a decisive edge over peoples in other regions,

and colonialism became more firmly entrenched. Control could be accurate and quick.

But decolonialization also came, partly due to the weakening of cC, partly due to the strengthening of cP that might not challenge what cC did, but want to do so itself. Neo-colonialism came; and in this present phase of imperialism, control is not of the direct, concrete type found in the past. It is mediated through the means of transportation (and, of course, also communication) linking the two centers to each other. The control is less concrete: it is not physical presence, but a link; and this link takes the shape of international organizations. The international organization has a certain permanence, often with physical headquarters and a lasting general secretary in the mother country. But above all it is a medium in which influence can flow, with *both* centers joining as members and finding each other. Their harmony of interest can be translated into complete equality within the international organization, and vice versa. Their identity is defined relative to the organization, not to race, ethnicity, or nationality. But with differential disharmony *within* nations, this actually becomes an instrument of disharmony *between* nations.

These organizations are well-known for all five types of imperialism. For the economic type, the private or governmental multinational corporations (BINGOs) may serve;¹⁸ for the political type, many of the international governmental organizations (IGOs); for the military type, the various systems of military alliances and treaties and organizations (MIGOs?);¹⁹ for communication the shipping and air companies (CONGOs?), not to mention the international press agencies, offer ample illustration; and for cultural imperialism, some of the international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) may serve as the conveyor mechanisms. But this is of course not to say that international organizations will necessarily serve such purposes. According to the theory developed here, this is an empirical question, depending on the degree of division of labor inside the organization and the extent to which it is feudally organized.

Next, the third phase. If we now proceed even further along the same line of decreasingly concrete (but increasingly effective?) ties between the two centers, we can envisage a phase where even the international organizations will not only go into disrepute, but dissolve. What will come in their place? *Instant communication*, whereby parties who want to communicate with each other set up ad hoc communication networks (telesatellites, etc.) that form and dissolve in rapid succession, changing scope and domain, highly adjustable to external circumstance, guided by enormous data-banks and idea-banks that permit participants to find their 'opposite numbers' without having them frozen together in a more permanent institutional network that develops its own rigidities.²⁰

In other words, we envisage a future where very many international organizations will be threatened in two ways. First, they will be exposed to increasing criticism as to their function as a tie between two centers, communicating and coordinating far above the masses in either country, which will in itself lead to a certain disintegration. Second, this does not mean that the centers, if they are free to do so, will cease to coordinate their action, only that they will do so by other means. Instead of going to ad hoc or annual conventions, or in other ways instructing a general secretary and his staff, they may simply pick up their videophone and have a long distance conference organized, where the small group of participants can all see and talk to each other — not like in a conference, but in the more important adjoining lobbies, in the coffee-houses, in private quarters — or wherever they prefer to carry out communication and coordination.²¹

To penetrate more deeply into the role of international organization as an instrument of imperialistic dominance, let us now distinguish between five phases in the development of an international organization. As example we take one economic organization, General Motors Corporation (GMC) and one political organization, the International Communist Movement (ICM) — at present not organized formally as an international. The stages are indicated in Table VI. Needless to say, these two

Table VI. Stages in the development of an international organization

	General Motors Corporation (GMC)	International Communist Movement (ICM)
<i>Phase 1:</i> National only	in one country only ('mother country')	in one country only ('fatherland')
<i>Phase 2:</i> National goes abroad	<i>subsidiary</i> , or branch office, established by 'agents'	<i>subversive</i> organization, established by 'agents'
<i>Phase 3:</i> Multi-national, asymmetric	other national companies started, with 'mother country' company dominating	other national parties established, with 'fatherland' party dominating
<i>Phase 4:</i> Multi-national, symmetric	total network becomes symmetric	total network becomes symmetric
<i>Phase 5:</i> Global, or transnational organization	national identities dissolve	national dissolve

are taken as *illustrations* of economic and political imperialism — this is not a *study* of GMC and ICM respectively.

In the beginning, the organization exists only within national boundaries. Then comes a second phase when it sends representatives, at that stage usually called 'agents', abroad. This is a critical stage: it is a question of gaining a foothold in another nation, and usually subversive, from below. If the other nation is completely new to this economic or political pattern, the 'agents' often have to come from the 'mother country' or the 'fatherland' upon the invitation of dissatisfied individuals who find their own mobility within the system blocked *and* who think that the present system does not satisfy the needs of the population. But this phase is not imperialist, for the center in the mother country has not established any bridgehead in the *center* of the offspring country — yet.

The agents may be highly instrumental of social change. They may set into motion patterns in economic life that may reduce significantly the power of feudal landlords and introduce capitalist patterns of production; or they may set into motion patterns in political life that may reduce equally significantly the power of industrialists and introduce socialist patterns of production. Both activities are subversive of the social order, but not imperialist, and are, consequently, examples of other ways in which

one nation may exercise influence over another.²²

But in Phase 3 this development has gone a significant step further. The agents have now been successful, so to speak: national companies/parties have been established. Elites have emerged in the Periphery nations, strongly identified with and well harmonizing with the Center elites. The whole setting is highly asymmetric; what we have identified as mechanisms and types of imperialism are now discernible.

There is *division of labor*: the 'daughter' company in the Periphery nation is particularly concerned with making raw materials available and with securing markets for the mother company in the Center nation. If it enters into processing, then it is often with a technology already by-passed by 'development' in the Center country, or only leading to semi-finished products. Correspondingly, the company/party in the mother country makes more decision and the parties in the Periphery provide obedience and secure markets for the implementation of orders. Thus, in both cases the implicit assumption is always that the top leadership of the international organization shall be the top leadership of the company/party in the Center country. Headquarters are located there and not elsewhere; this location is not but rotation or random choice.²³

Further, the *general interaction structure* is

clearly feudal: there is interaction along the spokes, from the Periphery to the Center hub; but not along the rim, from one Periphery nation to another. There may be multilateral meetings, but they are usually very heavily dominated by the Center, which takes it for granted that it will be in the interest of the Periphery to emulate the Center. And this then spans across all five types of interaction, one way or the other — in ways that are usually fairly obvious.

We have pointed to what seem to be basic similarities between the two international organizations (GMC and ICM). Precisely because they are similar, they can do much to impede each other's activities. This similarity is not strange: they both reflect the state of affairs in a world that consists of (1) nation-states, of (2) highly unequal power and level of development along various axes, and is (3) too small for many nation-states to stay within their bonds — so they spill over with their gospels, and patterns are established that are imperialist in nature. *For phase 3 is clearly the imperialist phase*; and because so many international organizations are in this third phase, they at present stand out as vehicles of asymmetric forms of center-center cooperation.²⁴

This is the present state of most international organizations. Most are extensions of patterns developed first in one nation, and on assumptions that may have been valid in that country. They are usually the implementation in our days of the old missionary command (Matthew 28: 18—20): 'Go ye all forth and make all peoples my disciples'. This applies not only to economic and political organizations, but to the other three types as well. Typical examples are the ways in which cultural patterns are disseminated. In its most clear form, they are even handled by official or semi-official institutions more or less attached to the diplomatic network (such as USIS, and the various cultural activities of the Soviet and Chinese embassies in many countries; and to a lesser extent, the British Council and Alliance Française). But international organizations are also used for this purpose by Center nations who firmly be-

lieve that their patterns are good for everybody else because they are good for themselves.

However, the Periphery does not necessarily rest content with this state of affairs. There will be a dynamism leading to changes towards Phase 4, so far only brought about in very few organizations. It will probably have its roots in the division of labor, and the stamp as second-class members given to the Periphery in general, and to heads of Periphery companies and parties in particular. Why should there be any written or unwritten law that GMC and ICM heads are located in the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively?²⁵ Why not break up the division of labor completely, distribute the research contracts and the strategic planning evenly, why not rotate the headquarters, why not build up interaction along the rim and build down the interaction along the spokes so that the hub slowly fades out and the resulting organization is truly symmetric? This is where the Norwegian GMC president and the Rumanian ICM general secretary have, in a sense, common interests — and we predict that this movement will soon start in all major international organizations following some of the very useful models set by the UN and her Specialized Agencies. It should be noted, however, that it is not too difficult to obtain equality in an international organization where only the elites participate, since they already to a large extent harmonize with each other.

But this is not the final stage of development, nothing is. The multi-national, symmetric form will always be artificial for at least two reasons: the nations are not symmetric in and by themselves — some contribute more than others — and they form artificial pockets relative to many of the concerns of the organizations. Any multi-national organization, however symmetric, is a way of reinforcing and perpetuating the nation-state. If nation-states are fading out in significance, much like municipalities in many parts of the world, multi-national organizations will also fade out because they are built over a pattern that is becoming less and less salient. What will come in its place? The answer will probably be what has here been called a hypo-

Table VII. Convertibility of types of imperialism

	Economic	Political	Military	Communication	Cultural
Economic	1	2	3	4	5-9
Political					
Military					
Communication					
Cultural					

thetical Phase 5 — the *global* or *world organization*, but we shall not try to spell this out here.

7. *From spin-off to spill-over: convertibility of imperialism*

We have now presented a theory of imperialism based on *three* criteria, *two* mechanisms, *five* types, and *three* phases. In the presentation, as is usually done in any presentation of imperialism, economic imperialism was used for the purpose of illustration. However, we tried to carry the analysis further: for economic imperialism, exploitation was not only defined in terms of unequal exchange because A gives less to B than he gets from B, but also in terms of differential intra-actor or spin-off effects. Moreover, it is quite clear from Tables III and IV that these spin-off effects are located in other areas in which imperialism can also be defined. Vertical economic interaction has political spin-offs, military spin-offs, communication spin-offs, and cultural spin-offs; and vice-versa, as we shall indicate.

For that reason we shall now make a distinction between *spin-off* effects and *spill-over* effects. When a nation exchanges tractors for oil it develops a tractor-producing capacity. One possible spin-off effect is a tank-producing capacity, and this becomes a spill-over effect the moment that capacity is converted into military imperialism, for instance in the form of *Tank-Kommunismus* or *Tank-Kapitalismus*. Of course, this does not become military imperialism unless exercised in cooperation with the ruling elite in the Periphery nation. If it is exercised against that elite, it is a simple *invasion*

— as distinct from an *intervention* that is the product of cC — cP cooperation.

A glance at Tables III and IV indicates that the road from spin-off to spill-over is a short one, provided that there are cooperating or even generalized elites available both in the Center and the Periphery nations. It is not necessary for the same person in Center and Periphery to be on top on both the economic, political, military, communication, and cultural organizations — that would be rather super-human! Many would cover two or three such positions, few would command four or five. But if the five elites defined through these five types of exchange are *coordinated* into generalized upper classes based on a rich network of kinship, friendship, and association (not to mention effective cooperation), then the basis is laid for an extremely solid type of *generalized imperialism*. In the extreme case there would be rank concordance in both Center and Periphery, which means that there would not even be some little disequilibrium present in either case to give some leverage for a revolutionary movement. All groups would have learned, in fact been forced, to play generalized roles as dominant and dependent, respectively.

For this rank concordance to take place, gains made from one type of imperialism should be readily convertible into the other types. The analytical instrument here could be what we might call the *convertibility matrix*, given in Table VII.

The numbers in the first row correspond to the spin-off effects for vertical division of labor in economic transactions, as indicated in Table III. A more complete theory of imperialism

would now try to give corresponding spin-off effects, convertible into spill-over effects, for the other four types with regard to all five types. We shall certainly not engage fully in this taxonomic exercise but only pick one example from each row.

Thus, it is rather obvious how political imperialism can be converted into economic imperialism by dictating terms of trade, where the latter are not seen so much in terms of volume as trade composition.²⁶

Correspondingly, military imperialism can easily be converted into communication imperialism by invoking the need for centralized command over communication and transportation facilities. It is no coincidence that the capital in so many Center countries is located inland and well protected, whereas the capital in most Periphery countries is a port, easily accessible from the Center country, and with a feudal interaction network inland facilitating the flow of raw materials to the capital port and a trickling of consumer goods in the other direction (most of it being absorbed in the capital port itself). Precise command of territory may be necessary to establish a communication network of this type, but once established, it is self-reinforcing.

Similarly, to take another example: communication imperialism may be converted into cultural imperialism by regulating the flow of information, not only in the form of news, but also in the form of cheaply available books, etc. from the Center country.

Finally, cultural imperialism is convertible into economic imperialism in ways very commonly found today: by means of technical assistance processes. A technical assistance expert is not only a person from a rich country who goes to a poor country and stimulates a demand in the poor country for the products of the rich country.²⁷ He is also a man who goes to the poor country in order to establish a routine in the poor country, reserving for himself all the benefits of the challenges of this entrepreneurial activity. He *writes* the SOP (Standard Operating Procedure); it is for his 'counterpart' to *follow* the SOP. That this challenge is convertible into more knowledge

(more culture) and eventually also into economic benefits upon the return of the technical assistance expert is hardly to be doubted in principle, but it is another question whether the Center country understands this and fully utilizes the resource.

Convertibility could now be studied at two levels: the extent to which the nation as such can use such spin-offs from one type and direct them towards consolidation of another type, and the extent to which an individual may do so. If an individual can, the result is some type of rank concordance; if the nation can, we might perhaps talk of imperialism concordance.

But the only point we want to make here is that the convertibility matrix seems to be complete. It is hard to imagine any cell in Table VII that would be empty in the sense that there could be no spill-over effects, no possibility of conversion. If everything can be bought for money, obtained by political control, or ordered by military imposition, then that alone would take care of the first three horizontal rows. Correspondingly, most authors would talk about economic, political, and military imperialism, but we have added the other two since they seem also to be primordial. Perhaps the first three will build up more slowly along the lines established by division of labor in communication and cultural organizations, but it is very easy to imagine scenarios as well as concrete historical examples.

The completeness of the convertibility matrix, more than anything else, would lead us to reject the assumption of one type of imperialism as more basic than the others. It is the mutual reinforcement, the positive feedback between these types rather than any simple reductionist causal chain, that seems the dominant characteristic. If economic, political, and military imperialism seem so dominant today, this may be an artifact due to our training that emphasizes these factors rather than communication and cultural factors. Belief in a simple causal chain is dangerous because it is accompanied by the belief that imperialism can be dispensed with forever if the primary element in the chain is abolished, e.g. private capitalism. The more general definition of imperialism presented here

directs our search towards the two mechanisms as well as the particular criteria of exploitation within and between nations.

In order to talk about imperialism, not only economic inequality but also political, military, communication, and cultural inequality should be distributed in an inegalitarian way, with the periphery at the disadvantage. Are they? We think yes. The not-so-blatantly-unequal access to acquisitive power, to some *political* power through voting, to some control over the *use of violence* (through political power, through civilian control of the military and through equality of opportunity as to access to ranking positions in the military), to *communication* (usually via access to acquisitive power, but also via denser, less feudal communication networks linking periphery outposts more directly together in Center nations), and to *cultural* goods (through widespread literacy and equality in access to educational institutions) — all these are trademarks of what is referred to as a liberal democracy. And that form of sociopolitical life is found in the Center rather than the Periphery of the world.

This leads to an important point in the theory of imperialism. *Instead of seeing democracy as a consequence or a condition for economic development within certain nations, it can (also) be seen as the condition for exercising effective control over Periphery nations.* Precisely because the Center is more egalitarian and democratic than the Periphery, there will be more people in the Center who feel they have a stake in the present state of affairs, since the fruits of imperialist structures are more equally shared on the top than on the bottom. And this will make it even less likely that the periphery in the Center will really join with the periphery in the Periphery against the two centers. Rather, like Dutch workers they will oppose the independence of Indonesia, and like US workers they will tend to become hard-hats over the Indo-China issue.

It is now relatively clear what would be the perfect type of imperialism. In perfect imperialism, regardless of phase, we would assume all three criteria, both mechanisms, and all five types to be completely operative. This would

mean complete harmony between the centers, with the elites in the Periphery nations almost undistinguishable from the elites in the Center nations where living conditions are concerned; much better distribution in the Center nations than in the Periphery nations; a perfectly vertical division of labor along all five types of exchange, and a perfectly feudal interaction network.

Where in the world, in space and/or in time, does one find this type of relations? The answer is perhaps not only in the colonial empires of the past, but also in the neo-colonial empires of the present using international organizations as their medium. To what extent it is true is an empirical question, and all the factors mentioned above can be operationalized. In other words, what is often called 'positivist' methodology can be brought to bear on problems of structuralist or even marxist analyses. A crude and limited exercise in this direction will be given in the following section.

Suffice it here only to say that no system is perfect, and no system is a perfect copy of some ideal-type model. It may be that the neo-colonial empire United States had in Latin America in the 1950's and into the 1960's was a relatively perfect case,²⁹ and that this also applies to the relation between the EEC countries and the Associated States.³⁰ But it does not apply to the United States in Western Europe, nor to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, to the Soviet Union in the Arab World or to Japan in Southeast Asia. This is not to deny that United States in Western Europe and Soviet Union in Eastern Europe are at the summit of military organizations that seem to satisfy all conditions, although the parallel is not entirely complete. But both of the super-powers are peripheral to the communication networks, their cultures are largely rejected in Western and Eastern Europe respectively, and where economic penetration is concerned there is a vertical division of labor in favor of the United States relative to Western Europe, but in favor of Eastern Europe (in general) relative to the Soviet Union — with Soviet Union as a provider of raw materials for, for instance, high level processing in the DDR. But it may then

be argued that what the Soviet Union loses in economic ascendancy it compensates for in a political organization with strong feudal components.³¹

Similar arguments may be advanced in connection with the Soviet Union in the Arab World, and with Japan in Southeast Asia. Where the latter is concerned there is no doubt as to the economic imperialism, but there is neither political, nor military, nor communication, nor cultural ascendancy.³²

And this, then, leads to the final conclusion in this section. Imperialism is a question of degree, and if it is perfect it is a perfect instrument of structural violence. When it is less than perfect something must be substituted for what is lost in structural violence: direct violence, or at least the threat of direct violence. This is where the military type of imperialism becomes so important, since it can be seen as a potential to be activated when the other types of imperialism, particularly the economic and political types, show important cracks in the structure. This does not, incidentally, necessarily mean that direct violence only has to be applied in Periphery nations; it may also be directed against the periphery in Center nations if there is a danger of their siding with the periphery in the Periphery. The structural conditions for this would be that criterion no. 2 in the definition does not hold, in other words that

there is not less, but possibly even more, inequality in the Center than in the Periphery.³³

8. *Some empirical explorations*

The theory developed above is too complex in its empirical implications to be tested in its entirety. But some data can at least be given for economic imperialism, not because we view this as the basic type of imperialism, but because it is the type for which data are most readily available.

Everybody knows that there is the gap in GNP per capita, that there are rich nations and poor nations. From one point of view this gap poses a problem, the answer to which is in terms of *redistribution*. But from the structuralist point of view taken here the gap poses a problem that can only be answered in terms of *structural change*. It may be that redistribution can contribute to this change; but it may also be that it only serves to postpone the solution because symptoms rather than the disease itself is cured.

The claim, therefore, is that when some nations are rich and some nations are poor, when some nations are developed and some nations are under-developed, this is intimately related to the structure within and between nations. To explore this in line with the theory developed above we shall use of the following seven variables:³⁴

Development variables:

1. GNP/cap
2. Percentage employed in non-primary sectors

Inequality variables:

3. Gini index, income distribution
4. Gini index, land distribution

Vertical trade variable:

5. Trade composition index

Feudal trade variables:

6. Partner concentration index
 7. Commodity concentration index
-

The first two variables place the nation in the international ranking system using two types of development variables that are, of course, highly but not completely correlated. The next two variables, the Gini indices, say something about the internal structure of the

nation, whereas the last three variables say something about the structure of the relations between them. Of these three, the first one relates to the first mechanism of imperialism and the other two to the second mechanism of imperialism. More precisely, the trade compo-

sition index is based on the following formula:³⁵
Trade composition index

$$\frac{(a + d) - (b + c)}{(a + d) + (b + c)}$$

where

- a is value of raw materials imported
- b is value of raw materials exported
- c is value of processed goods imported
- d is value of processed goods exported

There is no doubt that this index is a crude measure, among other reasons because the variable *degree of processing*, so crucial to the whole analysis, has here been dichotomized in 'raw materials' vs. 'processed goods' neglecting completely the problem of degree, and because the basis for dichotomization is the division made use of in UN trade statistics. However, despite its short-comings it serves to sort nations apart. The highest ranking nation on this variable is Japan with an import consisting almost entirely of raw materials and an export consisting almost entirely of processed goods. Correspondingly, at the bottom according to this index are the nations that export raw materials, and import processed goods only; but the relative position of several countries in between may certainly be disputed.

As to the last two variables, they are simply the ratios between the proportion of the export going to the *one* most important partner, or consisting of the *three* most important commodities relative to the total export, respectively.³⁶

According to our general theory we should now expect some countries to be developed and




Fig. 3. The correlation pattern according to the imperialism hypothesis.

to be on top of the vertical trade index but low in terms of inequality and position on the feudal trade index — whereas other countries would be undeveloped and low on the vertical trade index but on the other hand high in terms of inequality and position on the feudal trade index. The correlation structure should be something like Fig. 3 where the solid lines indicate positive relations and the broken lines negative relations, and the numbers in parentheses are the numbers of indicators for each dimension.

Thus, of the twenty-one bivariate correlations we predict six positive and twelve negative correlations. In addition there are the three correlations between indicators of the same dimension: we expect them to be positive, but not too positive since that would reduce the usefulness for independent testing of the hypotheses.

Because of the grave doubts as to the validity and reliability of all variables we decided to dichotomize them, either at the point where there is a 'natural' cut (a large interval between one country and the next) or at the median cut. The correlation coefficient used was Yule's Q, and the results were as shown in Table VIII.

Table VIII. A test of the hypothesis of economic imperialism (Yule's Q)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1 GNP/cap		0.79	-0.90	-0.80	0.89	-0.52	-0.89
2 % non-primary			-1.00	-0.83	0.77	-0.72	-0.87
3 Gini income				0.20	-0.83	0.80	0.86
4 Gini land					-0.95	0.21	0.85
5 Trade comp.						-0.69	-0.97
6 Partner concentration							0.35
7 Commodity concentration							

All correlations are in the expected direction, most of them rather substantial. There are only three low correlations, and two of them are between indicators of the same dimension. Hence we regard the hypothesis as very well confirmed.

Of course, this is only a test of a theory along the edges of that theory; it does not in itself prove that the system is in fact working as described above. But if these findings had not come out so strongly as they do, we would have been forced to conclude that the imperialist model cannot possibly be a good model of the world system today. Hence, as a test of the hypotheses the findings provide positive confirmation, but as a test of a theory only the negative support that a theory would have to be rejected if the findings had been in the opposite direction.³⁷

We should also add that the theory in itself is so rich in implications that it provides ample basis for empirical research, within liberal and marxist schools of thought, and employing synchronic statistical methods as well as diachronic case studies. It would be sad if ideological and other types of conflicts between adherents of different schools should lead to any systematic neglect as to mobilizing general social science for a deeper understanding of how this system works.

9. Further theoretical explorations

Let us then make use of the results of the theoretical and empirical explorations to go somewhat more deeply into four problems.

9.1 Defining 'center' and 'periphery'

We are now in a better position to define our basic terms, 'center' and 'periphery' (loosely introduced in section 2), whether they refer to relations between or within nations.³⁸ Actually, implicit in what has been said above are three approaches when it comes to defining these terms:

- (1) in terms of *absolute properties* (e.g. development variables): center is high on rank dimensions, periphery is low
- (2) in terms of *interaction relation* (e.g.

trade composition index): center enriches itself more than the periphery

(3) in terms of *interaction structure* (e.g. partner and commodity concentration index): center is more centrally located in the interaction network than the periphery — the periphery being higher on the concentration indices.

Empirically it may not matter that much which of these three dimensions is used to define center and periphery, since Table VIII shows them highly correlated — at least today. According to one type of theory this is because (1) above is primordial, basic: the richer, more educated, stronger nation (individual) is able to place itself in the world structure (social structure) so that it can be on top of a vertical interaction relation and in the center of a feudal interaction structure. According to another type of theory (2) or (3) are basic: if an individual or nation is able to place itself on top of a vertical relation, and possibly, in addition, in the center of a feudal interaction structure, it will also be able to climb higher on the dimensions on which nations (individuals) climb — whatever they might be.

We find it difficult to be dogmatic about these two theories. Rather, they seem to complement each other. One nation (individual) may have gotten an edge over another in one way or another, and been able to convert that into an advantageous interaction position, as the Europeans did after the Great Discoveries. Or — it may have come into an advantageous interaction position by some lucky circumstance, e.g. in a communication network — and been able to convert this into some absolute value for itself, and so on.

In general, we think there are reasons to say that the relative significance of the three *aspects* of the center-periphery distinction varies with time and space, with historical and geographical circumstances. For that reason we would prefer to view them precisely as three different *aspects* of that distinction. Thus, we define center vs. periphery as nations (individuals) that satisfy (1) *or* (2) *or* (3); 'or' taken in the usual sense of and/or. This may

lead to confusion, but since both theories above would lead to the same conclusion we do not worry so much about that. Rather, the definition should be accompanied with a warning to the analyst: he should always be sensitive to possible cases of divergence, that a nation (individual) may be in the center relative to one aspect and in the periphery relative to another, and so on. That this in itself would provide rich sources for theories about dynamism, about how a center position of one kind can be converted into a center position of the other kind, is obvious. And in that connection the second aspect, the relation itself, may perhaps be more basic, since it provides, through accumulation, a constant flow of resources towards the center. The advantage of this aspect is that it is so *concrete*. According to this aspect the sorting into center and periphery is not only an operation carried out by the analyst, it takes place, *in concreto*, in the interaction process itself. The two actors 'sort' themselves away from each other by participating in vertical interaction, and become increasingly unequal in the process.³⁹

9.2 *Generalization to three nations and three classes*

So far we have operated with a simple scheme involving two nations and two classes; time has now come to break out of that limitation. Here we shall only offer some remarks in that connection, not carry the analysis through in detail.

Thus, the introduction of a middle class between the center and the periphery would be entirely consistent with thinking in most social science schools. Whether the center is defined in terms of economic, political, military communication, or cultural interaction, a strict dichotomy between center and periphery will often be too crude. The alternative to a dichotomy may be a continuum, but on the way towards that type of thinking a trichotomy may also be useful. Strict social dichotomies are usually difficult to obtain unless hedged around by means of highly visible and consensual racial, ethnic, or geographical distinctions. A country composed of three races may therefore provide

a stable three-class structure; if there is only one race, the continuous model may be more useful.

However, it is difficult to see that this should significantly affect our theory. Whether there are two or three classes or a continuum from extreme center to extreme periphery does not invalidate descriptions of the nation in terms of averages (such as GNP/capita) and dispersions (such as Gini indices). Nor will it invalidate the comparisons between the nations in such terms. In fact, there is nothing in this theory that presupposes a dichotomous class structure since the theory is not based on a dichotomy like owner vs. non-owner of means of production.

More interesting results can be obtained by interspersing a third nation between the Center and Periphery nations. Such a nation could, in fact, serve as a go-between. Concretely, it would exchange semi-processed goods with highly processed goods upwards and semi-processed goods with raw materials downwards. It would simply be located in between Center and Periphery where the degree of processing of its export products is concerned. Moreover, such go-between nations would serve as an intermediate layer between the extreme Center and the extreme Periphery in a feudal interaction structure. And needless to say: the intra-national centers of all three nations would be tied together in the same international network, establishing firm ties of harmony of interest between them.

In another version of the same conception the go-between nation would be one cycle behind the Center as to technology but one cycle ahead of the Periphery;⁴⁰ in line with its position as to degree of processing. This would also apply to the means of destruction and the means of communication.

If the United States is seen as *the* Center nation in the world (with Japan as an extremely dangerous competitor precisely in terms of degree of processing), then several such chains of nations suggest themselves, as shown in Table IX.

Just as for the generalization to three classes, this could also be generalized to a continuous

Table IX. Some hypotheses about go-between relations

Center	Go-Between	Periphery
USA	Western Europe	Eastern Europe
USA	Canada	Anglo-America (Trinidad, etc.)
USA	Mexico Argentina Brazil	Central America
USA	Japan	Southeast Asia
Japan	South Korea Taiwan	Southeast Asia (and North America)
Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Soviet Union

chain which would then serve to make for considerable distance between the extreme Center and the extreme Periphery.

9.3. Generalizations to more than one empire

So far all our thinking has been within one empire, except for passing references to countries outside the empire that the Periphery is prevented from interacting with. But the world consists of more than one empire, and any realistic theory should see an empire in its context — especially since direct violence is to relations between empires what structural violence is within empires.

Clearly, relations between empires are above all relations between the centers of the Centers; these relations can be negative, neutral, or positive. Two capitalistic empires may be in competition, but they may also sub-divide the world between them into spheres of interest so perfectly that the relations become more neutral. In this first phase one empire may fight to protect itself in the competition with another capitalist empire, but in a second phase they may join forces and more or less merge to protect not this or that particular capitalist empire, but the system of capitalism as such. And we

could also easily imagine a third phase where non-capitalist empires join with capitalist empires in the pattern of ‘united imperialism’, for the protection of imperialism as such.

All this is extremely important from the viewpoint of the Periphery nations. A world with more empires, which above all means a world with more Center nations, is at least potentially a world with more possibilities. To explore this in more detail, let us assume that we have Center and Periphery nations, vertically related to each other. For each type of nation there are three cases: one nation alone, two nations either very low on interaction or hostile to each other, and two nations in so friendly cooperation as to constitute one actor. The result is shown in Fig. 4, which permits us to recognize many and politically very important situations (the arrows in Fig. 4 stand for relations of vertical interaction).

Here, situations *a*, *b*, and *c* take place within one empire and lead to a situation with a certain element of defeudalization: horizontal interaction has been established between the two Periphery nations.

In situations *d*, *e*, and *f* Periphery nations are able to interact with more than one Center nation, possibly even play one against the other because of their hostile relationship. In this situation the Periphery will have a vested interest in protracting the Center conflict, and may even join forces (model *f*) to make optimum gains from the conflict.

In situations *g*, *h*, and *i* it is the Center side that cooperates, for instance by establishing a ‘consortium’ whereby several rich nations join together to help one or more poor nations, singly or combined.⁴¹

Importantly, none of these strategies will lead to any changes in the vertical interaction relation, only to some changes in the feudal interaction structure. As such they attack only one aspect of imperialism, not the other, possibly more important aspect. And if we look more closely at model *i*, this is nothing but model *a* writ large, as when EEC rather than France alone stands in a relationship of vertical interaction with 18 Associated States rather than with one of them alone. It is dif-




Fig. 4. Possible relations in a multi-empire world

difficult to see that imperialistic relationships become less imperialistic by being established between super-Center and a super-Periphery rather than between the original Center and Periphery nations (we should add that *h* rather than *i* is a more correct model of the relationship between EEC and the Associated States).

This factor notwithstanding, there is no reason to deny that a multi-empire world not only creates more bargaining possibilities, but also is a more realistic model of the world in which mankind lives — at present.

9.4. Generalization to non-territorial actors

We have defined non-territorial actors above, in Table V, phases 3, 4, and 5 — where phases 3 and 4 refer to multi-national or inter-national non-territorial actors and phase 5 to trans-national actors. These are collectivities, they consist of human beings, they have more often than not a vertical division of labor within, and there is little reason why they should not also

often have vertical division of labor between and be chained together in imperialistic relationships. Thus, there may be a division of labor between governmental and non-governmental international organizations, with the more far-reaching decisions taken by the former and some of the implementations carried out by the latter. For this system to function well, the governmental organizations will have to harmonize the policy-making centers of the non-governmental organizations with themselves, and one concrete way of doing this would be to have a member on the Council or Executive Committee. This article is not the occasion to spell this point out in any detail or with empirical examples, but we should point out that imperialism as a structure is not at all tied to territorial actors alone.⁴²

10. Conclusion: some strategic implications

From a general scheme, we cannot arrive at more than general policy implications that can serve as guide-lines, as strategies. More con-

creteness is needed to arrive at the first tactical steps. But theory developed in peace research should lead to such guide-lines; if it merely reflects what is empirical, not what is potential, then it is not good theory.

Our point of departure is once more that the world is divided into have's and have-not's, in have and have-not nations. To decrease the gap,⁴³ one aspect of the fight against structural violence, redistribution by taking from the have's and giving to the have-not's is not enough: the structure has to be changed. The imperialist structure has inter-national as well as intra-national aspects and will consequently have to be changed at both levels.

However, let us start with the international changes needed, for a point of departure. Following closely the analysis of the mechanisms of imperialism in order to establish anti-mechanisms, we get Table X.

Table X. *Strategies for structural change of the international dominance system*

I. HORIZONTALIZATION

1. *Horizontalization Center-Periphery*

a. *exchange on more equal terms*, either by reducing the division of labor, or by more horizontal division of labor that would equalize spin-off effects. Concretely this would mean that Center nations would have to start importing processed products from Periphery nations, and engage in intra- rather than inter-sector trade, and even intra- rather than inter-commodity trade.

b. *reduction of vertical interaction*, down to total de-coupling in case exchange on more equal terms is unacceptable or does not work.

c. *self-reliance*,⁴⁴ partly in order to develop import substitutes, and partly in order for Periphery nations to define themselves what products they need rather than adapting the preference scales developed in the Center.

II. DEFEUDALIZATION

a. *exchange on equal terms*, intra- rather than inter-sector, but obviously at a lower level where degree of processing is concerned than under 1.a. above. It may imply exchanges of raw materials, or exchanges of semi-processed goods. Obviously,

which Periphery country should interact horizontally with which other Periphery countries would depend on the nature of the economic exchange and the concrete geo-political situation.

b. *development of viable organization of Periphery countries for international class conflict*. Such organizations seem to depend for their viability not only on commitment to an ideology (rejection of past and present as well as visions for the future), but also seem to function better if they are built around an exchange relation of the type indicated in 2.a. The exact purpose of the organization would be to force Center nations to change their policies in the direction of 1.a., and also to command a better redistribution of capital and technology from the Center. This would also be the organization that could organize a strike on the delivery of raw materials in case Center nations do not conform with these types of structural changes, as an analogy to the denial of human manpower typical of intra-national strikes.

3. *Multilateralization Center-Periphery*

a. *multinational, symmetric organization should be established wherever possible*, the system of international organizations should be taken out of phase 3 and moved towards phase 4. These organizations would serve as concrete instruments for horizontal relationships between Center and Periphery, and between Periphery and Periphery.

b. *destruction of multi-national asymmetric organizations* if they do not change in the direction of 3.a. above by withdrawal of Periphery participation.

c. *self-reliance with the Periphery itself building multinational symmetric organizations*, retaining some contact with the Center for conflict articulation. This pattern might also apply to the UN and the UN Agencies unless they pursue policies of the types indicated above.

d. *establishment of global or trans-national organizations* that could serve to globalize the world's means of communication and means of production in order to establish a universally accessible communication network and a production system that would give top priority to the needs of the periphery of the Periphery.

4. *Extra-bloc activity*

a. *Periphery-Center contacts extended to other Centers*, but in accordance with the program indicated in 1.a. and 1.b. above.

b. *Periphery-Periphery contacts extended to other Periphery countries*, but in accordance with points 2 and 3 above. For the latter the Algiers Group of 77 would be an important, although weak model, and the conferences of non-aligned states another. At the first conference in Beograd in 1961 there were 25 participants, at the second in 1964 in Cairo 47 participants, and at the 1970 Lusaka conference there were 54 participants (the number of observers was 3, 10, and 12 respectively).

Again, at this general level it is impossible to indicate the first steps that would lead from vertical, feudal interaction towards horizontalization and defeudalization. These are guide-lines only. And their implementation should certainly not be seen as a sufficient condition for a process of genuine development to start in the Periphery, with the possible result that the gap between Center and Periphery may be decreasing again, but as a necessary condition. Very many of the findings in 'liberal' development theory may become valid precisely when today's periphery nations become autonomous through structural change. Hence, the basic formulas of horizontalization and defeudalization are necessary conditions, not panaceas.

But another question that certainly has to be asked is what this presupposes in terms of intra-national strategies. In one sense the answer is simple: Table X also applies to the relation between center and periphery within a nation, not only between nations. As such it gives four general guide-lines for a revolutionary process that would abolish the exploitation of the periphery by the Center.

But this is too abstract, so let us return to the question in more concrete terms. The major difficulty with the international strategies in Table X is obviously that these would not be in the interest of the center in the Periphery. Nothing in these strategies would guarantee them the living conditions they already enjoy, very often on par with (or even above) the living conditions of the center in the Center. They would have all reasons to resist such changes. In fact, from a purely human point

of view this group is perhaps the most exposed group in the whole international system, on the one hand the pawn and instrument of the center in the Center and on the other hand the exploiters of the periphery in the Periphery. In such a cross-pressure it seems reasonable to expect that the group will sooner or later have to choose sides. Either it will have to relocate and join the center in the Center, or it will have to stand in solidarity with the periphery in the Periphery.

We can now, building on the *criteria* of imperialism, formulate a new set of strategies that would have more immediate domestic implications and support the international strategies of Table X, as is shown in Table XI.

Table XI. *Strategies for structural change of the intra-national dominance system*

I. REDUCED HARMONY BETWEEN THE CENTERS

1. *Reduction to neutral or no relationship*

This type of situation arises often when there is a crisis in the center of the Center, for instance due to internal war in the Center or external war between two or more Center nations. In this situation the Periphery attains some kind of autonomy because the Center can no longer exercise minute control — as seems to be the case for many countries in Latin America during the Second World War.

2. *Change to negative relationship between the centers*

In the general theory it has been postulated that there is 'harmony' between the two centers, but social relations being complex such a harmony is hardly ever complete. There may be some privileges that cC reserve for themselves (such as taxation *without* representation) or some privileges that cP reserve for themselves (such as the right to maintain a slavery or racist society). In general tensions may arise precisely because the model of complete harmony and similarity is not realized. The result may be a *nationalist* fight for liberation from the Center country, and this fight may even attain a populist character if cP can manage to interpret the conflict as a threat to the Periphery nation as a whole, not only to its center. If the Center engages in destructive behavior

against the Periphery, such as economic warfare (with economic sanctions as a special case) or even military warfare, a homogenization of the Periphery may occur, sufficient to conceal the disharmony of interest built into the Periphery.

II. REDUCED DISHARMONY IN THE PERIPHERY

3. *Violent revolution in the Periphery*

According to this formula the internal disharmony of interest is eliminated by eliminating cP as a class, by using means of force. This can be done partly by killing them, partly by means of imprisonment, and partly by giving them the chance to relocate, for instance by using their ties with cC so as to settle where they really belong — in the Center.⁴⁵ A new regime is then introduced which perhaps may have its center, but certainly not a center that is tied with relations of harmony to the old cC.

4. *Non-violent revolution in the Periphery*

In this approach cP are not eliminated as persons, but as a part of the Periphery structure because the rest of the Periphery nation refuses to interact with them. They become non-functional socially rather than eliminated in a physical sense. To give them new tasks in a new society becomes an important part of the non-violent revolution.

5. *Cooperation between the peripherics in the Periphery*

Since international relations are so dominated by the centers in the Periphery, more of international relations has to be carried out by the peoples themselves in patterns of non-governmental foreign policy. The Havana-based *Tricontinental* (OSPAAAL) is an important example.

But in general we would believe more in Periphery-generated strategies than in Center-generated ones, since the latter may easily lead to a new form of dependence on the Center.

III. CHANGES IN THE CENTER

6. *Increased disharmony in the Center*

In this case pC may no longer side with cC as it should according to nationalist ideology in the

Center, but find that the Periphery nation in general and pP in particular is the natural ally. It is difficult to see how this can have consequences that could be beneficial to the Periphery unless the two countries are contiguous, or unless this might be a factor behind the types of development outlined in I,1 and I,2 above.

7. *Changes in the goals of the Center*

In this case there is no assumption of changes in the level of internal disharmony in the Center. The Center might itself choose to stop imperialist policies, not because it is forced to do so from below (the Center by the Periphery, or cC by pC as above), but out of its own decision. Thus, cC might see that this is a *wrong* policy to pursue, e.g. because of the exploitation it leads to, because of the dangers for world peace, because of relations to other nations, etc. Or, there may be internal reasons: the Center might reduce its economic growth and change towards a politics of justice. Anti-centers, or the periphery in the Center might decide to boycott further economic growth because of its consequences in terms of negative spin-off effects (pollution, exploitation of man). There are many possibilities, and they may combine into quite likely contributions towards a disruption of the system. But in general we would believe more in Periphery-generated strategies than in Center-generated ones, since the latter may easily lead to a new form of dependence on the Center.

At this point we choose to stop. These strategies will be explored in much more detail elsewhere. They are only presented here in brief outline in order to indicate what to us seems to be a crucial criterion against which any theory should be tested: is it indicative of a practice, does it indicate who the actors behind that practice could be? A theory should not only be evaluated according to its potential as a reservoir of hypothesis implications to be tested against present reality (data), but as much — or perhaps more — as a reservoir of policy implications to be tested against potential reality (goals, values). What we have tried to do here is an effort in both directions.

APPENDIX. Some data on economic relations within and between nations

Nation	1 GNP/cap.	2 Non- Primary %	3 GINI (i)	4 GINI (l)	5 Trade Compo- sition Index	6 Partner Concen- tration	7 Commodity Concen- tration
Argentina	670	82.2	0.45	0.863	-0.667	16.5	51.5
Australia	2 035	90.6	0.35	0.929	-0.576	18.4	50.9
Austria	1 287	79.9	-	0.740	0.021	20.1	29.2
Belgium	1 761	94.5	-	0.587	0.175	22.4	34.1
Brazil	273	48.4	-	0.837	-0.510	32.0	59.3
Canada	2 505	87.9	-	0.497	-0.258	57.5	26.7
Ceylon	145	51.1	0.50	-	-0.375	29.3	93.4
Colombia	305	52.8	0.50	0.849	-0.710	47.3	84.8
Congo, D.R.	85	86.4	-	-	-0.062	32.3	65.5
Costa Rica	421	50.9	-	0.892	-0.989	50.0	65.1
Denmark	2 109	83.4	0.42	0.458	-0.270	22.5	34.8
Ecuador	223	44.4	-	0.864	-0.766	54.7	75.2
El Salvador	273	39.7	0.45	0.828	-0.529	25.7	68.3
Finland	1 747	64.5	-	0.599	-0.039	20.8	60.5
France	1 922	83.4	-	0.583	0.158	18.7	23.8
W. Germany	1 977	90.0	0.44	0.674	0.418	11.3	24.7
Ghana	288	42.0	-	-	-0.750	22.0	78.1
Guatemala	322	34.6	0.48	0.860	-0.659	32.9	68.0
Guyana	-	70.4	-	-	-0.675	-	-
Honduras	225	33.2	-	0.757	-0.759	56.9	67.9
India	102	27.1	0.57	0.522	-0.044	19.0	54.8
Iran	270	53.1	-	-	-0.812	17.3	92.8
Ireland	951	69.2	-	0.598	-0.322	70.7	42.3
Israel	1 407	88.0	-	-	-0.076	14.9	52.4
Italy	1 100	76.7	0.40	0.803	0.384	20.1	22.5
Ivory Coast	285	13.6	-	-	-0.703	37.5	83.1
Jamaica	516	63.9	-	0.820	0.480	37.4	76.5
Japan	870	79.4	-	0.470	0.707	29.7	36.1
Jordan	237	64.7	-	-	-0.241	15.0	59.9
S. Korea	99	48.2	-	-	-0.114	27.3	26.8
Kuwait	-	98.9	-	-	-0.486	-	-
Liberia	280	19.1	-	-	-0.754	38.7	91.2
Libya	705	64.3	-	0.700	-0.871	19.0	98.8
Mexico	482	45.2	0.53	-	-0.608	55.0	35*)
Morocco	196	43.7	-	-	-0.345	42.8	45.2
Netherland	1 532	91.7	0.43	0.605	-0.077	27.2	18.5
New Zealand	2 025	86.9	-	0.772	-0.733	46.4	81.0
Nicaragua	325	40.3	-	0.757	-0.783	29.5	65.2
Niger	91	3.1	-	-	-0.688	-	-
Norway	1 907	81.5	0.39	0.669	-0.207	18.9	26.4
Pakistan	97	31.2	0.38	-	-0.337	12.8	61.7
Panama	517	53.8	-	0.737	-0.524	55.9	89.4
Peru	372	50.3	-	0.875	-0.545	41.8	58.7
Philippines	156	47.3	-	0.564	-0.608	43.1	72.7
Poland	-	52.3	-	-	0.037	-	-
Portugal	400	66.5	-	-	-0.068	-	25*)
Sierra Leone	159	25.2	-	-	-0.108	65.7	82.7
S. Africa	590	70.5	-	-	-0.386	-	-
Spain	600	67.2	-	0.780	-0.131	-	35*)

*) Estimate

Contd next page

Appendix contd

Nation	1 GNP/C	2 % Non- Primary	3 GINI (i)	4 GINI (l)	5 Trade Comp.	6 Part. Cons.	7 Comm. Cons.
Sudan	103	14.2	-	-	-0.718	14.4	69.7
Sweden	2 487	89.9	0.42	0.572	-0.012	13.8	28.6
Switzerland	2 301	92.2	-	0.498	0.152	15.8	28.5
Syria	228	43.0	-	-	-0.449	36.5	64.9
Thailand	129	18.0	-	-	-0.606	19.4	56.3
Turkey	279	28.8	-	-	-0.705	17.2	38.3
UAR	159	43.4	-	-	-0.275	50.8	63.0
UK	1 790	96.9	0.38	0.710	0.424	10.8	22.2
USA	3 536	95.0	0.36	0.705	0.101	20.2	15.6
Venezuela	971	67.7	-	0.909	-0.893	35.5	99.6
Yugoslavia	-	43.1	-	-	-0.045	-	-

Sources:

- GNP/Cap.: Hagen & Hawlyryshyn, 1969: Analysis of World Income and Growth, 1955-65, in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 18, No. 1 part II, October 1969.
- % Non-primary: The PRIO Nation Data File. Compiled from ILO and OECD sources. Year: 1967.
- GINI (i): Weisskopf, T. E. 1970: Underdevelopment, Capitalistic Growth and the Future of the Poor Countries. Preliminary Draft, Harvard University, April 1970.
- GINI (l): Russett, B. et al., *World Handbook of Social and Political indicators*
- Trade comp.: Computed from, *UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, 1967.
- Partner conc.: Hagen & Hawlyryshyn, op.cit.
- Comm. conc.: Hagen & Hawlyryshyn, op.cit.

NOTES

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1. For an exploration of this concept, see Gal-tung, J. 1969: Violence, Peace and Peace Research, *Journal of Peace Research* 6 pp. 167-91.

2. This equality premise may be formulated in terms of distribution, or redistribution, of values generated by the society in liberal theory, or as absence of exploitation in marxist theory. The two approaches have in common the idea that a party may have an interest even if it does not proclaim that it has this interest, but whereas the liberal approach will keep the social structure but carry out some redistribution along the road, the marxist approach will change the social structure itself. In both cases one may actually also make a further distinction as to whether harmony is to be obtained by equalization of what the society produces of material and spiritual value, or equalization when it comes to the power to decide over what the society produces. But imperialism as a structure cuts across these distinctions and is, in our view, based on a more general concept of harmony and disharmony of interests.

3. No attempt will be made here to explore similarities and dissimilarities between this definition of imperialism and that given by such authors as Hobson, Luxemburg, Lenin, Hilferding and very many others. This definition has grown out of a certain research tradition, partly inductively from a long set of findings about international interaction structures, and partly deductively from

speculations relating to structural violence in general and the theory of inequality in particular.

4. Particularly one aspect of Lenin's conception of imperialism has been picked up in our definition: the general idea of a labor aristocracy. Lenin quotes Engels when he says that '— quand aux ouvriers, ils jouissent en toute tranquillité avec eux du monopole colonial, de l'Angleterre et de son monopole sur le marché mondial'. (*L'impérialisme: Stade suprême du Capitalisme*, Moscow, 1969, p. 139.) — The same idea is expressed by L.-S. Senghor: 'les prolétaires d'Europe ont bénéficié du régime colonial; partant, ils ne s'y sont jamais réellement, je veux dire efficacement, opposés'. (*Nation et voie africaine du socialisme*, p. 51.) And T. Hopkins in Third World Modernization in Transnational Perspective (*The Annals*, 1969, pp. 126-36) picks up the other angle of this: '...there are strong indications that in most Third World Countries, internal inequality is increasing. The educated are markedly more advantaged; urban workers are relatively well-off; unemployment is high and increasing; rural populations are poor'.

5. Thus, international statistics should not be given only for national aggregates since this conceals the true nature of the relations in the world. It would be much more useful if statistics were given for the four groups defined in our definition. In general we would assume such statistics over time to show that cC and cP grow most quickly and more or less together, then follows pC and at the bottom is pP that is not only located much below the other two, but also shows very little growth or none at all. The more numerous the group, the lower the growth: it is the accumulated work from these vast masses that permits the growth of the dominating minorities. One highly stimulating analysis in this direction is given by Th. E. Weisskopf who tries to disaggregate the growth rates and is led to the conclusion that the growth in the developing countries has taken place in the upper and middle strata of the population, in the secondary sector of economic production, and in the urban areas. The growth rates in these parts of the developing nations are not too different from growth rates in corresponding parts in developed nations, but due to the absence of mechanisms for redistribution this leaves the vast periphery of the developing nations with close to zero or even negative growth. Weisskopf, T. E.: *Underdevelopment, Capitalistic Growth and the Future of the Poor Countries*, World Order Models Project, 1970.

6. This argument is carried much further for the case of interindividual rather than international interaction in Galtung, J.: *Structural Pluralism and the Future of Human Interaction*, paper presented at the Second International Fu-

ture Research Conference, Kyoto, April 1970, and Galtung, J.: *Perspectives on Development: Past, Present and Future*, paper presented at the International Sociological Association Conference, Varna, September 1970.

7. The basic point here is that a demand generates a chain of demands. Economists have made some estimates in this connection. For instance, H. B. Chenery and T. Watanabe conclude, 'In the four industrial countries studied here (United States, Japan, Norway, and Italy), between 40 % and 50 % of total domestic demands for goods and services comes from other productive sectors rather than from final users' (*International Comparisons of the Structure of Production, Econometrica*, 1958, p. 504). The more connected the economy of a country, the more will a demand proliferate. Other social scientists should have tools corresponding to the input-output analyses of the economists in order to study the degree of connectedness of a society. Characteristic of a traditional society is precisely the low level of connectedness: the spread effect into other branches of economic activity and into other districts is much lower. — Also see Stirton-Weaver, F.: *Backwash, Spread and the Chilean State, Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. V. no. 12, and Hirschman, A. O.: *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1958), especially his discussion of backward and forward linkages (pp. 100-119).

8. It is this equality that we stipulate to be in the interest of both parties, both for the exploiter and the exploited. Obviously, there are two approaches: the interaction structure can be changed so that the inter- and intra-actor effects are equal, and/or redistribution can take place. But if this interaction structure has been in operation for a long time and has already generated considerable differences in living conditions then both methods may have to be used, a point to be further elaborated in section 10 below. For highly stimulating discussions of unequal exchange, see Casanova, P. G.: *Sociología de la Explotación* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969); and Arghiri Emmanuel: *L'exchange inégal* (Paris: Maspéro, 1969).

9. What we have in mind here, concretely, is of course all the various forms of development assistance based on the idea that grants are given to poor countries on the condition that they use them to procure capital goods in developed countries. In an excellent article, 'Prospectives for the Third World', S. Sideri summarizes much of the literature showing how well development assistance pays. However, these analyses are by no means complete since only some aspects of the economic spin-off effects are considered, not all the others that may also, incidentally, be con-

vertible into economic effects, at least in the long run.

10. For an analysis of social status systems using feudal interaction as the basic concept, see Galtung, J.: *Feudal Systems, Structural Violence and the Structural Theory of Revolutions, in Proceedings of the IPRA Third General Conference, I* pp. 110-188. Van Gorcum, Assen, 1970.

11. For a penetrating analysis of the relation between dependency and development, see Cardoso, F. H. & Faletto, E.: *Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969). One important difference between that book and the present analysis lies in the warning the authors give against generalization beyond the concrete case. While sympathetic to this, we nevertheless feel there is considerable virtue in general theory, as a baseline for understanding the concrete case.

Another basic analysis of this type of relationship is, of course, Frank, A. G.: *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (N. Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1967). The basic key to Frank's analysis is the structure that 'extends from the macrometropolitan system center of the world capitalist system 'down' to the most supposedly isolated agricultural workers, who, through this chain of interlinked metropolitan-satellite relationships, are tied to the central world metropolis and thereby incorporated into the world capitalist system as a whole' (p. 16), and he goes on (p. 17) to talk about 'the exploitation of the satellite by the metropolis or — the tendency of the metropolis to expropriate and appropriate the economic surplus of the satellite'. All this is valid as general formulas, but too little emphasis is given to the type of exploitation referred to here as 'asymmetric distribution of spin-offs' and the special organization referred to as 'feudal interaction structure'. And economists with no Marxist inclination at all are certainly not helpful when it comes to reflecting imperialistic types of relations. Thus, in Jan Tinbergen, *The Design of Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966), development is discussed throughout the book as if the government in a developing country is free to make its decisions. And in T. Haavelmo, *A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publ. Co., 1954) it is difficult to see that any theory at all based on relations between nations is offered to explain the tremendous disparities in this world; just to mention two examples. And even Myrdal's *Asian Drama* has little to say on international relations, as pointed out by Lars Rudebeck in an excellent review article (*Cooperation and Conflict* 1969, pp. 267-81).

12. One book that gives a fairly balanced account of Soviet dominance patterns is *The New*

Imperialism by Hugh Seton-Watson (N. Y.: Capricorn Books, 1961). Andre Amalrik's analysis *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984* (N. Y.: Harper & Row, 1970) also deserves reading, not so much for its apocalyptic scenario as for its penetrating analysis of the internal dominance system. The question of whether the total Soviet system should be referred to as imperialism remains open, however, among other reasons because the Soviet Union does not enjoy spin-offs from processing of raw materials and because the internal inequality is hardly lower than in dependent countries. But the elite harmonization criterion will probably hold to a large extent mediated through the cooperation between party élites. — Comparative studies of imperialistic structures, in the tradition of Helio Jaguaribe, comparing different types of empires in this century as well as long-time historical comparisons bringing in, for instance, the Roman Empire, would be highly useful to shed more light over this particular international structure. At present this type of exercise is hampered by the tendency to use 'imperialism' as an abusive term, as a category to describe the other camp. We have preferred to see it as a technical term, which does not mean that he who struggles for peace will not have to struggle against imperialism regardless of what shape it takes.

13. For an analysis of international air communication, see Gleditsch, N. P.: *Trends in World Airline Patterns, JPR* 1967, pp. 366-408.

14. For an analysis of the role of the international press agencies, see Østgaard, E.: *Factors Influencing the Flow of News, Journal of Peace Research* 2, pp. 39-63.

15. For an analysis of this, see Galtung J. & Ruge, M. H.: *The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers, Journal of Peace Research* 2, pp. 64-91.

16. For an analysis of this, see Galtung, J.: *After Camelot*, in Horowitz, I.L. (ed.): *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967).

17. As one example, and a very explicit one, may serve the following quotation: ... 'can we discharge our responsibility to God and to man for so magnificent, so populous a proportion of the world? — Our answer is off hand ready and simple. We are adequate. We do discharge our responsibilities. We are a conquering and imperial race. All over the world we have displayed our mettle. We have discovered and annexed and governed vast territories. We have encircled the globe with our commerce. We have penetrated the pagan races with our missionaries. We have inoculated the Universe (sic!) with our institutions. We are apt indeed to believe that our

soldiers are braver, our sailors hardier, our captains, naval and military, skilfuller, our statesmen wiser than those of other nations. As for our constitution, there is no Briton at any hour of the day or night who will suffer it to be said that any approaches it.' From Lord Boscawen; *Questors of Empire 1900, in Miscellanies, Literary and Historical vol. II* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921). I am indebted to Fiona Rudd for this remarkable reference.

18. This is extremely clearly expressed in Report of a US Presidential Mission to the Western Hemisphere (The Rockefeller report):... 'Just as the other American republics depend upon the United States for their capital equipment requirements, so the United States depends on them to provide a vast market for our manufactured goods. And as these countries look to the United States for a market for their primary products whose sale enables them to buy equipment for their development at home, so the United States looks to them for raw materials for our industries, on which depend the jobs of many of our citizens...'. (Quality of Life in the Americas, Agency for International Development, August 1969, pp. 5-113.) — The paragraph is as if taken out of a textbook on imperialism, emphasizing how the Center countries provide capital equipment and manufactured goods, and the Periphery countries raw materials and markets. The only interesting thing about the quotation is that it is still possible to write like this in 1969.

19. One example is the Brezhnev Doctrine: 'Speaking in Warsaw on November 12, 1968 to the V Congress of the Polish United Workers Party Brezhnev emphasized the need for "strict respect" for sovereignty of other socialist countries, and added: "But when internal and external forces that are hostile to Socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards the restoration of a capitalist regime, when socialism in that country and the socialist community as a whole is threatened, it becomes not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all Socialist countries. Naturally an action such as military assistance to a fraternal country designed to avert the threat to the social system is an extraordinary step, dictated by necessity." Such a step, he added, "may be taken only in case of direct actions of the enemies of Socialism within a country and outside it, actions threatening the common interests of the Socialist camp."' (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1968, p. 23027.) Its similarity to the Monroe doctrine has often been pointed out, but there is the difference that the US sometimes seems to be the acting as if they had a Monroe doctrine for the whole world.

Without implying that the following is official

Soviet policy, it has nevertheless appeared in *International Affairs* (April, 1970): 'The socialist countries, united in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, are profoundly aware that the most reliable guarantee that their security will be preserved and strengthened is allround cooperation with the Soviet Union, including military cooperation. They firmly reject any type of anti-Soviet slander and resist attempts by imperialism and the remnants of domestic reaction to inject into the minds of their people any elements of anti-Sovietism, whether open or veiled.

With the two worlds — socialist and capitalist — in global confrontation, any breach of internationalist principles, any sign of nationalism, and especially any toleration, not to say use, of anti-Sovietism in policy turns those who pursues such policies into an instrument of imperialist strategy and policy, regardless of whether their revisionist slogan is given a Right or ultra-Left twist, regardless of the subjective intentions of the advocates and initiators of the course. And whether it is very big or very small, it remains nothing but an instrument in the hands of imperialism and in either case retains its ignominious essence, which is incompatible with truly revolutionary socialist consciousness'. (V. Razmerov: *Loyalty to Proletarian Internationalism — Fundamental Condition for Success of All Revolutionary Forces*). — What this quotation says is in fact that not only hostile deeds, but also all hostile words are to be ruled out. It is also interesting to note that the types of attitudes that are not to be expressed are referred to as 'anti-Soviet'. In other words, the reference is to the Center country in the system, not even to the masses of that country, nor to anti-socialism.

20. In general, international contacts between ministries seem to become increasingly transnational. Where the minister of defense in country A some time ago would have to use a channel of communication involving at least one embassy and one ministry of foreign affairs to reach his opposite number in country B, direct telecommunication would now be the adequate channel. What this means in terms of cutting out filtering effects and red tape is obvious. It also means that trans-national ties may be strengthened and some times be posted against the nation state. Obviously, this system will be expanding, for instance with a system of telesatellites available for elite communication between Center and Periphery countries within a bloc. For the Francophone countries the projected satellite *Symphonie* may, perhaps, be seen as a step in this direction, although it is targeted on audiences rather than on concrete, specific persons. The NATO satellite communication system is another example.

21. Very important in this connection is, of

course, the quick development of the telephone concept from essentially bilateral (one person talks with one other person, possibly with some others listening in at either end, or in the middle!) towards the telephone as a multilateral means of communication. Bell Telephone Company can now organize conferences over the telephone by connecting a number of subscribers. Obviously, if combined with a video-screen the conversation may be more orderly because participants may also react on non-verbal, visual cues such as facial expressions, etc. More particularly, they may raise a finger and ask for the 'floor'.

22. The battle between the two types of imperialism is perhaps more important in the imagination of those who try to uphold one of the types than in social reality. Thus, what happened in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was interpreted by those who are upholding a pattern of economic imperialism as an attempt by 'the other bloc' to establish political imperialism; just as the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were interpreted by the servants of political military imperialism as an effort by 'the other bloc' to introduce economic imperialism. Whatever history's judgement may be in terms of these two hypotheses it is obvious that two types of imperialism, directed from antagonistic blocs, cannot at the same time be in the same phase. One pattern would be that the dominant type is in phase 3 and the competitive type is in phase 1 — and that is what was claimed by the Center countries in the two cases.

23. The best analysis we have read of division of labor in multinational corporations is by Stephen Hymers. (The Multi-national Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development — to appear in Bhagwati, J. N. (ed.): *Economics and World Order* (N. Y.: World Law Fund, 1970).)

24. This is not a random event: international organizations are in that phase because they reflect the relationships between national actors, that in the present stage of development are the major carriers of these relations.

25. Thus, when Stalin died in 1953 there must have been great expectation in China that Mao Tsetung would be the next head of the international Communist movement. His revolution was more recent, the country in which the revolution had taken place was by far the biggest, and he was also older as a revolutionary fighter in a leading position than possible competitors. Nevertheless, it was quite clear that the Soviet conception was that the leader of the international Communist movement would have to be the leader of what they interpreted as the leading Communist nation: the Soviet Union herself.

26. This is a major difference between liberal and structuralist peace theory. It is hardly unfair to interpret liberal peace theory as somehow

stating that 'peace' is roughly proportionate to the volume of trade, possibly interpreted as an indicator of the level of interdependence, whereas structural peace theory would bring in the factor of equality and ask for the composition as well as the volume of trade. If structural theory is more correct and if the present world trade structure is such that only the Center nations can enjoy both high level of interdependence and high level in equality in exchange, then 'peace' is one extra benefit that will accrue to the Center layer of the world.

27. Another concept would be the frequently quoted saying that 'technical assistance is taken from the poor man in the rich country and given to the rich man in the poor country'. The model of the world implied by the dominance theory would certainly not contradict this quite elegant statement: technical assistance is to a large extent paid for by tax-payers' money, not to mention by the surplus produced by the masses working in the rich countries, and given via public channels for investment in infrastructures in poor countries, often for the benefit of the layers in the poor countries that have a consumption structure compatible with a production structure that the rich countries can offer.

28. Galtung, J.: *International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach, Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology* (International Sociological Association, 1966), pp. 121-61.

29. E.g. Magdoff, H.: *The Age of Imperialism*, (N. Y.: Monthly Review, 1969).

30. Research on this is currently in progress at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

31. But it is still an open question whether this should really be referred to as imperialism, since so many of the criteria do not seem to be fulfilled. Once more this seems to bring up the importance of seeing imperialism as a special case of a wider set of social relationships, conveniently lumped together under the heading 'domination'.

32. Relations between Soviet Union and the Arab World and Japan and Southeast Asia are being explored at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo by Tormod Nyberg and Johan Galtung respectively.

33. This type of structural reasoning seems particularly important in the Soviet case. It can hardly be claimed that the Soviet periphery participates more in the decision-making made by the Soviet center than the Czech periphery participated in the decision-making made by the Czech center in the months prior to the invasion in August 1968. On the contrary, the opposite hypothesis seems more tenable. And if this is the case the Soviet center could no longer necessarily count on the allegiance of its own periphery, par-

ticularly not on the Ukrainian periphery, bordering Czechoslovakia not only geographically, but also linguistically and culturally (and apparently listening attentively to broadcasts). This means that what happened in Czechoslovakia became a threat to the Soviet center, perhaps more than to the Soviet Union as a Center nation.

34. See Appendix for data for 60 nations on these seven variables (but missing for most of the nations for Gini i, and for many of the nations for Gini 1). The trade composition index was developed by Knut Hongrø after some suggestions by the present author. It may, however, well be that

the index $\frac{(a + d) - (b + c)}{(a + d) + (b + c)}$ would be bet-

ter, since values of trade are usually added, not multiplied, and since this would attain the value 1 not when b or c equals 0, but when b and c equals 0. (Galtung, J.: Vertical and Horizontal Trade Relation: A Note on Operationalization, WOMP 1970).

36. References are given in the Appendix.

37. In this connection it should be pointed out that the theory of imperialism would not be disconfirmed if these correlation coefficients had been much lower. It is only the theory as a model for the concrete empirical world here and now that would have been disconfirmed, not imperialism as one factor in systems of collectivities, and particularly as a factor that together with other factors may rise to the constellation known in the present world. What Table VIII seems to indicate is that the theory of imperialism as presented here is not a bad map for orientation in the contemporary world.

38. For one exposition of the center-periphery theory for individuals see Galtung, J. 1964: Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position, *Journal of Peace Research* 1, pp. 206-31.

39. This, of course, would also be true inter-individually: division of labor may be organized in such a way that it is personality expanding for some actors and personality contracting for others so that they 'sort' themselves away from each other by participating in this type of vertical interaction.

40. See the article by Stephen Hymer referred to in footnote 23 above.

41. We are thinking particularly of the Pakistan consortium and the India consortium.

42. Thus, center-periphery theory in connection with nonterritorial actors should perhaps not be stated so much in terms of size or age of organizations, as in terms of whether they are able to establish bridgeheads in other non-territorial actors, and whether they are able to organize systematically some vertical type of division of labor. Thus, the system of 'consultative status'

clearly indicates who is to decide and who to be consulted.

43. It should be pointed out that no strategy seems to exist for reducing the gap. There is not even any strategy for reducing the increase of the gap, the only strategy that perhaps may be said to exist is a strategy for improving the level of poor nations. A strategy for reducing the gap does not necessarily imply a basic change of the structure of the relations between rich and poor nations, however. It might also come about by reducing significantly the growth in the rich nations.

44. New statesmen seem to have put this point more strongly than Julius Nyerere in the famous Arusha Declaration: 'If every individual is self-reliant the ten-house cell will be self-reliant; if all the cells are self-reliant the whole ward will be self-reliant; and if the wards are self-reliant, the District will be self-reliant. If the Districts are self-reliant, then the Region is self-reliant, and if the Regions are self-reliant, then the whole Nation is self-reliant and this is our aim.' — In this there is of course also an implicit theory: self-reliance has to be built from the very bottom, it can only be basically a property of the individual, not of the nation. — And Kenneth Kaunda has this to add (*Humanism in Zambia*, Lusaka, 1968), 'We all know that a man who has developed a genuine sense of self-reliance will not in any way wish to exploit his fellow men' (p. 50).

45. In the present phase of imperialism, cP would use their good contacts with cC through international organizations to get resettled in the Center. This seems to work for businessmen in the capitalist world as well as for high-ranking party officials in the communist world. For the latter, 'reasons of health' are often invoked.

SUMMARY

Imperialism is defined as a special type of dominance of one collectivity, usually a nation, over another. Basic is how the center in the imperialist nation establishes a bridgehead in the center of the dominated nation by tying the two centers together by means of harmony of interest. In the stronger form of imperialism this system is protected by keeping the two peripheries apart, usually by having less inequality in the dominating than in the dominated nation.

Two mechanisms of imperialism are then defined. One is the pattern of vertical interaction whereby the dominating nation enriches itself more as a result of the interaction process than the dominated nation. Particularly important in contemporary imperialism in its neo-colonialist forms is the idea of spin-off effects in the developed nations when they exchange manufactured goods for raw materials from the underdeveloped

nations. The second mechanism is the feudal interaction structure whereby the dominated nations in the periphery are kept apart, with little communication and trade among themselves.

Five *types of imperialism* are then explored: Economic, political military, communication and cultural imperialism, with emphasis on the possible spill-over effect from one form to the other. Several ways in which different types of imperialism may reinforce each other are discussed.

Three *phases of imperialism* are discussed: the colonialist phase where the two centers belong to the same nation (the period of white settlers), the present neo-colonialist phase where they are tied together by means of international organizations and the neo-neo-colonialist phase for the future where the ties are established by means of rapid communication.

The theory of imperialism is then tested empirically in terms of some of its consequences, and found a good model of the present world. Particularly important in that connection is the pattern of vertical trade, as measured by the trade composition index. Some generalizations of the theory are then suggested, as well as a number of strategies for the struggle against imperialism.

КРАТКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

В этой статье представлены три модели двустороннего конфликта, которые объясняют каким образом и почему гандийский принцип ненасильственного сопротивления («сатьяграха») может осуществляться по утилитарному смыслу. Автор доказывает, что повидимому бессмысленный аскетизм, «неразумность» и абсолютизм могут вести сатьяграхи к оптимальным утилитарным результатам — потому что такое поведение делает вероятные угрозы и обязательства возможными. Некоторые социальные и психологические аспекты удачного пассивного сопротивления объясняются с точки зрения этих моделей. В заключение автор подвергает и обсуждает в свете этих моделей четыре важные противоречия в употреблении тактики сатьяграхи.

Следовательно два *механизма* империализма объяснены. Первый модель отличается вертикальным взаимодействием, посредством чего доминирующий народ результатом процесса взаимодействия обогащает более чем подчинённый народ. Очень важным в современном империализме в его нео-колониальных формах является понятие штопорных эффектов в более развитых государствах, которые реализуют обмен фабричных товаров на сырьё материалы из слаборазвитых стран. Второй механизм — это структура феодального взаимодействия, посредством чего подчинённые народы в периферии держатся в стороне, органичная связь и торговлю между ними.

Затем пять *типов* империализма исследуется: экономический, политический, военный, коммуникационный и культурный империализм, особенно подчёркивая возможный эффект «переливания» из одной формы в другую. Разные способы посредством которых различные типы империализма могут укреплять друг друга рассмотрено.

Три *фазы* империализма обсуждается: колониальный период, когда эти два центра принадлежат тот же самой нации (время белых колонистов), настоящий нео-колониальный период, когда оба центра связываясь друг с другом посредством международных организаций и нео-нео-колониальный период в будущем, когда узлы устанавливаются рядом быстрой коммуникации.

Теорию империализма автор подвергает эмпирическому испытанию с точки зрения некоторых последствий из неё — и решает, что она — полезным образцом настоящего мира. Очень важным в связи с тем является модель вертикальной торговли, измеряемой индексом торгового сложения.

Итак автор предлагает несколько обобщений теории, а также различные стратегии борьбы против империализму.